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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims at investigating the financial stability of China‘s banking system. 
Since the banking system is one of the most important financial intermediaries in the 
financial systems, the financial soundness of banks could secure the stability of the 
whole financial system. Two of the factors that may significantly increase imbalance 
of the banking system, and hence affect financial stability of an economy is the 
accumulated non-performing loans of banks and the macro-economic turbulences. 
This fact raises the questions of how macroeconomic condition, as a determinant of 
systemic distress, can be assessed more comprehensively and consistently, and what 
the implications are for modelling it within an integrated credit risk framework. The 
aim of this thesis is addressing these issues. 
We develop a framework for macro stress-testing of China‘s banking system. Our 
estimates of the correlations between banks‘ stability indicators and macroeconomic 
factors establish significant relationships between the non-performing loan ratio and 
key macro-economic variables, such as GDP growth, the retail price index, the 
unemployment rate, total fixed investment, the money supply, interest rates and 
exchange rates. Further, results from the macro stress tests show that robustness, or 
otherwise, of the banking system is highly dependent on the source of the potential 
risk. Our value-at-risk tests suggest that (at a 99% confidence level) the Chinese 
banking system is robust with respect to interest rate shocks. However, GDP growth 
and exchange rate shocks exhibit a profound negative effect, indicating that 
significant losses become likely.  
We also examine the determinants of non-performing loan ratio for regional 
China‘s banking system, using data from 2002 to 2011 for 31 regions in China. Our 
estimations suggest that the non-performing loan ratio worsens with decreasing 
economic growth, shrinking export and property market depression. Further, with the 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
ii 
 
help of a probit model, we identify the leading indicators of banking distress and 
estimate the banking distress probability for regional China. Moreover, this study 
provides an overview of banking system stability in the geographical distribution of 
these indicators.  The findings show there are significant relationships between the 
regional banking distress indicator and key macroeconomic variables, such as GDP 
growth, the consumer price index, the unemployment rate, and house price. Based on 
the findings, we designed an early-warning system to monitor banking stability of 
regional China.  
These results should prove informative for policymakers and regulators alike, 
regarding awareness of loss-limitation in China‘s banking system, the banking distress 
signals and macro-prudential perspectives to monitor the potential risk exposure of the 
banking system in China‘s regions. 
 
 
Key words: financial stability; stress-testing; VAR model; non-performing loan; early 
warning system. 
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1.         CHAPTER 1                                                                          
Introduction 
 
1. 1. Background 
There is no doubt that macro-economic stability is closely correlated with financial 
stability. Both economic theory and empirical practice from the financial crises in the 
last three decades clearly indicate that the volatility of the macro-economy is strongly 
associated with instability in the financial system. Such instability of financial system, 
which is always followed by crisis, can affect the economy through decreasing 
economic growth and increasing unemployment. Financial instability that originates 
from the outstanding debt of an economy has an adverse influence on the macro-
economy through weakening the capabilities of the economy (Bean, 2004). Therefore, 
financial stability is increasingly proving to be a crucial factor in the health of the 
macro-economy. 
The considerable costs of banking distress are well documented by an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey of 53 industrial and developing countries 
in 1998. In this survey, 54 banking crises were documented between 1975 and 1997, 
which were always accompanied by downturns of macro-economic performance 
(Table 1.1).  
The costs of reviving a failure in the banking sector after a crisis could be as large 
as half of a country‘s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank, 2000). For 
instance, Laeven and Valencia (2011) use European Union (EU) data to illustrate that 
the output losses of previous banking crises in 2008 accounted for around 20–25% of 
GDP. Moreover, credit tightening following a banking crisis would affect the potential 
recovery of the crisis country. Therefore, the recent global financial crisis, 
underscored by numerous research initiatives and developments in policy, has 
highlighted the importance of understanding sources of vulnerability which may bring 
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about banking distress.  
Table 1.1: Costs of Crises in Lost Output Relative to Trend 1975-1997 
 Number 
of crises 
Average 
recovery 
time(years) 
Cumulative loss 
of output per 
crisis (%) 
Crisis with 
output 
losses (%) 
Cumulative loss of 
output per crisis with 
output loss (%) 
 
Currency 
crises  
158 1.6 4.3 61 7.1 
 
Industrial   42 1.9 3.1 55 5.6 
Emerging 
market   
116 1.5 4.8 64 7.6 
Currency 
crashes  
55 2.0 7.1 71 10.1 
Industrial    13 2.1 5.0 62 8.0 
Emerging 
market   
42 1.9 7.9 74 10.7 
Banking 
crises  
54 3.1 11.6 82 14.2 
Industrial   12 4.1 10.2 67 15.0 
Emerging 
market   
42 2.8 12.1 86 14.0 
Currency & 
Banking 
crises 
32 3.2 14.4 78 18.5 
Industrial    6 5.8 17.6 100 17.6 
Emerging 
market    
26 2.6 13.6 73 18.8 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: May 1998 
 
The relationship between macro-economic performance and banking stability, 
however, does not necessarily imply causation, because of the difficulties in 
identification of the direction of causation. Hence, it is crucial to identify the direction 
of causation, so that the supervisors and policymakers could adopt and implement the 
most appropriate public policies to strengthen financial stability.  
There is an increasing trend in the economy of pressure to monitor financial 
stability within banks and other financial institutions along with the highly complex 
and globalised financial activities, the more sophisticated financial products, and the 
more comprehensive financial system. Financial crises in the past 30 years have 
brought a series of issues into the spotlight. Two of them are covered in this thesis – 
macro stress-testing and early warning system (EWS) –which fulfill the growing need 
for preventive risk management policy. The studying of financial stability and bank 
distress is an important issue. First of all, it would improve supervisors‘ and regulators‘ 
ability to forecast and manage underlying risks, which would enable them to manage, 
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coordinate and supervise more efficiently. Second, it would enable supervisors to 
efficiently distinguish between sound and unstable banking systems, and thus take the 
appropriate actions in a timely fashion in the case of problematic institutions. Third, it 
might save the fiscal cost of bail-out for a banking sector that may be suffering from 
adverse shocks. Fourth, the crisis in the banking sector may generate other crises and 
extend through other sectors, which might cause damage to the economy as a 
consequence.  
While the form of crises may vary over time, the essence of a crisis remains the 
same, such as the cycle of affluent liquidity, fast credit growth, low-inflation 
environment, and asset-price bubble. The most recent global financial turmoil started 
in the mid-2000s while the United States (US) economy fell into an unbalanced 
macroeconomic position. Increasing defaults of sub-prime mortgage by 2007 resulted 
in an unstable domestic market, fiscal contagion dispersed all over the world, and 
global economic recession. Even worse, the recovery has been slow and turbulent, and 
many countries are still struggling in the aftermath of the crisis. The outbreak of the 
global financial crisis in 2008 has not only undermined financial institutions, but also 
brought in criticism to long-held beliefs and theories on risk regulation of the financial 
system, with renewed emphasis on macro-prudential supervision and reforming 
micro-prudential regulation. 
In the case of China, although the country avoided the impact of the East Asian 
crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 and has maintain a steady 
growth, severe structural problems remain, notably the banking systems' credit 
exposure of potential downturn of the macro-economy, the increasing concern about 
the real-estate bubble, and the threat from the shadow banking system. During the 
East Asian crisis, the non-performing loans (NPLs
1
) of the banking system 
skyrocketed to unprecedented levels: NPLs accounted for approximately 30% of GDP 
                                                             
1
NPLs are loans which are classified as being in default or very likely to be in default. Generally, it refers 
to the loans that are more than three months overdue. 
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for Korea and Malaysia, and about 60% of GDP for Thailand (IMF, 1998). Heavy 
dependency on bank-based financial systems together with the high debt-equity ratios 
of corporations has exacerbated the economic distress in East Asian countries. This is 
a valuable lesson for China, as the financial system in China is also a bank-centred 
system and NPLs used to retain it at a high level because of the large share of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).  Without in-depth financial reform, it is impossible to 
realise the goal of sustainable growth in a reasonable time with acceptable fiscal costs. 
Furthermore, the economies are likely to remain vulnerable to new external and 
internal shocks. To mitigate this, comprehensive risk management framework, 
adequate safety nets and appropriate policies are the prerequisites for stable and 
sustainable growth. It is also necessary for financial reform policies to involve two 
principal considerations: the first one is to minimise the likelihood of system distress 
with acceptable fiscal costs; and the second one is to maintain a healthy environment 
which is able to allocate asset effectively. This again highlights the necessity of 
enhancing financial stability, particularly for the banking sector, because systemic 
distress and considerable fiscal cost is usually caused by an unhealthy banking system. 
On the contrary, a healthy banking system is able to ensure the prudent credit support 
for businesses and households to maintain the growth of the real economy. For 
banking sector, due to that credit-related losses are often contributed by borrowers‘ 
failure to meet contractual loan obligations are the major risk source with potential to 
impair stability. Therefore, from a macro-prudential perspective, the modeling and 
projection of credit risk is a key element in the overall analytical framework used for 
conducting a forward-looking assessment. 
The apparent economic problems in China have become an urgent cause for 
concern. The fast speed of growth is gradually slowing down, as comparative weaker 
consumer demand is unable to replace the export of labour-intensive production to 
become the new engine of growth. Extensive infrastructure projects and fiscal 
expansion seem no longer the panacea for growth due to the limitation of the 
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government's resources. Consumer prices have shown a steady decline, particularly in 
the case of real-estate prices (source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistic 
Yearbook). Meanwhile, the banking industry in China plays an important role in the 
development of both the economy as a whole and financial system. Since late 1990s, 
reforms have been carried out by government to create a competitive environment in 
the banking sector. Thus, increase in competition also result in greater risk-taking 
behavior of banks to chase profit. The vulnerability of the banking sector, which is 
mainly contributed to by the poor performance of state-owned enterprises, has grown 
more evident. In China, the priority is to advance financial reforms to prevent a 
further buildup of risks, foster a more efficient allocation of investment, and 
strengthen the management, transparency, and governance framework of local 
government finances. Key steps include deposit rate liberalization, strengthening 
regulation and supervision (including of shadow banks), and resolving the moral 
hazard problem rooted in the perception of widespread implicit guarantees with the 
introduction of deposit insurance and a formal resolution mechanism for failing 
institutions. 
Based on the above overview, this thesis addresses factors that contribute to the 
securing of financial stability, particularly the banking system stability, in the 
economy. A better understanding of the resilience of a banking system to adverse 
macroeconomic shocks is of crucial importance for the proper evaluation of systemic 
risk and has a direct connection with the development of regulatory and prudential 
tools. Although financial stability plays a key role in the economy, there is currently 
no unique definition for financial stability. Some definitions emphasise the importance 
of outstanding debt on financial stability, because that outstanding debt would lead to 
a decrease of accessibility to money (Allen and Wood, 2006). This definition is also 
supported by Schwartz (1987), who suggests that the expectation on weakening 
accessibility to money would exacerbate financial crisis further through imposing 
financial pressure on the economic agents. Another strand of researcher focuses on the 
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importance of major financial institutions in financial stability. Researchers such as 
Crockett (1996) and Aspachs et al. (2007) argue that financial instability arises from 
both high probability of defaults (PDs) and low profitability of key financial 
institutions. Hence, outstanding loan, also known as non-performing loan, is chosen as 
a proxy to measure the stability of a banking system under economic imbalance. For a 
bank, which is one of the key financial institutions, the soundness arises from high 
returns on assets and equity capital and low returns volatility (De Nicolo, 2000). 
Hence, increase of distance-to-default of the bank would significantly secure financial 
stability. Thus, in this thesis, the level of financial stability is measured by non-
performing loans of borrowers and financial soundness of banks.  
 
1.2. Research Questions 
Based on this background, the purpose of this study is to provide an integrated credit 
risk framework for estimating the determinants and indicators of the banking system‘s 
vulnerability in China. Regarding the theoretical precedent, the main research 
questions are 
Q1. What elements of macroeconomic performance contribute to credit risk of 
the banking sector and how could these elements be integrated into a systematic 
stability framework? 
Q2. In the light of relationship between the banking system‘s stability and macro-
economic performance, does the banking system maintain enough resilience when 
confronting specific shocks?  
Q3. How does an early warning system provide information for both banks and 
supervisory authorities about potential distress? 
To answer the above questions, we develop the framework of an integrated credit 
risk model for assessing the stability of China‘s banking system. With the outcomes of 
this model, we apply the macro stress-testing to capture the robustness of the banking 
system in a situation of artificial shocks, and design an EWS to explore signals in 
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advance of shock occurrence. To achieve these research objectives, attention need to 
be paid to a number of issues from a conceptual perspective. To ensure the 
comprehensiveness of this framework, key risk factors from a wide range of classes, 
and from both within or outside the financial system must be involved. The 
framework should be adjustable so that scenario analysis can be applied. Moreover, 
the framework should be forward-looking; this is important to carry out stress-testing 
and the application of an EWS. Hence, when an upcoming shock is identified at an 
early stage, it would be beneficial for supervisors to take timely actions to prevent the 
crisis or mitigate the losses.  
Generally, this thesis makes several contributions to the literature on the 
relationship between bank stability of Chinese banking and macro-economic 
performance and. First, this study includes the latest banking data from 2000 to 2012, 
which is the period of last round of banking reform in China that introduce the idea to 
macro-prudential management into risk management of banking system and relates to 
the recent crisis. Second, this study contributes to the existing literature by using 
various risk indicators including the non-perform loan ratio and the probability of 
occurrence of banking distress. Further, with regards to the econometric modeling 
framework, we use the VAR approach, which measures the feedback effect within 
macro stress-testing. Finally, the results of this study may provide some information 
for policymakers and supervisory authorities on how to monitor and deal with the 
potential reverse shocks, and hence enhance the soundness of the banking system in 
China. This study fills the gap of empirical study on both macro stress-testing practice 
and early warning system based on relationship between macro-economic 
performance and stability of banking system in China.  
 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of 
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financial stability, as well as risk management for the banking sector in general, and 
China‘s banking system in particular. The methodology of the empirical study is 
discussed in Chapter 3. The discussion includes several topics such as the rationale of 
the methods and application of secondary data. Chapter 4 investigates financial 
stability through analysing the soundness of the banking system in China with macro 
stress-testing. In this chapter we develop a framework for macro stress-testing of 
China‘s banking system. Our estimates of the correlations between banks‘ stability 
indicators and macroeconomic factors establish significant relationships between the 
non-performing loan ratio and key macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth, 
the retail price index (RPI), the unemployment rate, total fixed investment, the money 
supply, interest rates and exchange rates. This chapter also provides the results of a 
simulation of loan default rates of the banking system in China. We then examine the 
determinants of the non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) for regional China‘s banking 
system in Chapter 5. Further, we use a probit model to identify the leading indicators 
of banking distress and to estimate the banking distress probability for regional China. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the thesis. 
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2. CHAPTER 2                                                                     
Literature Review and Background 
 
The author has undertaken an in-depth review of a large body of literatures on 
financial stability and risk management in the banking sector. Furthermore, 
significance of stress-testing for banks is discussed in detail in the chapter, and the 
history and characteristics of China‘s banking system are provided. The review that 
follows addresses the following.  
• How can the banking sector identify and assess its underlying credit risk based 
on historical data? 
• Is it possible to use stress-testing and the early warning system as standardised 
approaches based on the Basel Accord, to enhance financial stability? 
 
2.1. Financial Stability 
In this thesis I reflect on issues relating to stress-testing of the banking system in 
China, starting with the definition of ‗financial stability‘. In order to maintain a 
concrete basis for resources allocation through time, the most important target for an 
effective market economy is to ensure both monetary and financial stability. The 
absence of stability may lead to resource misallocation and may subsequently impede 
willingness to save and invest. In real terms, an unhealthy financial condition of the 
economic entities (for example, households and firms) would be likely to cause 
financial instability, which might even exacerbate the situation to become financial 
crisis.  Bean (2004) in fact argues that the impact of financial instability could spread 
to the real sector of the economy as well. 
For financial regulators like the central banks, the inherent functions of 
stabilising the price and setting out macro monetary policy offer a natural basis for the 
internal procedures for making forecasts and intermediate assessments. In other words, 
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monetary stability indicates a generally stable level of prices, which can be measured 
by inflation or deflation. In order to achieve a satisfactory inflation level, the central 
bank should set a clear ‗bottom-line‘ and then design a structural analytic framework 
for the related factors. Unlike the crystal clear state of the inflation target, things are 
much more complex when central banks are assigned with the new responsibility of 
financial stability (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: Stress-Testing and Centre Bank 
Element Price Stability Financial Stability 
General definition Clear A range of definitions 
Operational definition Clear (variable and target) Typically not specified 
Scope of centre banks‘ responsibility Full responsibility Partial/shared responsibility 
Research Well developed Developing 
 
To begin with, what is the generally accepted definition of financial stability? In the 
first place, classical economics focuses most of its attention on the equilibrium among 
markets but not on the factor, or factors, which can lead to disequilibrium. For 
instance, Minsky (1977, 1982) believes that periodic financial turmoil is the extreme 
case of aberrant behaviour of the market. In the 1990s, due to the integration of 
financial markets all over the world, an increasing body of literature emerged to 
explain the phenomenon of financial instability. Crockett (1996) carried out a survey 
focusing on financial stability. Although he provided a simple definition for financial 
stability which refers to the smooth-functioning financial system, this survey actually 
focused on the absence of financial instability as the achievement of financial stability. 
In this survey, financial instability was defined as when the fluctuations in the price of 
financial assets undermine the economic performance, or the financial intermediaries 
fail to meet their contractual obligations. Houben et al. (2004) suggested that, due to 
the fact that the study of financial stability was still in its early stages, there was, as 
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yet, no widely accepted definition or analytical framework for assessing financial 
stability. Compared to the inflation target, which is able to select inflation rate or price 
index as the target variable, it is difficult to find a single target variable for accessing 
financial stability, particularly when the major issue of financial stability focuses on 
the banking system. This is because the banking industry is undergoing its integration 
process of global finance cooperation and has already engaged in increasingly 
complex and diverse international financial activities. Due to these reasons, the 
interactions and imbalances between the banking sector and other financial sectors, 
domestic country and international markets, would all have impacts on financial 
stability even if the banking sector remains robust. However, monetary stability and 
financial stability are interdependent; stability in one of them ensures the stability in 
the other. 
The difficulties in identifying financial stability can be reflected in several 
aspects: 
(1) Financial stability is a relatively ambiguous concept at the current time. On 
one hand, it is partly because it covers the different finance subjects such as financial 
institutions (bank, security company, and insurance company), and markets (money 
market and capital market). On the other hand, it is partly because it covers the 
different participants like government, private participant, and public participant. In 
addition, there are also other related issues that need to be considered including the 
legal system and financial regulation. Accordingly, Truman (2003) suggests that the 
financial system which encompasses both the monetary system and financial activities 
assessed from a systematic perspective. Owing to the comprehensive relationships that 
exist between those financial stability components, if any individual part has a 
problem, it would probably undermine overall financial stability.  
(2) Financial stability requires that the financial system is not only able to 
minimise the probability of financial crises, but is also able to absorb and deal with 
the shocks in the early stages by itself.  
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(3) Financial stability implies the absence of contagion and the high likelihood of 
systemic effects. In other words, a single disturbance at individual financial 
institutions would not be possible against a backdrop of overall financial stability.  
(4) Financial stability does not require that every single part of the financial 
system operates at peak performance all the time. This is because uncertainty is a 
natural characteristic of financial activities and the financial system encompasses 
many interlinked components such as infrastructure, institutions, and markets. Thus it 
is reasonable that the financial system operates stably at one point in time and might 
be less stable at some other time. 
 
2.1.1. Definition of financial stability 
As we discussed above, defining the price stability is a comparatively easy task in that 
the concept maintains a set of target variables for measurement. In contrast, there is no 
existing set of target variables for accessing the financial stability. Accordingly, we 
can only identify the absence of financial instability as financial stability. This point 
was first supported by Davis (2001) in an internet discussion. According to his 
proposal, financial stability is the absence of an adverse impact on the real economy. 
Nevertheless, there are several aspects of this definition that merit comment. Given 
that financial instability is the ex ante risk for potential disruption, it is not the same as 
crisis which has already led to actual damage. Early literature usually regards the 
cyclical excess as the reason for financial instability (Kindleberger, 1978). Economists 
and scholars believe that the rises in financial assets prices encourage speculators to 
finance additional purchases on margin, because of the motivation of greed. Hence, 
when these assets are significantly overvalued, the prices may suddenly drop which 
results in damage to the financial system. At the same time, Schwartz (1987) observed 
the phenomenon of financial instability from the viewpoint monetary policy and 
argued that a mistake in monetary policy generates financial distress, particularly 
disruption of money supply. Both of these viewpoints can explain the instability to a 
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certain extent. However, these opinions either are challenged by micro-economic 
behaviour theory, or they overlook the nonmonetary causes. Afterwards, the 
development of game theory introduced a new perspective for explaining the kind of 
agent behaviour that would produce instability in a financial system (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1992). In recent years, there are two main strands to the definition of financial 
stability. Some researchers define financial stability in terms of robustness of the 
financial system to external shocks (Allen and Wood, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa, 2003), 
while others define financial stability in terms of the vulnerability of financial system 
to shocks originating within the financial system (Borio and Drehman, 2009; Schinasi, 
2005). 
 
2.1.2. Determinants of financial system stability 
The study of financial fragility can be traced back to 1933 when Fisher first suggested 
that macroeconomic fundamentals, particularly debt liquidation, have a close 
relationship with financial fragility. When indebtedness of an economic entity goes 
beyond the equilibrium position, the attempt to liquidate debt would trigger increases 
in bankruptcies and unemployment and decreases in output and market confidence.  
From the perspective of a theoretical study, business cycle models offer a good 
background for modelling NPL because these models emphasise the counter-
cyclicality of credit risk (Williamson, 1987). Later, the financial accelerator theory 
became the most prominent theoretical framework for thinking about linkages 
between macro-economic performance and financial system (Bernanke and Gilchrist, 
1999). These theories explain the cyclical nature of bank credit, NPL, and loan loss 
provisions. In the period of upturns, NPL ratios tend to be low. Meanwhile, optimism 
about the macro-economic outlook may persuade banks to loosen their lending 
standards, thus leading to a strong credit growth. These actions would sow the seeds 
of borrowers‘ and lenders‘ financial distress along with the profit growth. However, in 
the period of downturns, the over-expanding of credit would lead to rocketing NPL 
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ratios, coupled with the decline in the value of collaterals. Consequently, this leads to 
a tightening of credit extension, with adverse impacts on domestic demand. 
These theories, however, are not in the position to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the determinants of NPL, which are actually both institutional and 
macro-economic. The institutional indicators are linked to financial regulation and 
supervision. The differences of financial regulation and supervision among countries, 
which have direct impact on banks‘ behaviour and risk management practices, are 
better at explaining cross-country differences in NPL. The macro-economic 
performance affects banks‘ balance sheets and their debt-servicing capacity. The set 
of macroeconomic variables used varies across previous studies, but there are some 
broad macroeconomic indicators, like GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation that 
are generally included in the majority of the literature as the determinants of NPL.  
The structure of the financial system is also recognised as a major factor of 
financial stability by a series of studies (Allen and Gale, 2004; Ibrahim, 2006). 
According to Ruiz-Porras (2009), a financial system could be a market-based system 
(financial markets play a key role in the financial system) or a bank-based system (the 
bank sector is the centre of the payment system). Ruiz-Porras (2009) uses the fixed-
effect panel data to examine the relationship between financial structure and financial 
instability, and the financial determinant of financial instability. His findings suggest 
that the market-based financial system is more likely to improve financial stability. 
The first study about the relationship between financial structure and financial 
stability was carried out by Allen in 2001. Based on a theory of crisis, Allen (2001) 
describes the effects of the structure of the financial system, which might cause 
financial instability, and provides several possible solutions for preventing instability. 
Levine (2002) designs a ratio of the stock market activity (or size) to banking system 
loans to distinguish a market-based financial system from a bank-based financial 
system. Therefore, for this thesis, we choose stability of the banking sector to measure 
the financial system stability in that China‘s financial system is obviously a bank-
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oriented one with an immature financial market. The banking sector is the centre of 
the whole financial system, not only in China, but also in other developing countries.  
Consequently, the indicators, which are able to imply the condition of bank‘s asset 
quality and solvency capability, are important to assess the stability of a financial 
system (De Nicolo, 2000; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). Among these studies, Z-score 
is widely used to measure the financial soundness of banks; thus financial stability is 
defined as the distance-to-default for banks (e.g. Aspachs et al., 2007; Goodhart et al., 
2006). Following this idea, improvement of profitability and asset quality could 
reinforce the soundness of a financial system. Moreover, Luintel et al. (2008) argue 
that the structure of the financial system could even have an influence on the macro 
economy. 
Financial structure has also been an important aspect related to the study of 
economic performance. Luintel et al. (2008) used data of 14 developing countries 
over the period of 1978 to 2005 and, with country-by-country time-series analysis, 
revealed that financial structure significantly explains output levels in most countries. 
Beck and Levine (2004) also argued that stock market and bank development have a 
significant effect on economic growth. 
The introduction of the VAR approach into empirical literature, when exploring 
the linkages between NPL and macroeconomic performance, has highlighted the 
feedback effect. In the study of the cyclical behaviour of default rates in Italian banks, 
the result suggests that default rates decrease during macroeconomic upturns and 
increase during macroeconomic downturns (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008). 
Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) also point out that there is a feedback effect from 
the banking sector to the macro-economy through the bank capital channel.  
 
2.1.3. Macro-prudential perspective 
For policymakers, the financial crisis in 2008 has raised the requirements to expand 
the regulation boundary from a purely micro-based approach to macro-prudential 
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policy tools which enable the regulators and supervisors monitor the supply of credit 
more directly (Turner, 2010). According to the Deputy General Manager of the BIS, 
Herve Hannoun (2010), adding a macro-prudential approach can enhance the stability 
of a financial system both over time and at each time point. The origin of the idea of 
macro-prudential policy can be traced back to the mid-1980s, when Cross et al. (1986) 
firstly proposed that the macro-prudential perspective denotes a systemic or system-
wide orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks and their link to the macro 
economy. However, the more precise definition did not emerge until the beginning of 
the twenty first century in order to derive specific implications for the architecture of 
prudential arrangements (Borio, 2009). Since then, the usage of the idea of macro-
prudential perspective has gradually become more popular in the discourse on 
financial regulation. Subsequently, the term has gained further ground because of the 
financial crisis (BIS, 2008). As a consequence, the past two decades has seen an 
obvious increase in research on macro-prudential policy. Literally speaking, macro-
prudential policy is the policy aiming at financial stability. However, given that there 
is no commonly shared definition of financial stability within the literature, in terms 
of the specific goals of macro-prudential policy, the Bank of England (2009) stated 
that the general view of macro-prudential policy aims at ensuring provision of 
financial intermediation services such as credit intermediation, payment services and 
insurance, thus preventing the volatile fluctuation of the credit and liquidity supply. In 
addition, Landau (2009) stated that macro-prudential policy should target avoiding 
bubbles and imbalances in general. In 2010, BIS provided a summative report about 
the evolution of themacro-prudential perspective, stating that this term has two 
distinguishing features (Clement, 2010). First, it focuses on the financial system as a 
whole, so as to control the macroeconomic costs brought by financial distress. 
Secondly, in contrast with an individual financial institution which treats aggregate 
risk as independent of their decisions, macro-prudential perspective treats aggregate 
risk as dependent on the collective behaviour of financial institutions (Clement, 2010). 
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As the result of growing consensus on the macro-prudential approach, the importance 
of monitoring and measuring financial stability has been recognised. Consequently, 
financial regulation authorities among countries have made considerable efforts to 
develop macro-prudential tools, including early warning indicators and macro stress 
tests (Borio and Drehmann, 2009).  
 
2.2. Risk Management in the Banking Sector 
Although the history of bank can be traced back to the fourteenth century in Italy and 
the concept of credit can be traced even further back to 5,000 years, the history of risk 
management for banks is much shorter. Harrington and Neihaus (2003) demonstrated 
that modern risk management began in 1955, and has since undergone considerable 
evolution including the introduction of self-insurance instruments, and the use of 
derivatives and statistical tools to manage bank risk (Dionne, 2013). (See Appendix 
B.1 for the evolution of the risk management.) 
The studies on bankruptcy prediction emerged during the 1930s when Fitzpatrick 
(1932) first attempted to use comparative analysis to explore the signs of financial 
failure. Ratchford (1941), who followed Fisher‘s (1936) method, introduced the idea 
of discrimination to identify the quality of loans. However, due to the limitation of 
statistical methods at that time, this research cannot be used for predictive purposes 
without the help of financial ratio. Afterwards, univariate and multivariate 
discriminant models were applied to find the financial ratios which could be used for 
bankruptcy prediction (e.g. Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966). These studies provided a 
solid base for future research in this field, while the multivariate discriminant model 
became one the most popular methods. In addition, Altman (1968) developed the Z-
score model with five financial ratios, which could classify companies into three 
groups - healthy, bankrupted and other company. Altman kept improving the Z-score 
model and expanding it to different kinds of firms like larger companies, non-listed 
companies and non-manufacturing companies (Altman, 1977, 1993). As consequence, 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
18 
 
in the 1970s, a series of research studies on bankruptcy prediction applied and 
developed the discriminant model (e.g. Deakin, 1972; Edmister, 1972; Libby, 1975; 
Wilcox, 1971). 
The discriminant method, however, attracted criticism because of some 
assumptions it made, such as normal distribution of macro-economic data and 
financial ratio (Dimitras et al., 1999; Joy and Tollefson, 1975; Ohlson, 1980). 
Therefore, the logit regression method was introduced to overcome some of the 
disadvantages of the discriminant method, thus providing higher prediction accuracy 
(Santomero and Vinso, 1977). Santomero and Vinso (1977) applied logit regression 
method to predict banking failure in the US. Some following studies expanded the 
application of the logit regression method to other sectors and introduced probit 
regression into the prediction of bankruptcy (Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984).  
The logit method, though, is still not a flawless methodology, suffering 
problematic assumptions which could not always hold in reality. Hence, a series of 
methods for bankruptcy prediction have been developed such as classification trees 
(Breiman et al., 1983), neural networks (Zhang et al., 1999), hazard models 
(Hillegeist et al., 2004), and generalised additive models (Berg, 2007). 
Over the past decade, the ongoing financial crisis has driven commercial banks 
and bank regulators to devote many resources to developing risk management in 
general and credit risk analysis in particular for the purpose of better quantifying the 
underlying risks. Within this trend, credit risk is the major source of risk for banks and 
regulators (BIS, 2001). In 1997, the Basel Accord formally published market risk 
models for regulatory capital calculations with the value-at-risk (VaR) method, which 
is defined as the maximum loss over a target horizon such that there is a low, pre-
specified probability that the actual loss will be higher (Jorion, 2009). Besides, other 
organisations and financial institutions have also released some credit risk models, 
like J.P. Morgan (1998) and Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997). Credit risk 
refers to the degree of value fluctuation in debt and derivatives which was caused by 
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changes in the underlying credit quality. Compared with the VaR method which is 
able to generate about 250 forecasts (daily) per year for market risk, the credit risk 
method can only generate one forecast (yearly) or four forecasts (quarterly) per year 
because of longer horizons. Moreover, the limited historical data about credit loss also 
affects the validation of credit risk models. The demand of more comprehensive risk 
management technique encourages the invention of the stress-testing approach.  
The common purpose of these risk management models is predicting the 
probability distribution function of losses, which is usually generated from a bank‘s 
portfolio. Therefore, the idea of an early warning system (EWS) arises as an important 
complementary technique for risk management. Identification of the main factors 
connected with banks‘ failure is the prerequisite for EWS and a series of studies 
contributed to this issue (e.g. Graham and Horner, 1988; Martin, 1977; Thomson, 
1991). According to previous studies, several factors are found to contribute 
significantly to bank distress like managerial inefficiency (Barr et al., 1993; DeYoung, 
2003; Pantalone and Platt, 1987), and capital adequacy (Myers, 1977; Oshinsky and 
Olin, 2006; Santos, 2001). Insufficient capital adequacy may encourage the pursuit of 
high-return and high-risk portfolios, thus leading to moral hazard. According to the 
study of Torna (2010), there are five banking activities that have contributed to 
banking distress during the recent global financial crisis; these are investment banking, 
insurance, venture capital investments, securitisation and derivatives trading. The 
importance of the asset portfolio of banks and the quality of assets in risk management 
is also highlighted by studies, because real-estate construction is usually the major 
potential shock source during recent crises (Barrell et al., 2010; Cole and White, 
2012). Moreover, the provisions taken against losses and non-performing loans are 
playing an important role in risk management (Barth and Landsman, 2010; Betz et al., 
2014; Jin et al., 2011; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2012). Along the same lines lie the 
studies of Arena (2008) and Jin et al. (2011), who suggest that the credit expansion in 
the period before the crisis may contain predictive information. In such a period, 
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banks may be more willing to allocate assets to risky assets (Wagner, 2007). A number 
of researchers have investigated the structure of banking systems, and find that the 
likelihood of failure is lower in concentrated banking systems (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 
2009; Matutes and Vives, 2000; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). These studies explain 
that the incentive of concentrated banking systems to pursue excessive risks is weak, 
due to their high profits and robust capital reserves. However, some researchers argue 
that a concentrated banking system might increase bank fragility, because of higher 
interest margins and higher levels of default among borrowers (e.g. Boyd et al., 2007; 
Schaeck et al., 2009). Another direction of studies taken by Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
(1999), Porath (2006), Daley et al. (2008), De Graeve et al. (2008), and Aubuchon 
and Wheelock (2010), who focus on the relevance of macroeconomic performance, 
including GDP growth, inflation, money growth and interest rates, finds that 
macroeconomic indicators could significantly improve the predictive ability of the 
models used. 
 
2.3. Regulations for the Banking Sector 
It is commonly believed that a healthy banking system needs to operate under 
comprehensive supervision and regulation which entails complying with the rules. 
While the global liberalisation of the financial markets brings in many new 
opportunities, it also comes with a series of new risks and challenges for banks. 
Consequently, these new risks require new regulation methods and even new 
regulators to guarantee that the bank system functions well. Learning from the 
supervision practice in the past twenty years, the trend of liberalisation has forced the 
implementation of a prudential supervision perspective. In this way, the regulator 
should not only examine the activities of banks, but also be aware of the external 
financial conditions and other financial institutions with a close relationship with the 
bank sector. 
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Not surprisingly, like the disease promoting the progress of medical science, the 
economic crises between the 1970s and the 1980s pushed the central bank governors 
of the G-10 countries to take proactive measures to safeguard the banking sector from 
economic crisis. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which 
provides a platform for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters was 
established at the end of 1974 by the central banks of the G-10 nations. It is widely 
believed that the BCBS was created to develop common guidelines about supervisory 
standards, thus promoting the quality of banking supervision worldwide (Singer, 2007; 
Tarullo, 2008). The Committee‘s members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The aim of the Committee is monitoring and driving the progress of the 
evolution of key supervisory issues, and strengthening the quality of banking 
supervision worldwide. Information exchange among members about supervisory 
issues, approaches, and techniques is beneficial to promote common understanding of 
the Committee‘s objectives. Therefore, this common understanding could be used to 
provide guidelines and supervisory standards in areas where they are considered 
desirable. In this regard, there are three major common understandings which are 
widely accepted and applied by the member countries; these are the International 
Standards on Capital Adequacy, the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
and the Concordat on cross-border banking supervision (BIS, 2013). 
In 1988, the Committee came out with its first capital measurement system which 
is also commonly known as the Basel Capital Accord I. Inspired by the bank failures 
(saving and loan crisis) during the 1980s, Basel I originally focused on credit risk, and 
set guidelines on capital adequacy. Afterwards, the Committee supplemented the 
Accord with requirements for exposures to market risk. There were two major 
objectives of Basel I, which were to strengthen the financial stability and to ensure a 
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high degree of consistency among international banks (BCBS, 1988). The most 
important regulatory requirement in Basel I is a minimum capital level of 8% of risk-
weighted assets spent on loans using the single matrix system for international active 
banks (Jackson et al., 1999). In real terms, the bank should set aside eight million in 
reserves, when it provides a one-hundred-million loan to an entity. Otherwise, Basel I 
defines capital based on two tiers—Tier 1 (core capital) and Tier 2 (supplementary 
capital) (BCBS, 2001). However, Basel I has drawn criticism as it is narrow in its 
scope to ensure adequate financial stability to some extent, because it only covers 
credit risk and only targets G-10 countries (Balin, 2008). Moreover, Balin (2008) also 
pointed out that Basel I may have misaligned incentives to banks, as the absoluteness 
of the risk weightings of this Accord might not be suitable for all banks.  
Due to these criticisms and the increasing concerns of vulnerability of financial 
systems brought by economic integration and globalisation, the Basel Committee 
issued a new Capital Adequacy Framework in 1999, which is also known as the Basel 
Accord II. The Basel II agreement introduced a set of measures and standards for 
capital adequacy which banking regulators of the member countries are now working 
with to improve their risk management and regulatory capital requirements. 
Additionally, the Basel II promotes the forward-looking approach in implementation 
of capital regulation which focuses on identification of potential risks and enhancing 
the capacity to deal with these risks in advance. The aims of Basel II are to improve 
the stability of the banking system based on three pillars as follow (BCBS, 2004, see 
Figure 2.1):  
 Pillar 1: minimum capital requirements -where the Basel Accord I just 
monitors some of the risks in a simple way, the Basel accord II take all three 
major risks - credit risk, market risk and operational risk - into account for 
setting the capital requirements;  
 Pillar 2: supervisory review - provides a framework and a set of tools to deal 
with the potential risks; and  
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 Pillar 3: market discipline - improves the quality of information disclosures of 
banks which helps the market and the stakeholders to get a more 
comprehensive knowledge of the overall risk position of the bank.  
 
Figure 2.1: Three Pillars of Basel Accord II 
 
 
Since the global financial crisis spread in 2008, however, some criticisms were raised 
against Basel Accord II, because the capital adequacy regime had led to an insufficient 
level of quality capital of major international banks and amplified the global credit 
cycle (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Given the weaknesses of Basel Accord II which 
surfaced during the crisis, which are related with the bank‘s internal credit risk model 
and pro-cyclicality, the enhancement based on the Basel II framework is referred to as 
Basel III. The Basel Committee enhanced the previous Accords by introducing a more 
comprehensive set of reform measures to improve the regulation, supervision and risk 
management of the banking sector. The key objectives of Basel III are to  
1. help the banking sector to strengthen its capacity to absorb losses brought by 
financial and economic shocks;  
2. improve the quality of risk management; and 
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3. further reinforce transparency and disclosures of bank information.  
On one hand, the reform targets bank-level (or micro-prudential) regulation. It aims at 
helping individual banking institutions to reduce their vulnerability when shocks take 
place. On the other hand, the reform also focuses on system-level, or macro-prudential 
regulation, which emphasises systematic risks that can accumulate within the banking 
sector as well as the pro-cyclical amplification of these risks over time. 
 
2.4. China’s Banking System 
In the last three decades, China has maintained a surprisingly speedy and stable 
growth which also indicates the sustained development of the banking system. Along 
with China‘s comprehensive economic reform from 1978, which aims to transfer the 
planned economy into a market economy, the substantial progress of banking reforms 
have been the centre of overall effort, including independence of monetary policy for 
the centre bank, the autonomy of state-owned banks, the open market for the foreign 
banks, and bank regulation. Accordingly, a closer examination of the financial 
stability of the banking system in China is valuable for a number of reasons. First of 
all, the banking sector is the major financial intermediary in China because the bond 
markets and equity markets are not yet well developed. Secondly, China‘s banking 
sector successfully avoided the Asian financial crises in 1997 and the global sub-
prime crisis in 2008 and its economic growth continued. Thirdly, the banking sector as 
the fiscal agents following the credit plan is suffering from large non-performing loans 
(NPLs). In addition, the legacy of banks being managed by government agencies, 
which has created inefficiency and weak risk management, is a formidable challenge 
for banks.  
 
2.4.1. Banking reform in China 
In this section, we review the main issues of reform of China‘s banking system so as 
to better understand the characteristics of the system in China.  
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a) Mono-banking System (1948-1984). The current banking system in China can be 
traced back to 1948 when the establishment of the People‘s Bank of China (PBC) set 
the foundation for China‘s banking system. At that time, the PBC was the only bank in 
the finance market which was responsible for providing all kinds of financial services 
as a state-owned and controlled bank under the Treasury Department, controlling 
about 93% of the total financial assets of the country. However, as there was no real 
sense of commercial banking market, the major functions of the PBC were accounting 
and cashier and the only client was the government. Under the highly centralised 
planning economy system, the bank played a supplementary role in assisting the 
Treasury to allocate funding. 
b) Two-tiered banking system (1984-1994). Since 1978, China started the 
transformation from a planning economy to a market economy and the reform of the 
banking sector became the most important component of the transformation. The 
mono-bank system was not able to fulfill the growing requirements of financial 
service when the growth of the economy was on the fast track. In 1979, the general 
designer of China‘s ‗Reform and Open‘, Xiaoping Deng, directly proposed that the 
existing banking system should be transformed into a real modern banking system. To 
fulfill the requirements of reform and opening-up, the first and the foremost important 
step was the establishment in 1979 of three specialised state-owned commercial banks 
- the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Agriculture 
Bank of China (ABC) - whose obligations can be easily distinguished by their names. 
The Bank of China specialises in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; 
the Construction Bank of China focuses on the fixed investment (in manufacturing) 
appropriation; and the primary business of the Agriculture Bank of China is 
agriculture loans. However, with a vague central bank system, the PBC exercised the 
dual functions of centre bank function and specialised commercial bank function 
simultaneously. In other words, the PBC was competing with other specialised 
commercial banks as an athlete, while it was also playing the role of referee. 
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Obviously, this kind of central bank system easily leads to the non-objective 
supervision. This situation was not improved until 17 September 1983, when the State 
Council issued ‗the Decision of People Bank of China specializing in the central bank 
function‘. Meanwhile, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) which 
was separate from the PBC has carried on with the industrial and commercial loans 
and the saving business. Thus, the PBC was free to serve as a central bank and the 
two-tiered banking system was finally entrenched. During the initial stage, the reform 
focused on changing the mono-bank structure and encouraging those four commercial 
banks to become more active in the economic development process. In this way, these 
four specialised state-owned banks broke up the mono-bank system and took over the 
PBC to provide the finance service, mainly to the state-owned enterprises. At that time, 
there was a strict division of business for these four banks - for example, the ABC 
provided more than 95% of agriculture loans in 1985 (Qin and Ou, 2011) - but these 
four state-owned commercial banks were still part of an administrative hierarchy with 
limited autonomy of management, because the operations of the banks still followed 
the central economic plan and serviced specific economic sectors. During this period, 
the way in which capital was allocated did not undergo fundamental change. This is 
due to the fact that China‘s economic reform started from the micro-level; thus the 
government still retained the catching-up strategy inherited from the planning 
economy stage at the start of the process of change Since 1985, the allocation of the 
national income leaned to the private sector, which has resulted in the fact that 
because the fiscal revenue of central government has seen a decreasing share of 
national income, it had been increasingly difficult to meet the investment requirement 
of the state sector. Zhang (1998) suggested that the central government raises the 
money supply through the over-lending from the banking system to satisfy the 
investment requirement. Furthermore, the government controls the social deposit by 
controlling the SOBCs to make profit. However, because there was a limit to the 
monetisation, the PBC had to apply the quota management for the credit funding not 
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only on commercial banks, but also on regions. Against this background, the SOCBs, 
operating both policy business and commercial business, focused on extending credit 
scales and branch networks, but ignored the importance of risk management. When 
the benefit from the fast expansion of credit scale shrinks and the obvious inflation 
pressure expands, the SOBCs have to take on increasing costs and non-performing 
loans. Considering this situation, the authorities pushed banking reform to the next 
stage.  
In order to give more autonomy to those specialised banks, three policy banks - 
the State Development Bank of China (SDBC), the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China (ADBC), and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) - were established to 
take over the policy business related to lending in underdeveloped areas, export and 
import, and rural areas in 1994; thus the four SOBCs were able to expand their scope 
of business. It also was the burgeoning period for the joint-equity commercial banks 
(JCBs) and city commercial banks, which are smaller JCBs and have restricted 
geographical operations. Meanwhile, the commercial banks have shown impressive 
improvements in several aspects such as asset/liability management committees, 
credit committees, information system, and staff training. However, compared to the 
JCBs, the SOBCs had tremendous advantages in negotiating with the PBC on the 
credit quota and refinance issues. Besides, because of the lack of capital and branch 
network of the three policy banks, the policy banks cannot take over all the policy-
based lending from the SOBCs. Hence, the SOBCs had to carry on with policy-based 
lending because of the pressure from the government Overall, the banking system of 
China was dominated by PBC and four SOBCs until the mid- 1990s (Wong, 2001). 
Wong (2001) also pointed out that the concentration ratio of total asset, total loan, and 
total deposit of the four SOBCs was 84%、84%, and 88%, respectively, in 1998.  
Along with the progress of ‗Reform and Open‘, there were three forces pushing 
the banking sector to change significantly by decreasing the degree of monopoly. The 
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first one was that the divisions of business between the big four specialised banks 
were blurred, which allowed these banks to become commercial banks. The second 
one is that the barriers of entry for banking sector were broken down; thus the up-
coming commercial banks and financial institutions pushed the competition forward. 
The third one is that the SOCBs began to develop their risk management strategies 
and management of assets and liability ratio under the PBC‘s rules. Consequently, a 
united and ordered commercial banking market was established, accompanied by the 
rapid expansion of scale of money and the degree of monetisation. After this round of 
reforms, the amount of loans of commercial banks became based on their savings, so 
that some of the market share of the SOCBs was taken by the JCBs and other financial 
institutions. In addition, the SOCBs maintain more motivation for pursuing profit. 
Even though the SOCBs cannot completely abandon the policy business, the 
increasing share of commercial business has led to them holding some functions of a 
modern commercial bank. This means that the SOCBs should allocate their funding 
based on the perspectives of risk management and profitability. Therefore, the 
motivation of blind expansion of credit scale drops. At the same time, the SOCBs, as 
the legal person, improved their capacity in funding allocation among their branches, 
which means that the funds are more likely to flow into the more developed regions.   
c) The modern banking system (1995- now). The year 1995 is known as the milestone 
moment for financial lawmaking in China. In this year, the enactment of Central Bank 
Law and Commercial Bank Law represented the first step in establishing a 
competitive, modern banking system. The Central Bank Law officially announced that 
the PBC was transformed from a mono-bank which provided all sorts of financial 
service to the central bank of the country with the responsibilities of making monetary 
policy, supervising the financial system and regulating the payments system. Despite 
this, the banking system is still under the control of the government to a great extent. 
This control was mainly over the ownership of banks and non-bank financial 
institutions by the PBC, the State Planning Commission, and the provincial and 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
29 
 
municipal governments. Meanwhile, the Commercial Bank Law reclassified the big 
four state-owned banks as commercial banks, while provided the new supervision 
rules for commercial banks. Although, there were three policy banks which respond to 
the finance need of policy lending, the commercial banks had to continue their policy 
lending to support the state-owned enterprises (SOE) and infrastructure. This meant 
that the government still had a great impact on the operations of banks. According to 
Cho (1998), in this stage, the big four state-owned banks (ICBC, CCB, BOC, and 
ABC) dominated the Chinese banking sector, together accounting for more than 
70%of the total banking system assets and more than 30%of the financial system 
assets.  
Afterwards, since the competitive commercial bank market was settled, the 
institutional reform, as the initial step of banking reform, drew to a close and the 
reform moved its attention to bank restructuring, through the cleaning up of NPLs and 
recapitalisation. The bank restructuring, which began in the late 1990s, became the 
second important step of banking reform since poor asset quality and low 
capitalisation have been the pressing obstacles for the development of the banking 
industry and financial stability. The SOCBs were the major targets of the bank 
restructuring activities, since the policy lending for development had generated a large 
amount of non-performing loan. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis erupted. Even 
though China‘s banking industry had not suffered much from this turmoil, the lesson 
from this crisis accelerated the progress of banking reform of China in order to 
enhance its financial stability. 
Generally, the restructuring consisted of four major steps: 
a) Financial restructuring. The PBC injected the funding into banking sector, 
and then Centre Huijin Investments cancelled after verification of the 
equity capital of the Treasury Department and transferred some of the 
assets to Asset Management Companies (AMCs);  
b) Shareholding system reform. Under the assistance of Centre Huijin 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
30 
 
Investments, the SOBCs were transformed into joint-stock banks (JSBs);  
c) Introduction of foreigner strategy investors;  
d) Listing of the SOBCs.  
Through these four steps, four organisations were involved - the Treasury Department, 
the People‘s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: Banking Restructuring Process 
 
 
Three rounds of restructuring can be clearly identified from the figure above. The 
restructuring started in 1998 when the government injected a tremendous amount of 
270 billion (RMB) in the form of special national debt into the four SOCBs to 
reinforce the capital adequate rate (CAR) of SOCBs to above 4% in accordance with 
the rule of CAR set by the PBC (source: Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking). 
This action provided sufficient liquidity for the SOCBs to satisfy the regulation 
requirements. Although the CAR increased to a satisfying level after the capital 
injection, this is not a radical treatment for the inherited problem of credit practice. It 
is because that capital injection is the temporary expedient which may lead to the 
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misallocation of resources. Moreover, the one-time capital injection cannot 
substantially improve the asset quality of these SOBCs. To avoid this potential 
problem, a comprehensive operation followed in 1999, when the assets of RMB 1.4 
trillion (including non-performing loan of RMB 980 billion) were transferred from the 
four SOCBs to four corresponding Asset Management Companies (AMCs) - Cinda 
Asset Management Corporation, Great Wall Asset Management Corporation, Orient 
Asset Management Corporation, and Huarong Asset Management Corporation - by 
the authorities to rehabilitate the quality of the banks‘ assets (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Asset Management Company 
AMC Cinda Huarong Greatwall Orient Total 
Time of establishment April, 1999 October, 1999 October, 1999 October, 1999  
Related SOCBs CCB  ICBC ABC BOC  
NPLs stripping 3,730 4,077 3,458 2,674 13,939 
Capital  100 100 100 100 400 
Central Bank Lending 0 947 3,450  1,074  5,479 
Financial Bonds  3,730 3,130 0 1,600  8,460 
Unit: RMB 1,000 million; 
Source:The People‘s Bank of China. 
 
The second move started in 2003 with another capital injection into the CCB and the 
BOC when these two SOBCs were selected as the pilot banks for initial public 
offering (IPO). Along with the non-performing loan strip, the government authority, 
Central Huijin Investment, used foreign exchange reserve of USD 45 billion as further 
injection to improve the asset quality of the CCB and BOC. At the same time, these 
two banks issued subordinated debt to enhance their Tier II capital. Due to all these 
efforts, the NPL ratios of the CCB and BOC had fallen to 5.69% and 3.75%, 
respectively, while the CAR rose to 8% and 11.24% at the end of 2004, which was 
approaching the average level of the same financial indicators of foreign commercial 
banks. In the following year, the CCB signed the agreements about strategy 
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investment and corporation with the Bank of American and Temasek Holding, 
successively. In the same year, the BOC invited the Royal Bank of Scotland, Temasek 
Holding and the United Bank of Switzerland to become its strategic investors. The 
introduction of strategic investors diversifies the ownership structure and improves 
management quality. Finally, the CCB listed part of its shares in Hong Kong in 2005 
and listed in the Shanghai stock market in 2007. Meanwhile, the BOC listed in both 
Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets in 2006.  
After the successful restructuring of the CCB and the BOC, the third round 
moved on to the IPO process of the ICBC and the ABC, with the injections of USD15 
billion into the ICBC in 2005 and USD19 billion into the ABC. Because the ICBC 
was the biggest SOBC with the highest amount of non-performing loan, USD15 
billion is not enough to cover the write-off. To redress this situation, on the one side, 
the Central Huijin Investment replenished the capital fund with the amount of RMB 
124 billion. On the other hand, the second time of stripping of NPL was operated by 
AMC. Following the cases of the BOC and the CCB, the ICBC invited the Goldman 
Sachs Group as the major strategy investor via several rounds of tough negotiation. 
The Goldman Sachs Group‘s acquisition of an 8.89% stake of the ICBC (amounting to 
USD 37.8 billion) was the biggest single investment from foreign investors. Finally, 
the ICBC listed in both Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets in 2006. The 
restructuring was proved successful by the significant promotion of CAR, NPL ratio, 
and provision coverage ratio of these three banks, which fulfilled the requirements of 
the CSRC for the listed company. By June 2008，the CARs of ICBC, BOC, and CCB 
were 12.46%, 13.7%, and 12. 06%, respectively，while the NPL ratios were 2.41%, 
2.58%, and 2.21% respectively (Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking). Unlike 
these three SOCBs, the ABC did not introduce foreign strategy investors instead of 
some financial investors, because of the unsatisfied condition of the capital market 
both at home and abroad at that moment. With the listing of the ABC in 2010, the 
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banking restructuring finally drew to a close. The process of restructuring the Chinese 
banking system cost the equivalent of between 20% and 24% of the 2004 GDP; this 
was injected into the banking system in the form of capital or substitute of NPL 
(García-Herrero et al., 2006).  
As of 2012, China‘s banking system comprised two policy banks, five large state-
owned commercial banks; 12 shareholding commercial banks, 144 city commercial 
banks, 212 rural commercial banks, 190 rural cooperative commercial banks, 2265 
rural credit cooperatives, a postal saving banking, four asset management corporations, 
40 foreign financial institutions, 66 trust institutions, 18 financial leasing companies, 
14 automotive finance companies, and four consumer finance companies. This large 
finance network consists of 3,800 body institution and 3.19 million practitioners in 
total.  
 
2.4.2. The features of China’s banking system 
2.4.2.1. Centralisation 
China‘s banking system is a considerable size not only in relative terms but also in 
absolute terms (see Table 2.3). By 2013, the ICBC had moved from third to first place 
on the back of a 15% increase in capital in The Banker‘s Top 1000 World Banks 
ranking (by Tier 1 capital) for the first time ever. In addition, there are 96 China banks 
listed in the World Top 1000 Banks ranking and four of them hold places in the Top 
10 (the ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC), while China‘s banks dominate the top of the 
table for the largest profits. Due to the growth of the economy, and the rapid increase 
in personal income, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals have 
been growing very fast over the last 20 years, from RMB 11,066 billion in 2003 to 
RMB 34,740 billion in 2011. 
Moreover, the bank credit has maintained a steady high-speed growth for over 
one decade, since the economic boom took off (see Table 2.4). However, the 
unprecedented level of credit expansion in China makes a severe banking crisis a very 
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real possibility. Once the growth of the credit-driven economy slows down, the 
tightening of liquidity could prove very dangerous in such a highly leveraged 
economy. 
 
Table 2.3: Total Asset of Banking Financial Institution 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Banking Financial 
Institution Total  
26,749  30,726 36,454 42,891 52,144 61,208 77,254 93,125 110,680 
Policy Bank 2,125 2,412 2,928 3,473 4,278 5,645 6,946 7,652 9,313 
Large-scale Commercial 
Bank 
16,051 17,982 21,005 24,236 28,500 31,836 40,089 46,804 53,634 
Joint-stock Commercial 
Bank 
2,960 3,648 4,466 5,445 7,274 8,809 11,785 14,904 18,379 
City Commercial Bank 1,462 1,706 2,037 2,594 3,341 4,132 5,680 7,853 9,985 
Rural Commercial Bank 39 57 303 504 610 929 1,866 2,767 4,253 
Rural Corporative Bank n/a n/a 275 465 646 1,003 1,279 1,500 1,403 
Urban Credit 
Cooperative 
147 179 203 183 131 80 27 2 3 
Rural Credit Cooperative 2,651 3,077 3,143 3,450 4,343 5,211 5,493 6,391 7,205 
Foreign Bank 416 582 716 928 1,253 1,345 1,349 1,742 2,154 
New Rural Financial 
Institution and Postal 
Saving Bank 
898 1,085 1,379 1,612 1,769 2,216 2,741 3,510 4,354 
Unit: RMB one billion; 
Source: the CBRC. 
 
Table 2.4: Deposit and Lending of Banking Finance Institution 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Deposit 220,364 253,188 300,209 348,016 401,051 478,444 612,006 733,382 826,701 
Including: 
saving deposit 
110,695 126,196 147,054 166,616 176,213 221,503 264,761 307,166 347,401 
Total Lending  169,771 188,566 206,839 238,280 277,747 320,129 425,597 509,226 581,893 
Including: 
short-term loan 
87,398 90,808 91,158 101,698 118,898 128,609 151,353 171,237 217,480 
long-term loan 67,252 81,010 92,941 113,010 138,581 164,195 235,579 305,128 333,747 
billing finance 9,234 11,618 16,319 17,333 12,884 19,314 23,879 14,845 15,154 
Unit: RMB 100 million; 
Source: the CBRC. 
 
The rapid growth in asset and credit however does not imply a well-developed 
banking system because the diversity of banking products is insufficient, when over 
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70% of the profit is contributed by interest margin. Take the year 2010 for example: 
16 listed commercial banks have gained RMB 1,400 billion of net interest income, 
while the total operating revenue was RMB 1,700 billion. In the same time, although 
the non-interest income had achieved a growth of 37.8%, to RMB 552 billion, the 
share of total operating revenue was still less than 20%. Moreover, almost all of the 
policies tend to benefit the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while there is limited 
credit allowance left for small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and households. 
Take the year 2004 for example: the loans provided to SMEs and households 
accounted for just 15% and 11% of the total loans respectively (García-Herrero et al., 
2006).  
Like many transition economies, the banking system in China has been 
dominated by the big four SOCBs— the ICBC, CCB, BOC, and ABC - which were 
established as the specialised banks in the 1980s to take charge of appropriation to key 
industries In 1985, the SOCBs held 93.12% of total deposit, and 94.12% of total loans. 
Even though the specialised banks had transformed into commercial banks in the 
1990s, they still controlled the business of deposit and lending, with weak competition 
from other financial institutions. The remaining banks are relatively small, no matter 
what in terms of asset size, range of business, or branch coverage. This might offer an 
explanation for the high degree of concentration of Chinese banking system when 
measured in terms of the share of assets of the four largest banks. In the 1990s, the 
four SOCBs maintained their dominant position, facing limited competition from 
other up-coming commercial banks whose total assets and total profit were less than 
the smallest SOBC. According to Qin and Ou (2001), in 1999, the CCB took up 16% 
of total assets, while the total assets of other new-coming commercial banks 
accounted for less than 10%of total assets of the whole banking sector. Even though 
the other commercial banks had achieved rapid growth by the end of the 1990s, the 
four SOBCs held about 80% of total deposit and retained the share of total capital, 
total profit and tax at a stable high level of 80%, 90%, and 79%, respectively. This 
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point is also supported by the study of García-Herrero et al. (2006). They suggest that, 
compared with other industrial countries, the relatively high interest margin in China 
can be treated as evidence of lack of competition. In 2003, the figures were 1.79% for 
China‘s bank sector and 1.38 per cent for EU banks. Furthermore, the government 
held a massive 99.45% share of the 10 largest commercial banks in China in 1995; 
this had been 100% in 1970 (La Porta, Lopez and Shleifer, 2004). The concentration 
ratio seems have fallen sharply since 1997 with the entrance of a number of non-state-
owned banks. Since then, the weight of SOCBs in the banking system fell to 48.5% by 
2011, while the importance of other commercial banks kept increasing. For instance, 
the weights of the JSCBs and the City Commercial Banks climbed to 16.6% and 9% 
respectively. This rapid change was mainly contributed to by the considerable growth 
in the JSCBs‘ assets, which was 30% and three times the growth in SOCB‘s assets. 
In one respect, the banking management authority did not provide enough 
support for new-coming commercial banks when the SOBCs had the support from 
preferential policy. On the other hand, during the opening-up of banking market, the 
SOBCs also improve their sense of competition and make full use of their own 
advantages. In these ways, the high level of concentration of the banking market 
would possibly last for a long period in the future. Given that the SOCBs took up a 
considerable proportion of total bank assets, transforming these giants into genuine 
commercial banks would not only enhance the capacity of profit and efficiency of 
these banks, but would also improve the soundness of the whole banking system.  
 
2.4.2.2. Non-performing loan 
The high centralisation of the industry in the past 30 years has led to a series of 
problems in terms of asset quality and efficiency, particularly in the light of number of 
NPLs. Furthermore, the big proportion of NPLs particularly is a formidable challenge 
for the big four state-owned banks when the lending practices were under the credit 
plan and administered interest rates. In 1998, Dai, the governor of the PBC, 
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announced that about 20% of the total loans of the banking sector are classified as 
non-performing loans, while about 5% of the total loans are actually loss for the first 
time. His statement reflects the worsening situation of loan quality around the end of 
the 1990s when some optimists argued that the NPL ratio could in fact, surprisingly, 
reach 40%. As the president of the PBC, Dai‘s statement also delivers a signal that the 
regulators had noticed the problem of asset quality and were determined to reduce the 
number of NPLs in order to improve the soundness of bank. When we analyse the 
NPL problem and possible solutions, the lack of comprehensive and objective data on 
NPLs becomes the major obstacle. As the PBC did not formally publish the NPL data 
until 2002, the data of NPLs before 2002 were based on the reports by the Governor 
of the PBC which are classified based on the four-category classification (see Table 
2.5). It is believed that these data released on NPLs are likely to be underestimated for 
several reasons. According to the State-owned Assets Supervision and the 
Administration Commission of the State Council, Hubei Province was responsible for 
RMB 84.5 billion of bad loans at the end of 1997, which accounted for 43.69% of all 
bank loans. Pei and Shirai (2004) also pointed out that it is strange that the NPLs‘ 
figure of 10% in 1998 rocketed to more than 25% in other years. The study of Shi 
(2003) also supports this argument. The estimated NPL ratios of SOCBs given by Shi 
(2003) were 39% in 1999 and 29.2% in 2000 which are more reasonable in reflecting 
the stripping of RMB1.4 trillion from the NPLs. Moreover, the figures of estimated 
NPL ratio provided by foreign research institutions and credit rating agencies were 
even higher than the PBC‘s data. For instance, the NPL ratio of SOCBs carried out by 
Moody was in the range of 35%-70% in 1996, while the ratio given by Morgan 
Stanley in 1998 was 36%（Li, 2002）. Consistent with these estimated NPL ratios, 
some argue that the NPLs of China‘s SOCBs would lead to a negative net worth of 
SOCBs, if applying international standards on bad loans (Lardy, 1998). 
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Table 2.5: Non-performing Loan of Banking Sector 
  NPL Ratio (%) NPLs (RMB 100 Million) 
1997 25.00 12864 
1998 10.00 6247 
1999 25.00 16454 
2000 25.00 16301 
2001 25.30 17644 
2002 25.30 20331 
2003 17.80 24406 
2004 13.21 17176 
2005 8.61 13133 
2006 7.09 12549 
2007 6.17 12684 
2008 2.42 5602 
2009 1.58 4973 
2010 1.14 4293 
2011 1.00 4279 
2012 0.95 4929 
2013 1.00 5921 
                                Source: the CBRC 
 
Next, the PBC unveiled a series of regulations such as setting up core capital ratios 
and adjusting provisions. In this way, the NPL problem was partly relieved and banks 
made initial progress on improving the transparency and asset quality management. 
However, these actions did not bring the expected results because the major source of 
NPLs - the state-owned enterprise (SOE) - was also in the restructuring phase which 
created a tremendous amount of bad loans that increased from RMB30 billion in 1997 
to RMB70 billion in 2000, while the amount of loans made to the private sector and 
joint ventures was much less. According to Gregory et al. (2000), loans made to the 
private sector from the whole of the banking sector was less than 1% of total loans 
made in 1998, with half of these loans from state-owned banks. The debt-to-asset ratio 
of the SOEs rose from 60% to more than an astonishing 80% where it remained until 
the end of 1990s (Wei and Wang, 1997). This kind of poor performance of SOEs 
directly impacts the asset quality of the banking sector as the state-owned banks 
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generously contribute more than 80% of the loans to SOEs (Li, 1995). Since the SOEs 
are the main source of NPLs, the reform of SOEs needs to be done in advance of the 
reform of commercial banks.  
In addition, after the four trillion fiscal stimulus plans, there was less room for 
fiscal stimulus than there was before. Looking at government financing vehicles, even 
though central government debt was still low at around 20% of GDP, the increasing 
local government debt has accumulated to around 50% of GDP. According to the 2011 
IMF report, if the future losses related to NPLs and unfunded pension liabilities are 
taken into account, the general government debt would rise to 85% of GDP. 
Besides these external causes, there are two main underlying reasons for the NPL 
problem.  The first one is the soft-budget constraints, which requires the banks to 
provide credit support to SOEs. The other is the deficient loan management of banks 
due to lack of motivation and instructions from regulators. In most practices, the 
overdue loans could be rolled over rather than disposed of as bad debts because the 
interest can be recorded as income. Aligning with the internal constraints, unlike the 
modern commercial banks‘ operation practices, the hierarchical organisation structure, 
inefficient information channel, and lack of risk management can be put down as the 
key reasons for poor performance. As Luo (2003) stated, besides the poor capital base 
and asset quality, China‘s bank sector suffers from poor corporate governance and 
internal controls and a lack of adequate risk management skills. The organisation 
structure together with the intervention from the local government weakens the 
control held by headquarters over their branches, particularly in the decision-making 
of loans. In the central and western regions and the northeast region where there are 
many key construction projects, local government and branches of SOBCs have more 
negotiation power with the PBC for more credit quota. The governors of the branches 
have to trade-off between the goals of maximising profit and maintaining good 
relationships with local government. 
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2.4.3. Banking regulation in China 
In initial stage, since China‘s banking sector was part of the country‘s bureaucracy, the 
banking regulation and supervision in China has traditionally been framed within 
principles of economic regulation. This is due to the fact that state-controlled credit 
plans and politically determined interest rates played the key roles in the economic 
plan. Initial progress was made in 1995 when the Central Bank Law was enacted 
which imposed the obligation for regulation to be implemented and undertaken in a 
more prudential fashion: (1) classifying the loan into four categories based on the 
length of maturity; (2) setting the reserve for the loan loss; (3) defining the new 
information disclosure requirements; and (4) requiring the commercial banks to 
establish their own internal audit department. To prevent further accumulation of the 
NPLs, the PBC introduced the five-category classification for loans (normal, special 
attention, substandard, doubtful, and loss) based on the international practice of risk 
management. Although the PBC was appointed as the supervisor of China‘s banking 
sector, the obligation was actually shared by branches of the PBC and local 
governments. In order to strengthen its autonomy of supervision and internal 
management, the central bank introduced an experimental structure reform taking its 
example from the US Federal Reserve System in 1998. In this reform, nine cross-
region headquarters were established which are responsible for the regulation of 
financial system, monetary policy, and internal management. Thus, following the 
restructure, the original provincial branches only take charge of organising financial 
services within their jurisdiction. Given that the provincial branches will report to the 
cross-region headquarters directly, the restructure aims to improve the regulatory 
power of local governments over on local PBC branches. However, in the three years 
following experimental reform, numerous management problems were identified, due 
to the increase of management process and cost. Consequently, the restructure, which 
was criticised by most of the scholars, industry insiders, local governments, and even 
the staff of the PBC, was terminated in 2001. 
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After entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China‘s bank 
sector has gradually opened up to foreign banks and financial institutions. These 
newcomers bring more intense competition as well as new requirements for an 
updated international banking supervisory regulation. With deeper involvement in the 
global financial market, China‘s banking system cannot avoid facing the shocks of 
global financial crises. Douglas and Gaddie (2002) examined the financial crisis in the 
1990s and found that the regional shocks are able to sweep through the whole 
international financial market in a short time; for instance, the Asian crises, the 
Russian crisis, the Argentine crisis and the Brazilian crisis. These shocks push the 
development of banking regulation frameworks at the domestic, regional and 
international levels. According to Deng (2009), there are four stages to the 
development of the international commercial banking regulation - administrative order 
approach, standard approach, internal model-based approach, and pre-commitment 
approach. These reflect the increasing complexity of financial markets.  
Along with the integration into the global financial regulation, regulation 
authorities began to address prudential regulation as a new approach (Brehm, 2007). 
The year 2003 was another milestone year of banking regulation when the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established. The main functions of the 
CBRC are as follows: it (1) establishes regulation rules for the banking sector; (2) 
administrates the establishment, changes, termination and business scope of the banks; 
(3) conducts qualification management on the senior managerial personnel of the 
banks; (4) formulates the prudential operation rules for banks; (5) publishes statistics 
and reports of the overall banking system; (6) carries out on-site and off-site 
supervision, and deals with rule-breaking behaviours; (7) takes over or enforces the 
restructuring of banks with severe potential credit risk; and (8) oversees the 
supervisory boards of the major state-owned banks; along with other functions 
delegated by the State Council. Today, supervisory responsibilities are shared between 
the CBRC and the PBC. Following the international risk management practice, 
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financial institutions in China are required to measure and control credit risk, market 
risk, operational risk and liquidity risk (Santomero, 1997). However, economic 
regulation has not been completely replaced by prudential regulation, as economic 
regulation enables central and local authorities to guide economic development.  
Due to the global financial crisis of 2008, a number of emerging countries have 
been under the global regulatory standard setting, such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the FSB, for the first time. China, as a major 
emerging economy, has become increasingly pivotal in radical changes of financial 
regulation. According to the study on the attitudes of Chinese officialdom towards the 
Basel Committee by Walter (2010), driven by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the 
global crisis in 2008, China‘s government increasingly emphasised the importance of 
China‘s steady adoption of Basel agreements in policy terms. This is all because the 
Basel Accord is, arguably, an important tool which would be useful for further 
banking reform. According to Bergsten (2008), China‘s authorities treat the engaging 
with international institutions and cooperation as a helpful action to overcome 
domestic resistance to reform. However, China‘s authorities did not fully join the 
BCBS until 2009, when they generally accepted the norms and standards of the Basel 
Accord. Look back to the mid-1990s, China was no exception to showing interest in 
adopting the Basel Accord, even though it did so relatively later than other Asian 
countries. Given that the Basel Accord I was originally designed for international 
banks from advanced countries, it is problematic for banks from developing countries 
to participate in international financial markets. For China, during that period, the 
banking system which was dominated by state-owned commercial banks was not able 
to either internationalise or open itself up to foreign competition. For instance, the law 
of the People's Bank of China (1995) firstly adopted the minimum capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) of 8% of risk-weighted assets, but it was not enforced (Brehm and Macht, 
2004). Along with the banking restructuring that took place from 2003, the PBC paid 
more attention to applying the minimum capital adequacy ratio rule, because the 
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SOCBs had adopted modern management practices and recapitalised. Among the 
latter, the rule on loan classification, new accounting and loan loss provisioning were 
introduced in 1998, 2001 and 2002, respectively. Furthermore, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) established in 2003 pushed the progress of 
implementation of the Basel Accord forward greatly. The introduction of the 
International Advisory Board by the CBRC is another clear signal of the intentions to 
adopt essentially western standards of banking regulation and supervision. 
China has achieved quite impressive progress on launching and localising the 
Basel Accord in recent years. Over 2003 to 2007, the big four SOCBs adopted the 
advanced International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) system before they went 
public. During this period, the figure of proportion of banks‘ assets which has satisfied 
the Basel Accord I increased sharply from only 0.6% in 2003 to over 80% in 2008 
(CBRC, 2007). This means that even though there is no complete consensus on the 
full implementation of the Basel Accord, progress is gradual and substantial 
nonetheless (Davies, 2010). Owing to the success of banking restructuring, it has 
significantly accelerated the process of implementation of Basel Accord II and the 
improvement of risk management. Furthermore, the SOCBs which have involved in 
international financial markets introduced the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach 
into their internal risk management, following ‗Guidelines on the Implementation of 
the New Capital Accord for China Banking Industry‘ issued by the CBRC in 2007. 
For other banks, although there is no mandatory requirement for them to adopt the 
IRB approach, the authorities encouraged them to draw up a plan for implementation 
no later than 2013. Later, in June 2012, ‗Rules for Asset Management of Commercial 
Bank‘ issued by the CBRC as the localised Basel Accords II and III, drew up a final 
plan for the banking regulation reform. This rule has set the end of 2018 as the 
deadline for all kinds of banks to fulfill the Basel Accord requirements. This deadline 
is reasonable because, to date, only a few major banks have implemented the Basel II. 
This means that other medium-sized commercial banks, city commercial banks and 
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rural commercial banks should adopt both Basel Accords II and III concurrently. 
Given that the Basel Accord III redefines the rules related to capital and qualified 
capital tools, banks are asked to pay more attention to the key element of capital. 
Although banks sector is able to follow the new capital rules to some extent, the banks 
mainly depend on core capital reserve of common stock and dividend control to 
satisfy the requirements of regulation, because the capital tools available on the 
financial market are limited (more details of CBRC‘s supervision practice of banking 
sector see table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6: CBRC‘s supervision of banking sector in China 
Indicator Definition Requirement 
Non-performing loan ratio Non-performing loans to loan outstandings < 5% 
Provision coverage ratio Loan-loss reserves to non-performing loans >150% 
Loan loss provision ratio Loan-loss reserves to loan outstandings >2.5% 
Loan to deposit ratio Loans to deposits <75% 
Current ratio Current assets to current liabilities >25% 
Liquidity coverage ratio Stock of high quality liquid assets to net cash outflows 
over a 30-day time period 
>100% 
Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) 
Net capital to risk weighted assets >8% 
Tier 1 (core) CAR Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets >6% 
Core Tier 1 CAR Common equity to risk weighted assets >5%, 
Leverage ratio Tier 1 capital to the adjusted on-and off-balance sheet 
assets of the relevant bank 
>4% 
Source: CBRC website 
Another major change in Basel III is the stricter supervision of the global 
systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFI), because the increasing 
connection among international financial institutions makes the failure of just one of 
these institutions very dangerous to the whole global financial system. Currently, in 
China, there is just one G-SIFI, the Bank of China. The supervisors intend to impose 
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the stricter regulations (such as 1% of extra CAR) not only on the Bank of China, but 
also on other large commercial banks which can be treated as the systemically 
important financial institutions. 
The recent global crisis, however, attracted increasing criticism of the Basel 
Accord (Davies and Green, 2008). China‘s regulators and supervisors also think back 
over the lessons to be learned from the Wall Street crash, and take the criticism of the 
Basel Accord seriously. Otherwise, because the authorities still have control power 
over the SOCBs to some extent, the banks pay more attention to political priorities 
rather than to developing risk management and competition capacity (Brehm, 2008). 
In conclusion, the implementation of the Basel Accord has been a part of China‘s 
banking reform and the country has made impressive progress in order to strengthen 
the stability and profitability of the banking system. This tendency is motivated by the 
lessons learned from financial crises which are applied to enhance financial stability. 
Although there is a certain amount of criticism of the Basel Accord, the authorities 
hold an interest in applying the Basel Accord as a benchmark for banking reform. Due 
to the gradual adaptation of the Basel Accord, China‘s banking industry has improved 
its stability and profitability, particularly in the case of the SOCBs.  
Overall, the Chinese banking system is the major element of the Chinese 
financial system, within which risks exhibited by commercial banks contribute most 
of the threat to the financial stability. The impact of macro-economic performance on 
stability of banking system is thus a basic issue to which should be paid great 
attention when conducting the macro-prudential management under Basel framework. 
However, unlike most of advanced economies, banking system in China maintains a 
series of unique characteristics as we discussed above. Therefore, we need to adjust 
the existed method to measure the issues related to financial stability of banking 
system in China.  
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3. CHAPTER 3                                                                                       
Research Design and Methodology 
After highlighting the relevant theories and empirical studies, we discuss the methods 
applied in this thesis in details. The key objective of this chapter is to develop the 
research methodology to identify the research methods most appropriate for this study. 
We examine, in depth, the ontological and epistemological position of this research 
and establish whether the most valid method for this study is quantitative or 
qualitative. Moreover, the statistical approaches employed are discussed and these are 
then applied in empirical analysis in order to look for the possibility of a correlation 
between the variables of stability of the banking system and macro-economic 
performance. 
 
3.1. Research Philosophy  
The research philosophy adopted plays a fundamental role in research. There are some 
crucial procedures to rationally conduct a valid research. Every process involves 
different options: thus the choice of each option needs to be rationally selected 
according to the objectives and characteristics of the study (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Hence, this section provides a discussion of the nature and development of knowledge 
in order to apply the appropriate research philosophy. 
Research can be defined as (e.g. Ryan et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2009) an 
activity in which persons are engaged to learn more about our environment by 
collecting data relative to the phenomenon under study, and analysing the results in a 
systematic way. Therefore, research of sufficient quality should cover several factors. 
It should have a clearly defined purpose, follow a logical process and apply well-
planned research design. Appropriate analysis should be undertaken, and conclusions 
justified. Ethical standards should be adhered to, and limitations of the study should 
be stated (Boris et al., 2005). Due to the fundamental role of research philosophy, it is 
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critical to start a research from identifying the underpinning philosophy and the 
specific method relevant to this study (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In general, ontology 
and epistemology are the two major issues for the research philosophy, which are 
widely accepted in economic research and logically related to two key research 
approaches: quantitative and qualitative research. 
 
3.1.1. Ontological considerations 
According to the definition by Bryman (2012, p.32), Ontology means ―…claims and 
assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, what exists, what it looks 
like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. In short, 
ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality‖.  
In other words, the ontology is concerned about the nature of the reality and how the 
reality can be identified by a vocabulary of terms and the relations between them, 
which is supported by the studies of Gruber (1993) and Gómez-Pérez and Benjamins 
(1999), among others. Therefore, to conduct research, it is necessary to clarify the 
ontological positions at the start stage, which is dependent on the researcher‘s 
philosophical thinking. Ontology usually involves two opposing positions: 
objectivism and subjectivism. 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), objectivism refers to how social entities 
exist in reality external to and independent of social actors. Hence, objective 
researchers treat social phenomena as external facts that could not be affected and are 
constructed of real and factual features. Therefore, during the process of research, the 
entities, or phenomenon can be identified by their nature and relationships. Then the 
entities will be received by all humans, while the human mind could do nothing about 
the reality throughout the process. 
On the other hand, subjectivism refers to where social entities are not only 
produced through social interaction, but are in a constant state of revision, which is in 
contrast to the objective stance (Bryman, 2012). Subjectivism emphasises the key role 
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of the human‘s mind in the interpretation to the world, because Vrasidas (2000) and 
Cronje (2006) among other researchers, argue that the world is created in the mind by 
interaction with the world and the interpretive process relies highly on the human‘s 
experiences and understanding. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the determination of financial stability 
for the banking system in China, based on an objectivist view. According to the above 
arguments relating to ontological position, the reasons for this are presented below.   
First, both financial stability and macro-economic performance are established 
facts which exist, and which can be classified by their properties and relations. Second, 
the relationship between the banking system‘s stability and the macro economy, which 
is the major aim of this thesis, exists external to social actors in reality as it only 
reflects the objective reality. The role of the author is to show this potential existing 
objective reality to others instead of creating something that did not previously exist.  
Therefore, objectivism is the appropriate ontological position for this thesis. 
 
3.1.2. Epistemological considerations 
Epistemology refers to what is regarded as appropriate knowledge about the social 
world; the nature, method, and grounds of knowledge. Moreover, the central issue in 
this context is whether a social world could be studied according to the same 
principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences (e.g. Blaikie, 2007; Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). Complementary to ontological considerations, which focus on the 
human‘s opinion on the nature of the world, the epistemological position emphasises 
the human‘s opinion on the technical term for the theory of knowledge (Marsh and 
Stoker, 2010). Usually, research philosophy has two epistemological positions; these 
are positivism and interpretivism (or anti-positivism). 
According to Remenyi et al. (1998, p33), positivism refers to ―…working with an 
observable social reality and that the end product of such research can be law-like 
generalisations similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists…‖. 
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Therefore, objective of research is to build testable hypotheses and then test and 
develop theories. In other words, the positivist study aims to identify a hypothesis and 
then make causal inferences regarding social phenomena (Lin, 1998).  Moreover, in a 
positive research study, the researcher employs the existing theory as the foundation 
on which to develop a hypothesis and then to collect the credible data, following 
which the hypothesis is tested and confirmed (Saunders et al., 2009).  Consistently, 
positivism is epistemologically considered to be the fundamental concept of 
mainstream economic studies, where observers are not influenced by, and do not 
influence, the observed social phenomenon. 
Meanwhile, interpretive is described as follow: 
the methods of research adopt the position that our knowledge of reality is a 
social construction by human actors…value-free data cannot be obtained, since 
the enquirer uses his or her preconceptions in order to guide the process of 
enquiry, and furthermore the researcher interacts with the human subjects of the 
enquiry, changing the perceptions of both parties (Walsham, 1995, p376). 
 
Accordingly, researchers are not independent of the research, particularly in the 
case where the interview is used as a data collection tool, where the personal feelings 
and views of the researcher may influence the participants‘ response.  
As stated, this thesis employs a positivistic approach, which is the mainstream 
econometric research approach (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986; Boland, 1991; 
Ryan et al., 2002), because this thesis is built on the foundation of existing theories. It 
takes an objective view of society, regards individual behaviour as deterministic, and 
uses empirical observation and a positive research methodology. Based on these 
theories, hypotheses would be extracted from relevant literature and tested with the 
help of collected data. Furthermore, in the data collection process, the personal 
feelings of the researcher would not be involved, because the data are only collected 
from highly credible databases, websites and annual reports.  
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3.2. Research Methods 
As an objective and positive research, this thesis applies a hypothetic-deductive 
methodology which is considered relevant. This methodology begins with 
examination of the causal relationships between specific variables under a theoretical 
explanation. Afterwards, the required data are collected and analysed. The findings of 
the data analysis are then used to test and develop the chosen theory. It is important to 
choose the research methods - qualitative or quantitative - in the next step.  
The qualitative method is described as a situated activity that locates the observer 
in the world, which consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the 
world visible. These practices turn the world into a series of representations, including 
field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Hence, major qualitative research methods include the 
case study, oral history, focus groups, participant observation, holistic research, 
community discussion forums, and reflective journal log sources (Kumar, 2011). 
On the other hand, as Hammersley (1993) suggests, the quantitative method 
usually refers to the application of the natural science experiment for scientific 
research. Consequently, the crucial features of the quantitative method are statistical 
measurement of the phenomena studied and systematic control of the theoretical 
variables influencing those phenomena. Moreover, some researchers argue that the 
quantitative method, the process of which consists of data collection using 
standardised approaches on a range of variables, examination of causal relationships 
between these variables, and test of given theory, is logically based on the positivism 
assumption (Desai and Porter, 2006; Henn et al., 2005). Hence, positivism generally 
tends to adopt quantitative research approaches, while interpretivism inclines to the 
use of qualitative methods (Marsh and Stoker, 2010). The application of a quantitative 
research approach will fulfill the requirement of the positivist epistemological position, 
because the researcher remains separate from the data. Accordingly, this thesis use a 
quantitative method as it is more relevant to this type of research and to the 
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researcher‘s philosophical way of thinking. 
In conclusion, this thesis follows both objectivism and positivism, thus defined as 
empirical research. According to the philosophical and methodological positions, a 
quantitative research approach is deemed to the most appropriate.  
 
3.3. Empirical Models 
This study adopts two main models to explore the relationship between the macro 
economy and banking system stability, and the determinants of banking distress in 
China. In the first empirical chapter, we begin by adopting the framework proposed by 
Wilson (1997a, 1997b), Boss (2002) and Virolainen (2004), i.e. estimating the 
relationship between credit risk and macro-economic dynamics. Next, we employ the 
Monte Carlo simulation approach to examine the distribution of possible default rates 
for the scenario under investigation.  
The vector autoregression (VAR) is usually employed for forecasting models 
with interrelated time series and the dynamic impact of random disturbances within 
the model could be analyzed as well. The VAR approach treats each variable in the 
model as a function of the lagged values of all of the endogenous variables, which 
sidesteps the need for structural modeling. Because that only lagged values of the 
endogenous variables appear on the right-hand side of the equations, simultaneity is 
not an issue and OLS yields consistent estimates. Moreover, even though the 
innovations may be contemporaneously correlated, OLS is efficient and equivalent to 
GLS since all equations have identical regressors. 
Therefore, the first VAR model is designed as below: 
𝑦𝑡 = α + 𝐴1𝑥𝑡−1 ···+𝐴𝑛𝑥𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 ···+𝐵𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛 + ѵ𝑡                                             (1) 
Dependent Variables: Non-performing Loan Ratio. 
Independent Variables: GDP (Nominal Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate), RPI 
(Retail Price Index), UNE (Unemployment Rate), HPI (House Price Index), FIX 
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(Total Fixed Investment), M2 (Money Supply), INT (Interest Rate), and EX 
(Exchange rate, Chinese Yuan to US Dollar). 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a vector of endogenous variables and 𝑥𝑡  is a vector of exogenous variables. 
In this equation α is the vector of intercepts and 𝐴1 ···𝐴𝑛  are matrices of coefficients 
on the macro-economic variable lagged 𝑛  times, and the matrices of coefficients 
𝐵1 ···𝐵𝑛  are associated with the lags on the dependent variable, and the disturbance 
term is given by ѵ𝑡 , which may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated 
with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables. 
Subsequently, we employ Monte Carlo simulations to generate the distribution of 
possible credit losses under the macro-economic shock scenarios, which we can then 
compare with possible credit losses under the baseline scenario. 
In the second empirical chapter, we adopt a general-to-specific approach aimed at 
identifying determinants of NPLR. We start with single-equation panel regressions 
including the whole list of possible explanatory factors of NPLR. The second model is: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                                                 (2) 
Dependent Variables: Non-performing Loan Ratio. 
Independent Variables: GDP (Nominal Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate), GDPP 
(Gross domestic production per capita), CPI (Consumer price index), RPI (Retail 
Price Index), UNE (Unemployment Rate), HP (House Price), FIX (Total Fixed 
Investment), FDI (Foreign direct investment), and EXP (Annual change in regional 
export in percent). 
Here 𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡  represents the vector of endogenous and predetermined variables, 
including lags of the dependent variables; i=1,..., N is the cross-section indicator; 
t=1, ..., T is the time indicator; 𝛼expresses a vector of coefficients of 𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡; 𝜂𝑖 is a time-
invariant unobserved region-specific effect; 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡is a vector of disturbances; and C is 
constant. Lags of the explanatory variable and NPLR itself are included to explore the 
effect of omitted explanatory variables and the persistence of NPLR. 
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In order to develop a EWS for the banking system in China, we apply the binary 
dependent variable model to study banking stability indicators. In this model, the 
dependent variable take on only two values, which is a dummy variable indicating the 
occurrence of an event, or a choice between two alternatives. Therefore the model 
could examine the relationship between the individual characteristics and the 
probability of event employed. Common models include probit (standard normal), 
logit (logistic), and gompit (extreme value) specification for the function. In Chapter 5, 
we apply the probit approach to explore the probability of occurrence of banking 
distress in China: 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                                                                         (3) 
where 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡  denotes a variable positively correlated with the likelihood of an occurrence 
of banking instability in region i at time t. Due to the fact that -∞<𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡<+∞ is not 
observable, we use the observable binary dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 , which takes on a 
value of 1 if banking distress actually occurs in region i at time t and 0 otherwise, 
using the following rule: 
𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 =  
1  𝑖𝑓𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 > 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                                                                                  (4) 
We follow the definition used by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for the 
dependent variable, in which the region is defined as an unstable region if at least one 
of the following two conditions is satisfied: 
(1) The NPLR in the banking sector is larger than 10%. 
(2) A systemic bank failure occurs or emergency measures are enacted for rescuing 
systemic banking problems. 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
Data are classified into primary or secondary data; these are distinguished by whether 
the information is gathered firsthand by the researcher for the specific purpose of the 
study, or from existing resources. The data type we employed for this study, secondary 
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data which are obtained from organisations‘ documents, published papers and 
electronic form, have some advantages and disadvantages. In terms of the advantages, 
the secondary data are generally believed to be of high quality and credible, because 
they have been identified and generated by experienced researchers and organisations. 
Furthermore, these researchers and organisations always have developed control 
procedures to control the quality of the emerging data (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Another advantage of utilising secondary data is that this approach can save time and 
cost as the data already exist. Accordingly, they can be immediately accessed and 
analysed for research. However, there are also three major limitations of secondary 
data. First, unlike primary data being gathered firsthand for specific research goals, 
secondary data might not completely satisfy the researcher‘s requirements. Second, 
there might be a problem when it is difficult to find the related data of variables of 
interest in a database. Third, potential bias, errors, or problems of data, which would 
surely affect internal or external validity, should not be ignored, due to the insufficient 
information offered by the of data (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 1994). 
The researcher has chosen secondary data as the data collection tool, which 
means the researcher would not be involved in a primary data collection process, as 
the data have already been gathered and recorded by someone else, such as 
government publication, financial newspaper, annual reports of public companies and 
commercial research organisations (Lancaster, 2007). Most of the data we employed 
in this thesis are extracted from the Thomson Reuters‘ Datastream database and the 
Ruisi Statistical database. In addition, other data sources we used include the Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook (NBS, various issues), Almanac of China‘s Finance and Banking 
1999-2012, websites of the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. The sample in Chapter 4 covers quarterly updated data of NPLs and 
China‘s macro economy covers the period from 2000Q1-2012Q3. The sample in 
Chapter 5 is composed of annual data of NPLs and economic performance of 22 
provinces, four direct-controlled municipalities and five autonomous regions in China 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
55 
 
(totalling 31 regions) during the period 2000-2012. The time horizon of data sample 
of both empirical chapters is from 2000-2012 mainly because that the banking system 
has generally transformed from a closed two-tiered banking system to an opened 
modern banking system. Although the government still maintains certain controlling 
power through the state-owned commercial banks, as long as the lower entry threshold 
into banking sector, the public listing of state-owned commercial banks, and the 
opening of banking sector to foreign banks, the banking system in China has to face 
the financial shock from the international market and need to applied the risk 
management to ensure the stability of banking system. The NPL ratio data come from 
the website of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which covers commercial 
banks, state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial 
banks, rural commercial banks and foreign banks. The time interval is constrained by 
the availability of long enough NPLR time series which have been published since 
2003. As the quality of data in Chinese banking sector has been questioned, the data 
have been crosschecked from multiple sources to ensure consistency and to improve 
the reliability of the research findings. Besides, due to combining a number of datasets, 
it is important to note the differences in data collection methods, definitions of 
measures used in the data, and variations in general survey design. Thus, in this study 
we select the data carefully to prevent such problems occurring. In addition, the data 
sample is processed with Microsoft Excel and SPSS. 
 
3.5. Procedures of Analysis 
This study employs a range of statistical techniques to provide robust and reliable 
findings, and these statistical methods that are used in this thesis are discussed in this 
section. Due to the assumptions that were econometrically suggested, it might lead to 
some problems may emerge, particularly for employing panel data – namely, missing 
data, unbalanced data and outliers. 
Beginning with missing data, this is caused by poor disclosure practices of some 
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variables and missing values of some variables at some point in time. The data sample 
used in this research maintains some missing values and we would not delete the 
observations that contain missing values as that removal strategy would affect the 
sample size. In order to overcome this problem, we turn to alternative data sources. 
Otherwise, the software this study applied (i.e. Eviews) would drop the missing value 
automatically if necessary. Furthermore, the problem of unbalanced data, which is 
also caused by missing data, can lead to other problems, which can be overcome by 
adopting appropriate estimation methods such as random-effect or fixed-effect 
regression. 
Regression techniques not only provide the estimation of the relationship 
between a single dependent variable and a series of independent variables, but also 
offer summary statistics and significance of relationships. A group of summary 
statistics is generated during the application of regression models; the two major 
statistics are the adjusted R square and the Sig. F statistic. The former suggests the 
overall explanatory power of the model and the later confirms whether the regression 
coefficients are statistically significant. The three main alternative types of regression 
analysis adopted in this thesis are the VAR (vector autoregression) approach for time 
series data in Chapter 4, the fixed-effect regression approach and the binary logistic 
regression approach for panel data in Chapter 5. These approaches are applied based 
on their suitability in modelling specific relationships and exploring data.  
The first empirical study adopts a framework to explain how macro-economic 
dynamics affect financial stability based on generalised impulse response functions 
with the help of a vector autoregression (VAR) model. The VAR which is popular in 
the literature allows estimating how NPLR changes in the time interval following 
adverse shocks. Furthermore, the VAR model also takes account of potential feedback 
effects from the banking distress to the macro economy. According to Sims (1980), in 
the studies of macro-economics and finance, the VAR model is widely applied to 
explain the interactions that exist between variables. Besides, the impacts of 
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unexpected shocks to specified variables on other variables in the model could be 
captured by the VAR model. The impulse response function is able to explain the 
effects of innovation shock on future values of the endogenous variables. Therefore, 
the VAR model is an appropriate tool for this thesis, because that we aim to find out 
the impact of macro-economic shocks on banking system stability. The second part of 
this chapter uses a stochastic simulation technique to implement stress-testing of the 
banking system. In this process, we firstly define some stress scenarios based on the 
estimating results of the VAR model, and then the future value of a specific variable is 
generated using Monte Carlo method under the given stress scenario. The strategy of 
designing artificial shocks of stress scenario is to combine the historical extreme 
events and the hypothetical shocks based on historical data of an economy. 
The second empirical study employs the fixed-effect regression model over the 
13-years period. Baum (2006) suggested that this methodology allows testing 
variations among cross-sectional units at the same time as for variations within 
individual units over time. The fixed effect model estimates the fixed effect on the 
dependent variables by controlling for the constant variations coming from the 
omitted variables and for unobserved heterogeneity between groups over time.  
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4. CHAPTER 4                                                                                                  
Macro Stress Testing in the Banking System of 
China 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent years banks have engaged in increasingly complex and diverse international 
financial activities. The role of banks, as one of the most important financial 
intermediaries in an economy, and as a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, 
reinforce the fact that instability in the banking system would be costly for the real 
economy. This is manifest by the myriad ways the current Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) has impacted economies (e.g. Tagkalakis, 2013; Aboody et al., 2014). In 
particular, the costs and losses, at the national level, associated with failures within the 
banking system, underscore the need for supervision with a macro-prudential 
perspective, particularly with regard to how banks measure and control their risk 
exposure.  
From the macro-prudential perspective, the Basel III Accord emphasized the 
need for the development of a more robust stress-testing approaches compared to the 
Basel II.
2
 The emphasis suggests that up-to-date risk management techniques —
particularly, ‗macro stress-testing‘ — have become effective tools in assessing 
stability of the banking system, and the financial system more broadly (see Sorge, 
2004). This is especially so from the perspective of central banks, where stress tests 
are a prudent technique alongside the traditional regulation methods used to assess 
risk exposure in the financial system (Marcelo et al., 2008). 
In this study we focus on macro stress-testing in assessing financial stability in 
China, and we address two questions that naturally arise. First, how should we 
                                                             
2
The notion of stress testing — which was originally developed in medicine (Missal, 1938)— 
has emerged as both an ex ante risk management tool for identifying vulnerability ahead an 
extreme shock, and a crisis management and resolution tool (Wong et al., 2010; Visco, 2011).  
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measure the potential risks in the banking system? Secondly, how do we quantify the 
vulnerability of the banking system to potential risks? To achieve answers to these, we 
develop a framework for macro stress testing of credit exposures in the Chinese 
banking system. Our empirical analysis adopts a vector autoregression (VAR) 
approach, and investigates the relationship between the ratio of non-performing bank 
loans and key macro-economic factors, such as GDP growth, RPI, the unemployment 
rate, fixed investment, real estate price indexes, the money supply, interest rates, and 
the exchange rate. Macro stress testing assesses the credit risk of banks‘ overall loan 
portfolios and mortgage exposures by mapping multivariate scenarios against 
potential risks. The test introduces different types of macro-economic shocks into the 
scenarios, which are designed to replicate those that have occurred in past financial 
crises and stochastic simulations. 
The present study is thus predicated on the following: first, stress-testing has 
become an integral part of banks‘ risk management assessments; second, in 
interpreting the results of stress tests, many banks create a link between market shocks 
and banks‘ responses. Interestingly, in China, which is an emergent global economy, 
stress testing is still at the embryonic stage. On this basis, we posit that the analyses 
contained herein are timely and important contributions to our understanding of this 
very important emerging market economy. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
Many financial institutions have experienced large losses during the recent global 
financial crisis. These significant losses do not necessarily imply that these institutions 
and the supervisory departments failed as a result of traditional risk management 
processes, as it is apparent that most of these institutions had employed sophisticated 
risk management systems. For example, according to Stulz (2008), a considerable loss 
cannot only be attributed to a consequence of risk management failure as a significant 
loss might occur even with a perfect risk management system in place. In other words, 
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the common task of daily risk management is not able to control for extreme exposure 
under certain circumstances. That notwithstanding, the recent GFC has also 
highlighted serious deficiencies in traditional risk management models (e.g. Huang et 
al., 2009; Aizenman et al., 2012) and underscored the necessity for improvements in 
risk management systems, and the adoption of improved risk-management measures 
to better depict the possible risks. This is why stress tests and scenario analysis are 
apposite. 
Moreover, regulators need to provide a clearer definition of financial stability and 
the framework to achieve this goal. Recently, regulators have charged banks with the 
responsibility of ensuring a sound, stable and efficient banking system as a whole, i.e. 
financial stability, rather than only assuring the soundness of their own bank (Borio, 
2006). Financial stability depends, in essence, on the prudential regulation and 
effective supervision which was instituted in 1999 by the IMF and the World Bank via 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Although there is no one generally 
accepted definition of financial stability, Marcelo et al. suggest that ‗for a given 
economy, [financial stability] provides sufficient assurance that the efficiency of 
intermediation between the suppliers and demanders of funds (broadly speaking, 
between investors and savers) will not be significantly affected by adverse events 
(shocks)‘ (2008, p.65). Given the huge negative implications for the real economy in 
the event of financial instability, regulatory authorities should have a particular and 
well-justified interest in ensuring financial stability (as highlighted by the Basel III 
Accord). 
As pointed out by Drehmann (2005), stress testing models differ in terms of 
complexity and the risks considered. Despite many significant contributions to stress 
testing (e.g. Elsinger et al., 2006; Jacobson et al., 2005; De Graeve et al., 2008; 
Pesaran et al.,2009; Aikman et al., 2009), there is no consensus on the set of tools, or 
the best approach, to use. As a consequence of this various approaches have been 
proposed, including Wilson (1997a, 1997b), Virolainen (2004), Sorge and Virolainen 
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(2006), Misina et al. (2006), and Jimenez and Mencia (2009). Differences 
notwithstanding, the underlying structures assume a linear relationship between 
macro-economic variables and the probability of default on the bank‘s loan portfolio. 
 
4.2.1. Development of stress-testing 
The idea of stress-testing originated in engineering. It is a kind of technique that aims 
to determine the stability of a given system or entity. To observe the results, it focuses 
on testing beyond normal operational capacity, often to a breaking point. In terms of 
economics and financial studies, ‗stress‘ is always referred to as an extreme bad shock 
based on the historical economic and financial events such as a huge downward 
change in the GDP or stock market index. The Basel II framework brought significant 
progress in banking risk management, which encourages banks to develop their own 
models to decrease capital requirement (Mejstrik et al., 2008). Initially, stress-testing 
was applied to portfolios or individual institutions, also known as micro stress tests. 
Meanwhile, there is also a wide range of research on the macro-economic perspective 
of banking system risk. With the development of techniques, more and more 
techniques have been invented to test the stability of financial institutions as a whole, 
which are also known as macro stress tests. Therefore, stress-testing as a set of tools 
of assessing and analysing the financial stability of the banking system should be 
treated as a way of focusing on the extreme banking risks that enhances the perception 
of them. It is a kind of accurate assessment on how those risks may be influenced by 
certain extreme shocks, both at the micro level (individual institutions) and the macro 
level.  
According to Borio et al. (2012), both micro and macro stress tests have four 
elements; these are the risk exposures subjected to stress; the scenario defining the 
shocks; the model mapping the shocks onto an outcome, and the measure of the 
outcome. The aim of stress-testing is to measure the impact of severe shocks, which 
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are potentially able to harm to the financial stability. Hence, the results of stress-
testing are threefold: to add value to the internal risk management practices 
implemented by banks, to provide a foundation for further development in prudential 
techniques, and to facilitate prevention and early warning and response tasks to deal 
with these adverse situations (Marcelo et al., 2008). 
Up to two decades ago, stress-testing was initially raised by the International 
Organization of Securities Commission, and then accepted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a key element of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) -a joint effort by the IMF and the World Bank to assess vulnerabilities across 
institutions. Along with the growing integration of financial surveillance, the IMF 
started a trial about stress-testing as part of regular surveillance (IMF, 2006). This 
resulted in the rapid expansion of adoption of stress-testing among the regulation 
authorities of the member countries of the FSAP. As stated by Bunn et al. (2005), 
stress-testing soon became a key supplementary tool for broader macro-prudential 
analysis of potential threats to financial stability. Moreover, there is no doubt that the 
stress-testing application in the FSAP not only offers a tool to assess financial stability, 
but also has a lasting effect on encouraging policymakers of membership countries to 
develop a more specific financial stability assessment function (Jones et al., 2004). As 
the result of widespread implementation of the FSAP, many central banks and the IMF 
made extensive use of stress tests prior to the crisis. According to a report of the 
BIS (Fender et al., 2001), 43 central banks undertook 293 stress test scenarios (stress 
tests based on a potential market event, such as a stock market crash) and 131 
sensitivity stress tests (stress tests based on standardised moves in closely-linked 
market risk factors, such as a parallel yield curve shift).  
During the follow-up crisis, the researchers developed the techniques with 
several broad varieties based on increasing numbers of stress-testing practices. On one 
dimension, it can be classified in the forms of sensitivity test and scenario test. 
According to Majnoni et al. (2001), the stress-testing models were not very 
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sophisticated but basic to some extent in the early period. Considering there are 
limited data and resources available, those models which examine the relationships 
between aggregate profits and losses and macroeconomic factors may be the only 
possible approach. As well as the work of Majnoni et al. (2001), the most common 
method applied in member countries of the FSAP is the sensitivity test. This method 
addresses the impact of a change in a single risk factor on the balance sheets of banks; 
but the sensitivity testis not able to estimate the interaction between macroeconomic 
variables. In 2006, Elsinger and colleagues made a milestone contribution. They 
developed a model covering market risk, credit risk, interest rate risk and counterparty 
credit risk to assess the impact on Austrian banking sector. The full coverage of risk 
exposure data of this model can thus achieve a very robust test of vulnerability based 
on on-balance sheet exposures. Furthermore, the idea of value-at-risk (VaR) which is 
used to access the volatility of portfolio was firstly introduced to measure loss 
distributions. As this model also makes use of the interbank exposures data, it is able 
to explore the path of the failures of one individual bank extending through the system, 
which is known as the contagion effect.  
At the beginning, most of stress-testing practices were single-factor sensitivity 
analysis. However, this approach has evolved from being at the central position of the 
analysis to becoming a supplementary method. Meanwhile, the number of scenario 
analysis practices was increasing with varying degrees of complexity (Moretti and 
Swinburne, 2008). Unlike the sensitivity test, the scenario test focuses on scenarios in 
which multiple risk factors which are intended to be internally consistent change 
simultaneously. To achieve this objective, there are two approaches to designing the 
scenario. The first type is the historical approach which relies directly on historic data. 
The historical scenarios can be set in two ways. The first approach replicates a 
specific historical crisis, such as the global financial crisis of 2008, the stock market 
crash of 1987, and the Asian financial crisis of 1998. The second approach is to draw 
artificial shocks of specific risk exposure based on the tail part of the historical 
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distribution. This second type is a hypothetical approach which uses the experience 
and judgments of experts to identify the shocks that may possibly occur in the future 
and significantly affect the system. As we mentioned above, the work of Fender and 
Gibson (2001) sorted the 293 scenarios test into nine categories: the asset markets-
related scenarios in which the shocks are linked with market rates or prices, such as 
equities market, interest rates market, credit spreads market, commodities market, and 
among others; the geographical areas scenarios in which the shocks are derived from 
market-wide stress within countries including Europe, Japan, North America, and the 
emerging market countries; and the ―other‖ scenarios which covers a wide range of 
scenarios. Given these practices of scenario testing, macro stress test scenarios 
generally focus on severe macroeconomic situations, for example, a severe recession, 
a sharp drop in property prices, and a significant change of exchange rates. 
On a second dimension, stress tests can be classified in the form of bottom-up 
and top-down. On one hand, the bottom-up approach refers to when the central bank 
or supervisor co-ordinates the macro stress tests by designing the scenarios; thus the 
institutions subsequently run with their internal models to measure the impact of the 
shocks on their performance. Then, the supervisory authority integrates the results 
from individual institutions. On the other hand, the top-down approach refers to when 
the central authority directly produces the stress test results with detailed position data.  
On a third dimension, stress tests can be classified in the forms of the piecewise 
approach and the integrated approach. The piecewise approach runs on the portfolios 
of individual financial institutions to access the shocks from macroeconomic variables 
(such as economic growth, interest rates and unemployment). The latter embed the 
reduced-form equations into structural macro-econometric models, like the model of 
Norges Bank that has included financial stability variables in a macro-econometric 
model (Bardsen et al., 2006). On the contrary, the integrated approach focuses on the 
system level estimating a probability distribution of aggregate losses that could arise 
in a stress scenario based on an aggregate system-wide model. Several studies have 
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modelled default probabilities as non-linear functions of macro variables (Wilson, 
1997). 
Stress-testing in the FSAP covers a range of different risks, including credit risk, 
market risk, and liquidity risk: 
 Credit risk is the major overall source of risk for the banking industry in many 
countries whose damages can be directly reflected in banks‘ balance sheets. To 
estimate credit risk, single factor sensitivity analysis is the fairly classic approach 
which consists of NPL migration analysis and loan reclassification analysis. Then, 
more approaches have been developed based on loan performance data and 
regressions. As the result of application of these advanced approaches, probabilities of 
default (PDs) and loss given default (LGD) have replaced NPL for measuring loan 
performance. According to Avesani et al. (2006), the credit risk model based on 
CreditRisk+, which was originally developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products 
(CSFP), has examined the relationship between macro financial factors and PDs and 
LGDs. Meanwhile, the implementation of scenario analysis for credit risk largely 
depends on data availability.  
 Market risk consists of a range of different risks such as interest rate risk, exchange 
rate risk, real-estate price risk; credit spread risk, and commodity price risk. Because 
market risk shocks are usually built on the hypothetical or historical movements of 
related variables, the value-at-risk method is widely accepted to conduct such kind of 
stress-testing.  
Because stress-testing is a relatively new topic, there is no consensus on the most 
effective set of tools, or the best approach to use. Moreover, Drehmann (2005) argued 
that stress-testing models are different in terms of complexity and the risks considered. 
As a result of this, some recent researchers have proposed various approaches to 
stress-testing, including Wilson (1997a, 1997b), Virolainen (2004), Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006), Misina et al. (2006), and Jimenez and Mencia (2009). However, 
they all share a similar structure rooted in the quantitative risk management 
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framework: the first one is that all papers employed forecasted macroeconomic 
variables to simulate the impact of shocks on the economy; and the second is that all 
these approaches required the translating of these macroeconomic variables into loss 
distributions. The most basic approach is assuming a linear relationship between the 
macroeconomic variables and the probability of default of the bank‘s loan portfolio. 
It is generally accepted that carrying out any stress test normally involves the 
following stages:  
1. to delimit the realm of application of the test;  
2. to define, design and calibrate the shocks with which the target system is to be 
stressed;  
3. to estimate the influence of the shocks selected and to quantify that impact in 
terms of variables demonstrating the financial condition of the system to be tested;  
4. to identify the feasible considerations and policy measures emerging from the 
outcomes of applying point 3 above. 
 
4.2.2. Feedback effect 
Feedback effect illustrates the response of a financial system to the real economy 
when a risk factor relevant to macro-economic dynamics affects the financial system. 
Then, credit supply is expected to decrease along with the pressure on investment and 
consumption as a consequence.  In their paper, Jacobson et al. (2005) pointed out that 
the feedback effect is another important issue of stress tests. Consequently, the 
aggregate vector autoregressive model (VAR), with the data of default frequency of 
companies, was proposed to measure financial stability including macro-economic 
feedback. The result of this model reveals a significant feedback effect from financial 
stability to the macro-economy by integrating defaults of company, balance sheet of 
bank, and macro-economy. After it was first practiced in Sweden，this methodology 
has become widely accepted. De Graeve et al. (2008) applied this method for banks in 
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Germany, and Pesaran et al. (2009) proposed a global VAR framework for modelling 
national and international macro-economic risk factors jointly. In 2009, the Bank of 
England (Aikman et al., 2009) provided a more comprehensive approach - RAMSI - 
which successfully explored the feedback mechanisms.  
 
4.2.3. Contagion effect 
Besides the feedback effect, there is another reason why the financial sector is often 
thought to be more likely to suffer from systematic instability. It is worth noting that 
interaction among financial institutions could not be explained by simply aggregating 
the behaviour of individual banks. Thus, this interaction might lead to systematic 
fragility at times. The contagion effect refers to when the failure of a bank may cause 
a further deterioration in the capital adequacy in other banks. Because of the 
contagion effect, the risks could be easily transferred from a single failure of an 
individual institution to the whole system through the interbank market, OTC 
derivatives transactions, and the payments and settlements system (Schoenmaker, 
1996). The speed and the degree of contagion develop with the continued growth of 
international capital markets. Schoenmaker (1996) emphasised that contagions in the 
banking sector would spread more extensively, thereby resulting in larger losses, and 
causing serious damage to the economy at large. Otherwise, information asymmetry 
limits the public information for creditors to access the stability of their financial 
service provider. Even if there is a potential stress at other institutions, creditors may 
not realise that this vulnerability may directly affect their institutions. Because banks 
are the participants in the payment and settlement systems, the contagion effect could 
be amplified and pose a serious threat to financial stability (Corrigan, 1996). 
 
 
4.2.4. Stress-testing in China 
In China, the stress-testing is still in the early promotion period. The first Financial 
Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) of China was completed in July 2001 when the 
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CBRC organized some major commercial banks to conduct the stress-testing 
experiment with the mature risk management tools such as Risk Manager purchased 
from Risk Metrics. Then, at the end of 2003, the first formal stress test which assesses 
the credit risk, liquidity risk, exchange risk and interest rate risk was completed by the 
Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), 
the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and Guangdong 
Development Bank. Following the success of this attempt, two important regulatory 
documents were issued by the China Banking Regulation Commission in 2007 and 
2008 respectively: ‗The Notification of Conducting Stress Test on Real Estate Loan at 
Key Region‘ and ‗Guidelines about Commercial Bank‘s Stress-Testing‘. The IMF, 
however, stated that there are a series of obstacles facing full implementation of 
stress-testing in China, such as serious data gaps, weakness in the infrastructure and 
constraints on the FSAP team‘s access to confidential data (IMF, 2011).  
In accordance with the implementation of stress-testing in China, the study about 
stress-testing is also in its early stages. Yang and Zhu (2004) provided a relatively 
comprehensive summary about the practices of stress-testing among supervision 
authorities of FSAP member countries. Based on Yang and Zhu‘s study, Ba and Zhu 
(2010) discussed the pros and cons of stress-testing, with a particular focus on how to 
carry out an effective stress test in developing countries with limited data. In addition, 
Ba and Zhu (2010) provided insightful views about further research on macro stress-
testing and feasibility proposal of China‘s stress-testing practice.  
On the dimension of empirical research, stress-testing was not used for bank‘s 
risk management at the beginning. Wang et al. (2002) suggested that China‘s export 
would not be seriously affected by the significant depreciation of the Yen with 
sensitivity analysis and stress scenario. Next, researchers turned their interest to 
assessing the vulnerability of banking system with the probit and logistic model. Chen 
and Wu (2004) carried out an empirical analysis of the vulnerability of China‘s 
banking system with data covering the period of 1978-2000 and found that macro-
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economic dynamics, like financial deficit, inflation, growth of fixed asset investment, 
and interest spread, are the factors which could affect the bank‘s stability. Besides, 
they believed that financial variables are the major factors related to the vulnerability 
of the banking system. However, some researchers have argued that macro-economic 
variables have more significant correlation with the vulnerability of SOCBs, among 
which GDP growth, real interest rate, and inflation are the top three factors, while 
financial variable plays a supplementary role to the macro-economic variable (Fan, 
2004; Ren and Sun, 2007). The growth of the non-performing loan was first 
introduced to the logistic model to estimate its relationship with financial stability (Li, 
2006). Later, according to the FSAP, macro stress-testing became the most popular 
tool at the end of the 2000s. Xu and Liu (2008) explained how to use macro stress-
testing to estimate the stability of a financial system by comparing several popular 
macro stress-testing approaches. The research by Xu (2008) conducted a linear macro 
stress-testing model to estimate the asset growth of China‘s banking sector under the 
extreme scenario when GDP growth and CPI deteriorated to various level in 2008 and 
2009. The evidence from this study indicates that the asset of China‘s banking sector 
is able to maintain an increasing trend under the stress scenarios. Hua (2009) analysed 
the impact of macro-economic dynamics fluctuations on China‘s banking system and 
non-performing loan ratio by using the macro stress-testing scenarios method. Due to 
the uncertainty of the macro economy, credit risk stress-testing on the real-estate loan 
business has become the major element of risk management of commercial banks. 
Hence, such a credit risk stress test was carried out by Liu and Tian (2008), which 
analysed a series of risks for the real-estate loan business. For the real-estate loan 
business, the risks mainly depend on the repayment capacity of the real-estate 
company and mortgage borrowers. Some scholars suggest that the quality of the real-
estate loan of commercial banks in China is relatively satisfactory. Nevertheless, if the 
real-estate price drops significantly, the NPL of the bank sector would likely double 
its size and badly undermine the profitability (Feng, 2009; Wang and Wang, 2009). 
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Moreover, Yu and Li (2010) noted that the default risk of mortgage would boost in the 
case that CPI increases sharply and GDP drops. However, these studies only borrow 
ideas from macro stress-testing, while still employing traditional methods to simulate 
the changes of macro-economic factors. Furthermore, this approach has some 
disadvantages that cannot effectively reflect the impact of macro changes on the 
banking system, and thus cannot show which macro-economic variables affect the 
credit risk of the finance system under the shock circumstances.  
To conduct a more effective stress test for China‘s banking system, two main 
obstacles need to be overcome: (1) The availability and quality of data. For the 
People‘s Bank of China, the time horizon of basic public data for scenario design in 
the macroeconomic model is far from sufficient. Along with the varying statistical 
caliber and poor quality of data, these drawbacks lead to biases and errors in the 
stress-testing results. (2) Macro-economic model. In theory, the stress scenario is able 
to be designed based on the general macro-economic model, but there is no such 
widely accepted macroeconomic model which not only exactly reflects China‘s reality, 
but also passes the series of statistical tests. Alternatively, researchers have to apply 
the classic economic model or other countries‘ macro-economic models directly. 
However, during the transition period, the ubiquity of regional protectionism is the 
major characteristic of China‘s economy. Omitting this variable will definitely affect 
the effectiveness of stress-testing analysis.  
 
4.3. Methodology 
4.3.1. Empirical equations 
In testing credit risk exposure in China‘s banking system, we will begin by adopting 
the framework proposed by Wilson (1997a, 1997b), Boss (2002) and Virolainen 
(2004), i.e. estimating the relationship between credit risk and macro-economic 
dynamics. Next, we employ the Monte Carlo simulation approach to examine the 
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distribution of possible default rates for the scenario under investigation. The Monte 
Carlo simulation generates a given year a number of losses by a random quantile of a 
severity distribution (McNeil et al., 2010; Dutta and Perry, 2007). 
We set 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  as the aggregate non-performing loan ratio of the whole banking 
system in China in period t. Since 0 ≤ 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  ≤ 1  we can employ its logit-
transformed value (𝑦𝑡) instead of 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡   as the dependent variable. That is 
𝑦 𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛  
1 − 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  
  
After this canonical processing for the credit risk index (note here that –∞ <𝑦𝑡< +∞), 
it follows that 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  is negatively related to 𝑦𝑡 , which means a higher 𝑦𝑡  indicates a 
better credit-risk status, and vice versa. Further, preliminary (augmented Dickey-
Fuller) unit-root tests with the time trend and the intercept finds 𝑦𝑡  (our dependent 
variable) to be stationary. More specifically, 𝑦𝑡  dependents on its lags, and the n 
lagged values of the macro-economic variables: 
𝑦𝑡 = α + 𝐴1𝑥𝑡−1 ···+𝐴𝑛𝑥𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 ···+𝐵𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛 + ѵ𝑡                                             (4.1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a vector of endogenous variables and 𝑥𝑡  is a vector of exogenous variables. 
In this equation α is the vector of intercepts and 𝐴1 ···𝐴𝑛  are matrices of coefficients 
on the macro-economic variable lagged 𝑛  times, and the matrices of coefficients 
𝐵1 ···𝐵𝑛  are associated with the lags on the dependent variable, and the disturbance 
term is given by ѵ𝑡 , which may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated 
with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables. 
This macro-economic framework examines the dynamics of the macro-economic 
variables as well. Based on Wilson‘s original specification, which every macro-
economic variable follows an autoregressive (AR) process, we generalize a more 
realistic dynamic process by adopting by the following specification: 
𝑥𝑡 = β + 𝐶1𝑥𝑡−1 ···+𝐶𝑛𝑥𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐷1𝑦𝑡−1 ···+𝐷𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (4.2) 
 
where β is the vector of intercepts; 𝐶1 ···𝐶𝑛  and 𝐷1 ···𝐷𝑛   are coefficient matrices; and  
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𝜀𝑡  is an vector of disturbances. Following Wong et al. (2006) we recognize that 
macro-economic variables are mutually interdependent and equation (4.2) explicitly 
accounts for feedback effects of bank performances on the economy (the terms 
𝐷1𝑦𝑡−1 ···+𝐷𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛). Equation (4.1) and (4.2) together compose the framework to study 
the economic performance and the associated financial stability indicators. 
In developing our model we aim to improve on the specification employed in 
Virolainen (2004) and Wilson (1997a, 1997b). First, we employ a lag-effect of the 
macro-economic variables to banks‘ credit risk. Second, by allowing 𝑥𝑡  to depend on 
𝑦𝑡−1,...,𝑦𝑡−𝑛  this implies previous bank performances can influence the present macro 
economy.  
Subsequently, we employ Monte Carlo simulations to generate the distribution of 
possible credit losses under the macro-economic shock scenarios, which we can then 
compare with possible credit losses under the baseline scenario. Nevertheless, it is 
instructive to note that this approach has some limitations, such as the treatment of the 
contagion effect within the banking system. First, it is not unusual for central banks to 
use aggregate data when testing the change of credit risk in the regional banking 
system, based on the assumption that we move from top to bottom. However, the use 
of aggregate data when assessing credit risk in the whole banking system is equivalent 
to conducting micro stress-testing with the aggregate data, and ignoring the structural 
problems within the financial system. Second, the adaptive response of banking 
institutions may generate a feedback effect. It is commonplace that in a number of the 
macro stress testing practices the initial shock effect from the macro economy to the 
banking system is small in the first period, while the risk effect will be significantly 
increased when the period of stress testing is prolonged. In other words, the change of 
risk factors in the first round should not be treated as the ultimate outcome and 
underscores the need to continually reassess the response behavior of the banking 
system to a (macro-economic) shock.  
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4.3.2. Variables description and data sources 
Following the framework discussed above, we adopt a macro-economic credit risk 
model to estimate the relationship between macro-economic variables and the non-
performing loan ratio (NPLR) of the banking system covering the period from 
2000Q1 to 2012Q3. Due to the importance of selecting the appropriate variables, 
Table 4.1 presents a brief summary of the variables considered in previous research, 
which then informs our choice of variables for China. Based on the aims of this 
research (and the reliability and availability of data), we will focus on eight major 
explanatory variables for China (see Table 4.2). 
  
Table 4.1:Summary of Macro-economic Variables Employed in Previous Research 
Author(s) Geographical 
Location 
Macro variables 
Wong et al. (2006) Hong Kong Real GDP growth; Real GDP growth of Mainland 
China; Real interest rates (HIBOR); Real property 
prices. 
Bardsen et al. (2006) Norway Real GPD; Real household consumption; 
Unemployment; Consumer prices; Interest rate; House 
prices. 
Bunn et al.  (2005) United Kingdom Interest rate; GDP; Output gap; Unemployment rate; 
Real exchange rate; Inflation rate; House price inflation 
rate. 
Misina et al. (2006)  Canada GDP growth rate; Unemployment rate; Interest rate; 
Credit/GDP ratio. 
Virolainen (2004) Finland Nominal GDP growth; Interest rate; Exchange rate; 
M2; International balance of payment; Asset price. 
 
We identify three popular dependent variables typically considered in previous 
research, namely: the firm‘s probabilities of default (PD) (see for example, Pesaran et 
al., 2006); corporate expected default frequencies (EDF) (see for example, Alves, 
2005); and, the balance sheet information of the bank (such as NPLR, capital 
adequacy ratios and liquidity). Compared to PD and EDFs, balance sheet information 
is a traditional measurement, but it is limited because balance sheet information is 
only available on a relatively low-frequency basis (quarterly and yearly). In contrast, 
the PD and EDF are available at a higher frequency, and they can be forward-looking. 
Due to the nature of China‘s commercial banks, and the availability of relevant data, 
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we employ NPLR as the measurable dependent variable pertaining to the balance 
sheet. According to the Loan Quality Assessment Guidelines (China Bank Regulatory 
Commission, 2005), the NPLR is classified as the total of sub-loans, doubtful-loans 
and loss-loans divided by total loans. In other words, a higher NPLR implies a higher 
level of credit exposure. 
  
Table 4.2: Variable List 
Variable Description  
NPLR Non-performing Loan Ratio 
GDP  Nominal Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
RPI  Retail Price Index  
UNE  Unemployment Rate  
HPI House Price Index 
FIX Total Fixed Investment, nominal (%YOY) 
M2 Money Supply, M2 (%YOY) 
INT Interest Rate  
EX  Exchange rate, Chinese Yuan to US Dollar 
 
The eight explanatory macro-economic variables (Table 4.2), including the GDP 
growth rate, the retail price index, the unemployment rate, a house price index, the 
money supply (M2), the interest rate, exchange rate, and total fixed investment, can be 
placed into four categories to capture different kinds of potential shocks: 
1. The business cycle is measured by GDP growth, retail price index (for 
inflation), and the unemployment rate, as the stability of the macro-economy 
is the premise of a healthy financial system. A growing economy is likely to 
be associated with rising incomes and reduced financial distress. Therefore, 
GDP growth is negatively associated with NPLR and unemployment is 
positively related with NPLR. After maintaining high-growth for a number of 
years, the growth of China‘s economy has slowed down somewhat, while 
inflation remains above the Government‘s target. Thus, the policy-makers in 
China have been concerned with how to implement a successful ―soft-
landing‖, whilst dealing with inflation. 
2. Credit risk is measured by the interest rate, money supply (M2), and total 
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fixed investment. Banks are still the major source of corporate and fixed 
investment in China, and the interest rate and credit quota have a direct 
impact on the credit exposure of the banks‘ balance sheets. Otherwise, unlike 
their counterparts in developed countries, income from loans surprisingly 
makes more than 80 percent of the total profit of commercial banks in China. 
A hike in interest rates weakens borrows‘ debt servicing capacity, thus, NPLR 
is expected to be positively related with interest rate. 
3. Property-value bubbles, which are measured by house price indexes, have 
triggered several financial crises, such as the Florida property bubble in late 
1920s (White, 2009), the depression of Japan since 1991 (Posen, 2003), and 
the subprime lending crisis since March 2008. In China, the loans to the real 
estate sector have grown to RMB 11.74 trillion in September 2012, an 
increase of approximately 12.1% since the end of 2011 (Source: China 
Banking Regulatory Commission). Should this indicate a bubble this may 
create problems since real estate is a major item of collateral, and banks 
would be unwilling to service the debt should the value of real estate declines. 
4. Exchange rate risk is measured by the exchange rate (Chinese Yuan to US 
Dollar), which reflects the global macro-economic environment. The 
fluctuation of the exchange rate might significantly affect the stability of the 
whole economy and output. An appreciation of the exchange rate can have 
mixed implications. On the one hand, it could weaken the competitiveness of 
export-oriented firms and adversely affect their ability to service their debt. 
On the other, it can improve the debt-servicing capacity of borrowers who 
borrow in foreign currency. The sign of the relationship between NEER and 
NPL is indeterminate. 
These variables are initially chosen as macro-economic factors by the R-squared 
values of the regressions. We have also tried some other macro-economic variables 
like the consumer price index, producer price index, and stock market index, but find 
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no additional explanatory power. 
We source the NPLR data from the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
website and the Ruisi Statistical database. Other data used in this study are sourced 
from DataStream, the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and The People‘s Bank 
of China. The summary descriptive statistics of data are presented in Table 4.3. 
  
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics, 2000Q1-2012Q3 
 
Prior to 2000 annual data was only available for some variables. The trend in the 
NPLR of the banking system in China had climbed to a peak in 1999, thereafter 
exhibiting a steady decline. In part this turning point may be explained by the 
establishment of asset management corporations between 1999 and 2004, which were 
responsible for managing the bad assets of the four major state-owned commercial 
banks. Since these ―big four‖ state-owned commercial banks retained in excess of 60% 
of the total assets in the whole banking system, the concurrent injection by the Central 
Bank of a large amount of capital funds into these ―big four‖, together with the 
purchase of non-performing loans by asset management corporations from these ―big 
four‖, led to the overall NPLR dropping significantly.  
Results of our preliminary tests using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
method (with trends and intercepts, testing the time series properties for all these 
variables) suggest that three of the macro-economic series — specifically RPI, HPI, 
and M2— are stationary I(0). The other five variables — i.e. GDP, INT, EX, UNE 
and FIX — are first order stationary I(1). Because of this we use their first differences, 
DGDP, DINT, DEX, DUNE and DFIX in the regression (see Appendix C, Figure C.1).  
 NPLR GDP RPI UNE HPI FIX M2 INT EX 
Mean  11.22  9.77  1.51  4.02  4.93  19.58  12.08  6.37  7.59 
Median  7.53  9.60  1.20  4.10  4.30  21.15  12.15  6.21  8.02 
Maximum  29.18  14.80  7.56  4.30  12.19  37.40  19.54  7.83  8.28 
Minimum  0.90  6.60 -2.03  3.10 -1.10  5.39  7.07  5.76  6.29 
Std. Dev. 9.76 2.05 2.61 0.32 3.70 6.99 2.84 0.61 0.75 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
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Table 4.4: ADF unit root tests 
Variable t-Statistic Unit root test result 
GDP -1.88* GDP~I(1), DGDP 
RPI -3.67 RPI ~I(0) 
UNE -2.75* UNE ~I(1), DUNE 
HPI -3.48 HPI ~I(0) 
FIX -0.89* FIX ~I(1), DFIX 
M2 -7.31 M2~I(0) 
INT -2.69* INT ~I(1), DINT 
EX -2.12* EX ~I(1), DEX 
* Non-rejection of the null of non-stationarity at 10% 
 
Following Lutkepohl (1993) we focus on the Akaike (AIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQ) and 
Schwarz (SC) criteria for the selection of the lag lengths in our VAR model. Given the 
sample size, and the nature of the quarterly data, the results of the Akaike information 
criterion, Schwarz information criterion, and Hannan-Quinn information criterion all 
suggest a 4 period lag length. (see Appendix C, Table C.1). 
 
4.4. Empirical Results and Discussion  
4.4.1. Discussion of results 
In this section we adopt a VAR framework that links the credit risk measurement of 
the banking system to the macro-economic variables (outlined in Table 4.2) which 
reflect the situation of the macro economy. In our VAR framework we assume that 
vulnerability in the banking system can be affected by the general economic 
conditions, and there is a potential feedback effect which allows stress in the banking 
system to impact the macro economy. Unlike simple linear regression, the order of 
variables in VAR should be arranged according to the speed of reaction to a particular 
shock. Therefore, our variable ordering is such that the variables related to the 
business cycle — such as GDP, RPI and unemployment rate — were located after 
NPLR, because the business cycleaffects the banking system after a lag. Consequently, 
interest rates and the exchange rate were ordered at the bottom of the VAR. 
As the VAR results show in Table 4.5, most of the signs of the coefficients of the 
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variables are as expected and consistent with other studies (see Wong et al., 2006 and 
Shen and Feng, 2010). Thus 𝑦𝑡  is positively related to the lag effects on GDP growth 
and the unemployment rate due to the fact that when the economy enjoys steady 
growth with a low unemployment rate, the banking system can share the benefit as the 
financial intermediary. Meanwhile, 𝑦𝑡  is negatively related to the lag of RPI and the 
money supply, albeit via comparatively weak correlations which are below 
expectation.  
Between 2003 and 2007 China‘s economy experienced a significant cyclical 
upswing, with vigorous financing demand leading to a tremendous influx of funding 
into production. The onset of the GFC around 2008Q2 adversely impacted 
international trade. On the one hand, banks provided more loans to firms to avoid their 
potential default. On the other hand, the government employed easy monetary policy 
to ensure smooth growth. As a consequence, default rates remained stable, while the 
inflation rate and money supply increased significantly.  
 
Table 4.5: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
yt (-1) 
0.96*** 
(-0.27) 
-4.70* 
(-2.64) 
-2.75 
(-2.25) 
0.16 
(-0.12) 
-5.63** 
(-2.49) 
0.08 
(-9.81) 
3.11 
(-4.18) 
-0.70 
(-0.54) 
0.01 
(-0.18) 
yt (-2) 
0.39 
(-0.35) 
2.51 
(-3.44) 
-2.90 
(-2.93) 
0.11 
(-0.16) 
3.14 
(-3.24) 
-0.77 
(-12.81) 
1.35 
(-5.46) 
0.34 
(-0.70) 
0.12 
(-0.23) 
yt (-3) 
-0.66** 
(-0.32) 
5.31* 
(-3.12) 
3.67 
(-2.66) 
-0.18 
(-0.15) 
4.86 
(-2.94) 
2.81 
(-11.62) 
-8.02 
(-4.95) 
1.34** 
(-0.64) 
-0.11 
(-0.21) 
yt (-4) 
0.27 
(-0.30) 
-3.21 
(-2.95) 
1.75 
(-2.51) 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
-3.28 
(-2.78) 
-0.74 
(-10.96) 
4.39 
(-4.67) 
-0.97 
(-0.60) 
-0.04 
(-0.20) 
DGDP(-1) 
0.10** 
(-0.04) 
-0.76* 
(-0.44) 
0.11 
(-0.37) 
-0.04* 
(-0.02) 
0.52 
(-0.41) 
-3.26** 
(-1.62) 
0.24 
(-0.69) 
-0.07 
(-0.09) 
0.03 
(-0.03) 
DGDP(-2) 
0.10* 
(-0.06) 
-0.44 
(-0.58) 
0.37 
(-0.49) 
-0.05* 
(-0.03) 
0.78 
(-0.54) 
-4.41** 
(-2.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.91) 
-0.12 
(-0.12) 
0.03 
(-0.04) 
DGDP(-3) 
0.02 
(-0.05) 
-0.44 
(-0.53) 
0.74 
(-0.45) 
-0.05* 
(-0.03) 
0.85 
(-0.50) 
-3.40* 
(-1.98) 
-0.35 
(-0.85) 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
0.00 
(-0.04) 
DGDP(-4) 
0.06 
(-0.06 
-0.17 
(-0.63) 
0.35 
(-0.54) 
-0.05 
(-0.03) 
-0.29 
(-0.59) 
-3.17 
(-2.34) 
0.49 
(-1.00) 
-0.19 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
RPI(-1) 
-0.02 
(-0.04 
-0.35 
(-0.44) 
0.33 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
0.19 
(-0.41) 
1.06 
(-1.63) 
-0.52 
(-0.69) 
0.11 
(-0.09) 
0.04 
(-0.03) 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
RPI(-2) 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
-0.49 
(-0.63) 
0.22 
(-0.53) 
-0.05 
(-0.03) 
-0.13 
(-0.59) 
-3.42 
(-2.33) 
-0.07 
(-0.99) 
-0.19 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
RPI(-3) 
0.06 
(-0.04 
-0.39 
(-0.40) 
0.20 
(-0.34) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.42 
(-0.38) 
-2.89* 
(-1.49) 
0.13 
(-0.64) 
-0.06 
(-0.08) 
0.03 
(-0.03) 
RPI(-4) 
-0.07* 
(-0.04) 
0.41 
(-0.39) 
0.14 
(-0.33) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.65* 
(-0.37) 
0.07 
(-1.45) 
-0.20 
(-0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.03) 
DUNE(-1) 
1.12** 
(-0.55) 
-10.48* 
(-5.42) 
1.89 
(-4.62) 
-0.34 
(-0.25) 
-3.86 
(-5.11) 
-19.03 
(-20.16) 
-3.61 
(-8.59) 
-2.08* 
(-1.10) 
0.11 
(-0.36) 
DUNE(-2) 
0.83* 
(-0.48) 
-10.30** 
(-4.69) 
3.18 
(-3.99) 
-0.11 
(-0.22) 
-0.53 
(-4.41) 
-19.79 
(-17.42) 
-0.43 
(-7.43) 
-2.03** 
(-0.95) 
-0.09 
(-0.31) 
DUNE(-3) 
0.82* 
(-0.44) 
-7.65* 
(-4.34) 
1.57 
(-3.69) 
-0.13 
(-0.20) 
-3.65 
(-4.09) 
-19.70 
(-16.14) 
-1.93 
(-6.88) 
-1.59* 
(-0.88) 
0.04 
(-0.29) 
DUNE(-4) 
0.95** 
(-0.37) 
-2.21 
(-3.61) 
2.76 
(-3.08) 
0.58*** 
(-0.17) 
8.00** 
(-3.40) 
-9.10 
(-13.43) 
-3.83 
(-5.73) 
-1.40* 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.24) 
HPI(-1) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.02 
(-0.30) 
0.10 
(-0.25) 
0.03* 
(-0.01) 
0.90*** 
(-0.28) 
0.89 
(-1.11) 
-0.13 
(-0.47) 
0.00 
(-0.06) 
-0.02 
(-0.02) 
HPI(-2) 
0.03 
(-0.03) 
-0.04 
(-0.30) 
-0.08 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.12 
(-0.28) 
0.04 
(-1.12) 
0.19 
(-0.48) 
0.00 
(-0.06) 
0.00 
(-0.02) 
HPI(-3) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.03 
(-0.26) 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.05 
(-0.24) 
-0.45 
(-0.96) 
0.00 
(-0.41) 
0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.00 
(-0.02) 
HPI(-4) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.13 
(-0.15) 
-0.02** 
(-0.01) 
-0.15 
(-0.16) 
0.69 
(-0.65) 
-0.13 
(-0.28) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-1) 
-0.02* 
(-0.01) 
0.07 
(-0.12) 
0.17 
(-0.10) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.12 
(-0.12) 
-0.64 
(-0.46) 
0.08 
(-0.19) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-2) 
-0.03** 
(-0.02) 
0.16 
(-0.16) 
0.04 
(-0.13) 
0.01* 
(-0.01) 
0.00 
(-0.15) 
-0.31 
(-0.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.25) 
0.02 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-3) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.11 
(-0.13) 
0.02** 
(-0.01) 
-0.12 
(-0.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.56) 
0.30 
(-0.24) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-4) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
0.15 
(-0.19) 
-0.06 
(-0.16) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.22 
(-0.18) 
0.51 
(-0.72) 
-0.10 
(-0.31) 
0.07* 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-1) 
0.00 
(-0.02 
-0.26 
(-0.18 
0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
-0.06 
(-0.67) 
0.05 
(-0.28) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
M2(-2) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.06 
(-0.19) 
0.22 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.14 
(-0.18) 
-0.78 
(-0.71) 
0.55* 
(-0.30) 
-0.05 
(-0.04) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-3) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.21 
(-0.18) 
0.24 
(-0.16) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.33* 
(-0.17) 
-0.32 
(-0.68) 
0.36 
(-0.29) 
-0.02 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-4) 
-0.04** 
(-0.02) 
0.20 
(-0.17) 
0.09 
(-0.15) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.13 
(-0.16) 
0.16 
(-0.64) 
-0.43 
(-0.27) 
0.06* 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DINT(-1) 
-0.10 
(-0.22) 
-2.26 
(-2.17) 
-0.54 
(-1.84) 
0.15 
(-0.10) 
-1.71 
(-2.04) 
9.72 
(-8.05) 
-0.54 
(-3.43) 
0.19 
(-0.44) 
-0.16 
(-0.15) 
DINT(-2) 
0.14 
(-0.17) 
-1.40 
(-1.69) 
-2.10 
(-1.44) 
0.17** 
(-0.08) 
-2.80* 
(-1.59) 
2.13 
(-6.28) 
2.47 
(-2.68) 
-0.58 
(-0.34) 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
DINT(-3) -0.29 1.88 -0.42 0.12 0.90 8.41 -3.96 0.78 -0.10 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
(-0.22) (-2.16) (-1.84) (-0.10) (-2.04) (-8.04) (-3.43) (-0.44) (-0.14) 
DINT(-4) 
-0.26* 
(-0.12 
-0.79 
(-1.22) 
-0.65 
(-1.04) 
0.11* 
(-0.06) 
-0.83 
(-1.15) 
0.39 
(-4.55) 
1.15 
(-1.94) 
0.10 
(-0.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.08) 
DEX(-1) 
-1.18* 
(-0.65) 
3.82 
(-6.35) 
-4.21 
(-5.41) 
0.16 
(-0.30) 
-4.08 
(-5.99) 
-6.49 
(-23.63) 
-8.58 
(-10.07) 
1.35 
(-1.29) 
-0.26 
(-0.43) 
DEX(-2) 
-1.19* 
(-0.69) 
-2.02 
(-6.75) 
-0.83 
(-5.75) 
0.23 
(-0.32) 
8.79 
(-6.36) 
-0.27 
(-25.10) 
-4.27 
(-10.70) 
0.85 
(-1.37) 
-0.22 
(-0.45) 
DEX(-3) 
0.18 
(-0.78) 
-2.65 
(-7.67) 
-2.49 
(-6.53) 
-0.21 
(-0.36) 
-7.53 
(-7.23) 
-35.22 
(-28.53) 
10.37 
(-12.16) 
-0.15 
(-1.56) 
0.57 
(-0.51) 
DEX(-4) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
6.50 
(-8.21) 
5.43 
(-6.99) 
0.17 
(-0.39) 
2.49 
(-7.74) 
-27.69 
(-30.54) 
-9.97 
(-13.02) 
-0.52 
(-1.67) 
0.31 
(-0.55) 
C 
-0.20 
(-0.29) 
0.60 
(-2.83) 
-6.33*** 
(-2.41) 
-0.07 
(-0.13) 
-2.73 
(-2.66) 
8.35 
(-10.52) 
4.45 
(-4.48) 
0.27 
(-0.58) 
0.26 
(-0.19) 
 R-squared 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.78 0.92 0.88 0.78 
 Adj. R-squared 0.99 0.29 0.88 0.48 0.93 -0.10 0.59 0.38 -0.09 
 Sum sq. resids 0.10 9.93 7.20 0.02 8.82 137.36 24.95 0.41 0.04 
 S.E. equation 0.11 1.05 0.89 0.05 0.99 3.91 1.67 0.21 0.07 
 F-statistic 175.12 1.52 9.88 2.14 17.05 0.89 2.77 1.76 0.90 
 Log likelihood 75.12 -30.02 -22.62 110.75 -27.27 -90.43 -51.20 43.21 94.30 
 Akaike AIC -1.66 2.91 2.59 -3.21 2.79 5.54 3.83 -0.27 -2.49 
 Schwarz SC -0.19 4.38 4.06 -1.74 4.27 7.01 5.31 1.20 -1.02 
 Mean dependent 2.81 -0.02 1.83 0.01 5.32 -0.14 11.93 0.01 -0.04 
 S.D. dependent 1.27 1.25 2.55 0.07 3.68 3.73 2.59 0.27 0.07 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
standard errors in ( ). 
 
Regarding interest rates, a rise in interest rates implies an increase in the 
financing cost of loans. In particular, small firms which needed money to survive the 
crisis could not afford the financing cost, and failed to return their earlier loans. In 
addition, exchange rates have a strong negative correlation with the default rate for 
particular types of firms. Thus, the depreciation of RMB had negative impacts on 
three types of industries: industries whose raw materials are imported; second, those 
industries which maintain a huge amount of foreign exchange liabilities; and, third, 
the tourism industry. 
Interestingly, in our study we do not find a significant relationship between 
default rate and real estate price though, intuitively, one would expect this to be the 
case. The prolonged impacts on the default rate are captured by the lags i.e. DGDP(t-
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1): (0.09), DGDP(t-2): (0.10), RPI(t-4): (-0.07), DUNE(t-1): (1.12), DUNE(t-2): 
(0.83), DUNE(t-3): (0.82), DUNE(t-4): (0.95), DFIX(t-1): (-0.02), DFIX(t-2): (-0.03), 
M2(t-4): (-0.04), DINT(t-4): (-0.26), DEX(t-1): (-1.18), and DEX(t-2): (-1.19). 
Moreover, the coefficient of the lagged default rate, 𝑦𝑡(t-1) :( 0.96) and 𝑦𝑡(t-3) :(-0.66), 
are significant. This finding indicates that the expected default rate of banks in the 
past period would generate a prolonged impact on the NPLR in the current period. In 
other words, a one percentage point increase of the NPLR in the previous quarter will 
lead to a NPLR increase of 0.96 percentage points in the current quarter, which 
indicates that the impact of shocks are long-lasting. Because the signs of the 
coefficients of 𝑦𝑡 (t-1) and 𝑦𝑡 (t-3) are different, it implies that the response of the 
banking system towards shocks is slow, possibly due to the time needed for 
implementing risk solutions. Meanwhile, this finding suggests that it is necessary for 
the regulators to launch a risk early warning system toidentify the potential shocks, 
and the real shocks, at an early stage, because it is too late when the impact of the 
shock appears on the banks‘ balance sheet. The fact that negative autocorrelation of 
𝑦𝑡 (t-3) is different from the previous research (Shen and Feng, 2010) may be 
attributed to the differences in frequency of data. However, we posit that the quarterly 
data we employ is likely to be more informative. Given the autocorrelation of 𝑦𝑡 , it is 
necessary to analyze the progress of the default rate over a time horizon that is longer 
than the duration of the designed shock in order to reflect the long-term impact of the 
shock. 
In addition to the aforementioned analysis, we conduct impulse response analysis 
in order to simulate shocks to the macro economy, and estimate the feedback from 
these shocks to the NPLR. We are also able to estimate whether the changes in the 
NPLR have a further impact on macro-economic developments. In the VAR approach, 
because of the lag structure, a shock on one variable not only just has impact on the 
variable itself but also affect all of the other endogenous variables. Therefore, the 
impulse response function is used to explore the effect of a one-time shock to one of 
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the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. Following 
the traditional VAR literature, the impulse response analysis is accomplished by 
means of the orthogonalised impulse responses with Cholesky decomposition. Our 
impulse response functions suggest that the default rate increases to 0.08 over three 
quarters, following unexpected shocks to the GDP, and reverts to a lower level in the 
fourth quarter. Unexpected shocks in the RPI result in a decrease in default rate, with 
an effect potentially lasting more than 25 quarters. The response to a positive shock on 
real estate prices is not obvious during the first four quarters, and the impulse response 
of 𝑦𝑡  climbs to a peak of 0.25 from the fifth period to the twentieth. This can provide 
an explanation for why we failed to find a significant coefficient of real estate price in 
the credit risk model, because the impact of shocks to house prices can only be 
observed after four quarters, while the model estimates the lag value of the macro-
economic dynamics for four periods. However, when there is an innovation shock of 
one standard error for the unemployment rate, fixed investment, money supply, 
interest rate and the exchange rate respectively, there are no significant changes in 𝑦𝑡 . 
(see Appendix C, Figure C.2).  
Correlation between variables does not necessarily imply causality in real world. 
Therefore, in VAR approach, Granger causality test is employed to test whether an 
endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous. In this Chapter, we carried out the 
Granger causality test to detect the causal direction between variables, and results 
shows that the default rate is Granger caused by a series of macro-economic variables, 
including GDP, fixed investment, money supply, and interest rate. (see Appendix C, 
Table C.2).  
 
4.4.2. Scenario analyses 
In the previous analysis we examined the relationships between the NPLR and key 
macro-economic variables. In this section we aim to examine the response of the 
expected default rate to macro-economic shocks, via simulations. To generate the 
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future path of the expected default rate, our scenario analysis conducts a stress test on 
the banking system in China, with historical and hypothetical scenario methods. The 
historical scenario method provides limited insight since China has maintained high 
growth for over two decades without suffering severe shocks. Given this, we seek to 
gain insight by mimicking the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, and the 
Argentinean Financial Crisis (1999-2002), using the parameter estimates for the 
Chinese economy derived in the previous subsection (estimated coefficients of VAR 
approach). On the other hand, as uncertainty is the nature of hypothetical scenarios, 
we assume the macro risk factors follow the normal distribution and choose the 1/10, 
1/25, and 1/100 quantiles as the shock values, reflecting the maximum loss incurred 
over 10 years, 25years, and 100 years respectively. These changes are modeled to 
occur separately from 2012Q4 to 2013Q2, from the moderate situation to the severe 
case, and there is no further artificial shock introduced for the subsequent quarters. 
We conduct the following out-of-sample forecast by step-by-step method. In every 
forecasting period, the model is re-calculated with the new available data of variables 
of scenarios and generates the forecasted value of financial stability indicator for the 
next period. Given the macro-economic variables we have selected, we design four 
scenarios as follows: (i) The benchmark scenario, in which there is no shock; (ii) 
shocks via the business cycle, in which China‘s GDP growth rate slides to 7%, 6%, 
and 5% respectively in each of the three consecutive quarters (starting from 2012Q4); 
(iii) a rise in the interest rate by 300, 400, and 500 basis points respectively in each of 
the three consecutive quarters starting from 2012Q4; (iv) rises in the exchange rate by 
5%, 10%, and 15% respectively in each of the three consecutive quarters starting from 
2012Q4. 
Since stress testing focuses on extreme, but plausible shocks, we have designed 
the scenarios with a feasible probability such that these changes in the macro-
economic variables can occur. Furthermore, these scenarios reflect extreme situations 
which can bring large losses to the banking system. In addition, we have designed a 
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worsening trend for shocks, as economic stimulus policies may not be effective 
immediately. Then we simulate 2000 future paths and compute the expected default 
rates in 2013Q4 to construct a frequency distribution. With this frequency distribution, 
we can examine whether the banking system is stable within a certain confidence level, 
because the tails of the distributions provide insight into the extreme losses. 
 
Table 4.6: Stress-Testing Results for Scenarios 
Period Benchmark  GDP Shock  Interest Rate Shock  Exchange Rate Shock  
 yt  NPLR (%) yt  NPLR (%) yt  NPLR (%) yt  NPLR (%) 
2012 Q4 4.34 1.29 4.34 1.28 4.34 1.29 4.34 1.29 
2013 Q1 4.14 1.57 4.09 1.63 4.14 1.57 3.04 4.54 
2013 Q2 3.98 1.83 3.71 2.93 3.98 1.83 0.99 27.15 
2013 Q3 4.20 1.48 3.62 2.58 4.34 1.28 0.46 38.76 
 
The default rates in the following three periods after the shocks (2013Q1, 2013Q2, 
and 2013Q3) were computed with the macro-economic risk (VAR) model on a step-
by-step basis. The results of this are outlined in Table 4.6. The following are 
noteworthy: 
1. The benchmark scenario: As that there is no shock in this scenario, the default 
rates (yt) are at stable level about 4.17. Consequently, the NPLR for the whole 
banking system peaks at 1.83%, indicating very stable conditions for the 
banking system.  
2. The GDP shock scenario: Following the shock, the default rates in this 
scenario respond strongly to the change in GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate. The NPLR rises to 2.93% in 2013Q2, and falls down to 
2.58% in 2013Q3. Accordingly, the influence of this business cycle shock on 
financial stability is profound, which would lead to an increase in provision 
for bad loans, and a concurrent decrease in capital adequacy. Even though 
China‘s growth has all the hallmarks of a successful soft-landing in the past 
three years, the banking system is still vulnerable in the face of such a GDP 
shock.  
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
85 
 
3. The interest rate shock scenario: In this scenario we found a limited response 
in the relationship between the default rate and changes in the interest rate 
with the NPLR being raised to 1.83% in 2013Q2. Subsequently the NPLR 
falls to 1.28% in 2013Q3. This result suggests that the major clients of banks 
(big corporations and state-owned-enterprises) are not sensitive to the 
financing cost of debt. 
4. The exchange rate shock scenario. Recall that some industries — such as 
those whose raw materials are imported, those which maintain a huge amount 
of foreign exchange liabilities, and the tourism industry — can be profoundly 
affected by exchange rate shocks. It is of particular note that the strongest 
influence occurs in the exchange rate shock scenario, since the NPLR rockets 
to 27.15% in 2013Q2, and keeps rising to a more severe 38.76% in 2013Q3. 
This will likely lead to significant losses for banks and indicates that China‘s 
government should be cautious in exchange rate reform. 
Building on this, we generate a conditional probability distribution of losses based on 
the concept of value-at-risk. Usually value-at-risk is expressed a cut-off point of the 
distribution beyond which the probability of the loss occurrence is less than the given 
quantile. This process is as follows: first, as reported in Table 4.7, we compute the 
response of the financial stability indicator with macro-economic credit risk model 
and the Monte Carlo simulation (computed 2000 times); secondly, corresponding 
simulated values of financial stability indicator are used to assess loss distributions.  
 
Table 4.7: Loss Distribution Scenarios, A Quarterly Horizon 
 Benchmark GDP Shock Interest Rate Shock Exchange Rate Shock 
Confidence Level (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) 
80 4.35 1.28 3.65 2.53 4.42 1.18 1.37 20.14 
90 4.27 1.38 3.57 2.74 4.34 1.29 1.25 22.29 
95 4.19 1.49 3.49 2.93 4.27 1.37 1.16 23.94 
99 4.06 1.69 3.37 3.32 4.12 1.59 0.97 27.54 
 
These loss distributions, again, include a benchmark scenario and three stressed 
scenarios. Generally, the value-at-risk results show that for the confidence level of 
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99%, the banking system in China is able to maintain the financial stability with an 
interest rate shock, with an acceptable NPLR of less than 2%. According to ‗the Core 
Indicators for the Risk Management of Commercial Banks‘ (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, 2005), this indicates that the current risk from interest rate 
changes is moderate for the banking system. However, for the GDP chock and 
exchange rate shock our results suggest that with an 80% confidence level the NPLR 
exceeds the 2% threshold in each case. Our study suggests that an exchange rate shock 
is likely to be profoundly damaging in terms of the NPLR, exceeding 20% at each 
confidence level tested. The results shown in Table 4.7 do not contradict the previous 
step-by-step forecasting methods, though there are some differences in magnitude 
which can be explained by the differences in the methodological approach used. 
Overall, however, we would assert that this triangulates our result. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This study has developed a framework for macro stress-testing of credit risk for the 
banking system in China. This framework was used to measure the financial stability 
of the banking system in response to shocks in different macro-economic variables. 
We utilized VAR models and analyzed eight macro-economic variables, with the 
macro-economic credit risk models successfully explaining the impact of severe 
macro-economic shocks on the balance sheet of banks. The analysis suggests that 
there are some significant relationships between the default rates and macro-economic 
factors, such as GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the interest rate, and the 
exchange rate, which are focal concerns for macro stress testing perspectives. 
Macro stress-testing is used to assess the financial stability of the banking system. 
We combined the historical method and the hypothetical method to produce three 
stress scenarios with various artificial shocks including GDP growth shocks, interest 
rate shocks, and exchange rate shocks. Thereafter, the distribution of possible NPLRs, 
derived from the Monte Carlo method, was simulated, and the value-at-risk for credit 
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risk was calculated. The stress-testing results indicate that the banking system in 
China would be healthy in the case of interest rate shocks, but in the case of GDP 
growth and exchange rate shocks the NPLR of banks would climb beyond the limit of 
2%. Overall, the Chinese banking sector is well prepared to absorb the credit losses 
associated with a set of distressed macroeconomic scenarios without threatening 
financial stability. 
Although from a macro prudential perspective China emerged unscathed from the 
GFC, the Central Bank of China should learn the lessons of risk management from 
Western countries and encourage commercial banks to carry out both micro stress-
testing and macro stress-testing under the framework of FSAP. For the policy makers, 
they should pay more attention to the stress testing results during the decision-making 
process, especially when formulating growth and exchange rate policies. In particular 
the ongoing foreign exchange rate system reform is something that needs to be 
considered carefully so that China can avoid severe exchange rate shocks, which our 
study suggests would be extremely costly. Our results also provide helpful suggestion 
to policymakers in China in monetary policy formulation. The empirical results 
indicate that the interest rate and money supply have significant effects on stability of 
banking system in China. Therefore, applying the interest rate and the reserve 
requirement ratio is useful for China to achieve financial stability. In practice, when 
the economy is down, the policymaker could decrease the interest rate and the reserve 
requirement ratio to stimulate the economy. When the economy is up, the policymaker 
could increase the interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio to suppress the 
economy and reserve certain capital buffer for potential shocks to banking sector. 
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5. CHAPTER 5                                                                                                      
Non-performing Loan, Economic Performance 
and the Determinants of Banking Distress  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The costs of reviving a failure in the banking sector after a crisis could be as large as 
half of a country‘s annual GDP (World Bank, 2000). For instance, Laeven and 
Valencia (2011) use EU data to illustrate that the output losses of previous banking 
crises in 2008 reach around 20–25% of GDP. Moreover, credit tightening following a 
banking crisis would affect the potential growth of the crisis country. Therefore, the 
recent global financial crisis, underscored by numerous research and developments in 
policy has highlighted the importance of understanding sources of vulnerability which 
may bring about a banking distress. This focus is driven not only by the considerable 
cost of such crises, but also because they usually start from the failure of a single large 
institution then spread through the whole financial system, with associated macro-
economic risks. As a result, assessing the financial system as a whole and treat 
aggregate risk as endogenous was defined as macro-prudential perspective, which is 
intent on minimizing system wide distress and preventing output costs associated with 
financial instability (Borio, 2009). Hence, central banks, tasked with maintaining 
financial stability, place much emphasis on developing macro-prudential regulation 
policy (Das et al., 2004). Therefore, early identification of these risk sources is 
playing a major role because it provides valuable information for policy makers to 
decrease vulnerabilities and improve the ability of the financial system to absorb the 
impact of shocks. There is a common place for these costly economic and financial 
crises in both developing and developed countries, due to financial crises, a low 
quality of banks‘ loan portfolio is usually a major indicator of the banking system 
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distress. When we study about the determinants of banking system distress, the 
linkages between macro-economic shocks and the risk of banking distress have 
renewed its interest. The main aim of this study is to uncover the determinants of 
banking system distress and to establish the linkages between non-performing loans 
and macro-economic performance in regional China. 
It is widely believed that the outburst of financial crisis could hardly be 
forecasted (e.g. Rose and Spiegel, 2011). Therefore, the Early Warning System is such 
a tool designed for financial system supervisor and policy makers to forecast whether 
and when the given economic entity would be impacted by adverse shocks. The idea 
of the EWS was raised in 1990s because of a series of financial crises, which are from 
European monetary system crisis in 1992 to the crisis of Asia in the middle of 1997. 
More specifically, Lindgren et al. (1996) summarise that three-quarters of IMF 
member countries have experienced banking distress over this period. The EWS 
including both macro- and micro-economic variables is able to offer an overview of 
financial system vulnerability. There is a wide range of literature on the EWS applying 
numerous approaches from panel logit model to signal extraction method to binary 
recursive trees. There is no doubt that false alarms would cause inappropriate policy 
action, highlighting the importance of accuracy of the EWS. However, the 
fundamental issue of the EWS is the choice of financial and macro-economic 
variables to evaluate. In other words, it is impossible to build a general economic 
model which is suitable for every country and can deal with all kinds of crises. 
Particularly for the emerging countries, the reliance on generic indicators is influenced 
by the dearth of data and banking crisis observations. As a result of the limitation of 
EWS, the implementation of EWS is required to distinguish the characteristic of a 
certain country and choose variables based on the nature of the banking system and 
lending behaviour. 
China‘s economy expanded rapidly during 1978 and 2012 with an average real 
GDP growth of 9.8% (source: IMF), even though under a dire international context in 
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recent years, which no other country in the world has achieved such a long term rapid 
growth. As the OECD survey reports that, China has now overtaken the euro area and 
is on course to become the world‘s largest economy around 2016 (OECD, 2013). 
Along with the reform and opening policy first adopted in 1978, the explosive growth 
of foreign investment and export became the new engine of development, especially 
in coastal regions. Even though the inland regions have also been benefited by the 
reform and opening policy, the development speed was left behind, thus the following 
economic disparity among regions evolved into political and social problems. Since 
2000, the inland regions have achieved their own rapid growth owing to development 
programs carried out by the government in the mid-1990s in order to rebalance 
regional development. Therefore, the economic disparity leads to the disparity of 
financial sector development and the differences in characteristic of financial stability 
among regions. 
The banking sector of regional China is interesting for several reasons. The 
foremost reason is that the vast geographical disparities linking with the regional 
distribution of economic activity, living standards, resource base, and other 
determinants of stability of the banking sector.  Pronounced inequalities in income and 
economic opportunities between the coastal and inland regions of China are well 
documented in the literature. During the transition process from a centre-planned 
economy to a market-based economy, China has experienced growing inter-provincial 
inequality. Indeed, there are considerable disparities in growth performances among 
provinces. The gap between the most dynamic regions in terms of GDP per capita, 
Shanghai, is RMB 75,108, and the least dynamic, Guizhou, is RMB 9,428 in 2008. 
The general regional classification of provinces reveals that coastal provinces have 
experienced much faster growth than inland provinces. It is widely believed that 
preferential policies from the central government for the coastal provinces generally 
drive the disparity. Besides the promotion from the preferential policies, the coastal 
economies naturally contain the geographical advantage in engaging in international 
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trade and hence are most competent to industrialize by relying on export-oriented 
processing industries. Additionally, coastal regions are able to profit from a higher 
percentage of arable land, better conditions for developing infrastructure, and easy 
access to the sea. These significant regional disparities in economic generate different 
demands for types of financial arrangements, which will result in differences in 
stability condition of regional banking system. In addition, in China, major banks 
usually operate across wide regions, thus, it is not easy to determine the regional 
financial stability. The aggregate data do not reflect regional stability of the banking 
system. Due to these special characteristics of such a transitional economy, it is 
inappropriate to simply adopt the model which has been applied to development 
countries or just focus on the national level.  
These perspectives are reflected in this study, which examines regional China‘s 
banking system stability, using macro-economic indicators and panel data covering 
twenty two provinces, four direct-controlled municipalities and five autonomous 
regions. There are two major aims of this study. One is to provide an overview of 
banking system stability in the geographical distribution of these indicators by 
plotting them on maps. The other one is to identify appropriate early warning 
indicators of banking crises in regional China. In this way, this study could enable 
regulators to monitor the banking system vulnerability at an initial stage and carry out 
corrective actions to prevent potential adverse shocks.  
The structure for the remainder of this chapter is as follows: Part 2 provides an 
overview of the literature. Part 3 depicts the data and method. Part 4 presents the 
estimation results. Part 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
5.2. Literature Review 
Risk management in the banking sector has been the focus of researches in the past 
several years, among which the credit risk management is particularly a popular topic. 
It is all due to that credit risk is the major source of risk in the banking system. 
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Moreover, credit risk has been the target of strict banking regulatory (BIS, 2001). Due 
to the increasing interactivities in the global economy, banking sector regulators and 
risk managers of is in front of a question like ―How would it affect the vulnerability of 
a given bank (or banks) in a given region in the case of severe shocks to economy?‖ 
Consequently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) announces the reform of 
regulation of bank capital for credit risk, which is also known as Basel Accord II. 
Basel Accord II has caused a debate in the literature. Some argue about the effect of 
business cycles which focus on the effect of economic downturns on banks and value-
at-risk (VaR) capital requirements (Carey, 2002; Allen and Saunders, 2003). But this 
debate does not take into account of the macro-economic factors at national and global 
levels or build up an explicit model. 
Banking regulators have been increasingly interested in looking for formal 
models to support the financial stability monitor. In the recent researches, there are 
various approaches have been used. Goodhart et al. (2006) have attempted to model 
systemic risk in a general equilibrium framework. However, this approach is highly 
stylized and extremely difficult to perform. Therefore, there is a more common 
alternative approach which describes how the risk profiles, especially the default 
probabilities, of banks respond to changes in macro-economic conditions. The linkage 
between default probability and macro-economic factors and can be modelled in two 
ways. First one is the asset-pricing approach which relies on an option-pricing 
framework and extracts risk from observed security prices (Gray et al., 2007; Frisell et 
al., 2007). These approaches usually require high-frequency data, which is able to 
capture the market‘s perceptions of the risks of the system. The second one is to use 
balance-sheet information to estimate the performance of the bank‘s risk exposures. 
Many central banks apply this kind of approach as an input to their financial stability 
analysis (Foglia, 2009), because that these models offer a flexible and operational 
means of capturing a wide range of risks and transmission channels.  
The literature on the determinants of NPL and the interactions between NPL and 
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macro-economic performance is grounded in theoretical models as well as empirical 
regularities. Following the financial accelerator theory, empirical literatures include 
the cyclical nature of bank credit, NPL, and loan loss provisions. In particular, in 
upturns, contemporaneous NPL ratios tend to be low. Also, competitive pressure and 
optimism about the macroeconomic outlook lead to a loosening of lending standards 
and strong credit growth, sowing the seeds of borrowers‘ and lenders‘ financial 
distress down the road. The loosening of lending standards in upturns depends on the 
existing regulatory and supervisory framework. In downturns, higher-than-expected 
NPL ratios, coupled with the decline in the value of collaterals, engenders greater 
caution among lenders and lead to a tightening of credit extension, with adverse 
impacts on domestic demand. Dash and Kabra (2010) provide a detailed review 
focused on explaining differences in NPL across banks within specific countries 
highlighting the role of macro-economic performance and the management quality 
and policy choices. Louzis et al. (2012) examine the relationship between 
management quality, macro-economic fundamentals and NPL with the data covering 
Greece‘s nine largest banks during 2003–2009, and find a positive relationship 
between NPL and real lending rates. Besides, the result also shows that they find that 
management inefficiency is positively associated with NPL. This result is in line with 
Espinosa and Prasad (2010). The financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 
brought a sharp increase in the number of bank failures in the United States. 
Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) investigated regional patterns in bank failure in the 
US and found that bank failures during 2007-2010 were concentrated in regions that 
experienced the most serious shocks from real estate markets and the sharp declines in 
economy performance. They also argue that banks are vulnerable to localized 
economic shocks. 
There is another strand of the literature focus on predicting NPL at the macro-
economic level. Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) model NPL from households‘ 
debt for a panel of seven euro area countries. Jappelli et al. (2013) model consumer 
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credit and mortgage debt with the sample covering eleven European countries. The 
results all indicate that a higher ratio of debt-to-income is related to a higher level of 
NPL in subsequent periods.  
China, covering approximately 9.6 million square kilometers, is the world‘s third 
largest country, while it is the most populous country on earth with a population of 
over 1.35 billion. Given that China has experienced 30 years of rapid economic 
growth, the industrial structure has significantly changed (Wu and Yao, 2006). The 
dominated position of agriculture has been replaced by manufacturing and services. At 
the provincial level, the structural change is even more pronounced. Afterwards, it 
would be bias when study a topic related to this immense country solely from 
information at the national level. For instance, GDP per capita in current price of 
China in 2012 was 6,075.92 in US dollar. However, this indicator was much higher in 
coastal regions like Jiangsu province (USD10,827) and Zhejiang province 
(USD10,022), while it cannot provides accurate view of the situation in inland regions 
like Gansu province and Guizhou province where GDP per capita are USD3,482 and 
USD3,100 separately (Source: IMF). Due to this reason, there are numerous studies 
have been carried out with indicators from provinces, autonomous regions and direct-
controlled municipalities (Li and Xu, 2008). Besides, the study should take into 
account not only regional economic disparity, but also regional development policy, 
because these policies may have an influence on the magnitude and direction of 
inequality in a country (Kanbur, 2000). 
The reform and opening policy has led to China‘s remarkable double-digit 
growth for most of the past three decades (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Nominal 
GDP has dramatically increased from RMB1,871.8 billion in 1990 to RMB 9,800 
billion in 2000 and RMB 51,932 billion in 2012. In the initial stage of the economic 
boost era, the open cities and special economic zones in coastal regions have been 
benefited by the policy priority firstly. This situation was caused by Deng Xiaoping‘s 
concept that we should let some regions to achieve prosperity firstly. Thus these 
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regions could become engines for economic development of the rest regions. Owe to 
this policy, the development of inland regions lagged further behind coastal regions, 
and expanding economic disparity among regions, which eventually became a 
political and social problem. Economic disparity didn‘t shrink until the mid-1990s, 
when China‘s development strategy shifted to the reduction of regional economic 
disparity, followed by a series of specific programs, such as the Great Western 
Development Strategy in 1999, the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan in 2002 and the 
Rise of Central China Plan in 2004. With the help of these programs, reorientation of 
infrastructure investment towards the less prosperous regions has contributed to 
reducing regional inequality. There are nine provinces/ direct-controlled 
municipalities/ autonomous regions out of top ten fastest growth provinces/ direct-
controlled municipalities/ autonomous regions are located in inland region in 2012. 
For example, real GDP growth rate of Chongqing province, Guizhou province, and 
Yunnan province are 13.6%, 13.6%, and 13.0% separately, while some coastal regions 
have slowed down their growth below 10%. However, in terms of GDP volume, the 
coastal regions still keep ahead of inland regions, which nominal GDP of Guangdong 
province (USD904, 046 million) is about thirty times of Qinghai province 
(USD29,854 million). All these demonstrate the wide gap still exists.  
  
Table 5.1: Macro-economic developments and prospects 
 2007   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% change 
Real GDP  14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 
Consumption (households and government) 10.8 8.4 9.2 9.0 10.5 8.2 
Investment (fixed capital and inventories) 14.3 10.6  18.9 11.8 9.6 8.3 
Exports   19.8 8.5 -10.2 27.6 8.1 5.1 
Imports  13.7 4.0 4.5 20.6 8.8 6.3 
Consumer price index   4.8 5.9 -0.7 3.2 5.5 2.6 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, OECD Economic Outlook database. 
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Figure 5.1: Macro-economic developments and prospects 
 
There is a series of literature discussed the relationship between financial 
intermediation development and regional disparity (e.g. Zhang, 2000; Park and Sehrt, 
2001; Chen et al., 2010). These studies suggest that the banking system plays an 
important role in amplifying regional development disparity, because that the urban 
bias of state-owned banks leads to the concentration of cheap loan in the developed 
area. Moreover, we can discover that the high growth rates achieved by inland regions 
in recent years are also driven by the enormous amounts of fixed asset investment 
introduced by the government. To achieve this high level of fixed investment, the 
regions concerned will need to raise funds through the financial systems of both their 
and other regions, especially through the banking system. Additionally, considering 
that a certain amount of fixed investment as the part of four trillion stimulus plan in 
recent years, which is mainly channeled into infrastructure construction and excess 
capacity industries, it will become the potential source of default risk for banking 
system in the following five to ten years.  
According to Ozgulbas and Koyuncugil (2010), the early warning system (EWS) 
is a system applied to predict the probable unfavourable movement, thus reduce crisis 
risk of cases, affairs transactions, systems, phenomena, firms and people. More 
specifically, a financial EWS is a monitoring system which alerts the potential risks 
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and shocks before they influence the financial system soundness. This system mainly 
targets on financial risk, macro-economic shocks, and potential bankruptcies. 
Motivated by financial crises, the IMF has taken a lead in developing EWS models 
with an influential paper by Kaminsky et al. (1998). Then there is a large amount of 
literature dedicates to develop the statistical forecasting models (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 
1996; Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Kamin et al., 2001). In light of these researches, private 
sector has also implemented various models to predict financial system vulnerability 
(e.g. JP Morgan, 1998; Goldman Sachs, 1998; Deutsche Bank, 2000; Credit Suisse 
First Boston, 2001). These studies usually investigate both internal and external 
factors, as predictive variables. Given that the EWS tracks the historical information 
of financial crises in a country or region, the relative contribution to these crises of the 
external and domestic variables included in the EWS can be calculated as well. Due to 
that the EWS models contain substantial value for policy makers to assess underlying 
vulnerabilities and take pre-emptive steps, the performance of EWS models, 
especially that of out-of-sample forecast has become the major concern (Berg et al., 
2005).  
There are two main approaches in the empirical literature of the EWS: the signal 
extraction approach and the econometric approach. 
The signal extraction approach was firstly introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
into the EWS system. The Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (KLR) model, designed prior 
to the 1997 crisis, has achieved a fairly satisfactory prediction that most vulnerable 
countries have suffered the hit of the following crisis. They found three most useful 
indicators -such as real exchange rates, stock prices, and the ratio of public sector 
deficits to GDP -out of the 16 potential indicators, which measure the degree of 
financial liberalization, balance-of-payment conditions, and real and fiscal sector 
developments (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Later studies such as Goldstein et al. 
(2000) and Rojas-Suarez (2001) followed this method. 
 The multivariate logit/probit model is generally the most popular model for the 
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econometric approach. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) examine the 
determinants of banking distress, using panel data covering 65 developed and 
developing economies for 1980–1994, with the help of the multivariate logit/probit 
model. The pooled logit model gradually accepted by most literature because that 
accounting for time- and country-specific effects leads to better in-sample fit (e.g. 
Davis and Karim, 2008; Duca and Peltonen, 2013; Sarlin and Peltonen, 2013). Within 
the following studies, a set of explanatory variables estimated including macro-
economic, financial, institutional and past-distress variables (see Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache 2002, 2005; Domac and Martinez-Peria, 2003; Lestano et al., 2003). 
Besides the most popular macro-economic and financial variables, there was an 
increased attention on studying institutional development. Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
developed a useful indicator, known as KKZ institutional index, which measures 
country-level differences in institutional development consists of six dimensions: 
voice accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulations quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.  
As mentioned before, most studies have focused on the US and the EU banks. 
Until the late of 1990s, studies emerged to analyze banking failure in developing 
countries during the global financial crisis, such as Latin America (Gonzalez-
Hermosillo, 1999), East Asia (Rahman et al., 2004), and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries (Maghyereh and Awartani, 2014). In China, the researchers didn‘t 
pay enough attention to the EWS until the Asian financial crisis burst in 1997. For 
early warning indicator system, the one designed by Liu (1999) consists with the 
performance of domestic financial institution and economic fundamental. Then, the 
indicator portfolio expands covering three main groups, such as micro-economic 
indicator (default rate of individual company, z-score of financial institution), macro-
prudential indicator (e.g. GDP growth, inflation and money supply), and financial 
market indicator (e.g. securitization ratio and price earning ratio) (He, 2001; Dong, 
2004; Chen, 2006; Pong and Li, 2009). For empirical study, the KRL signal extraction 
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approach and logit/probit econometric approach are broadly applied (Xin and Gao, 
2004; Shi and Mou, 2005; Chen et al., 2006). They found that GDP growth, inflation 
and export are significantly related to China‘s financial stability as macro-economic 
proxy, while some financial market indicator like domestic credit/GDP and private 
sector credit/GDP are closely correlated with the probability of occurrence of financial 
distress.  
 
5.3. Data and Methods 
In our analysis we adopt a general-to-specific approach aimed at identifying 
determinants of NPLR. We start with single-equation panel regressions including the 
whole list of possible explanatory factors of NPLR. We estimate  
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝛼𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                                                (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡  represents the vector of endogenous and predetermined variables, including 
lags of the dependent variables; i=1,..., N is the cross-section indicator; t=1, ..., T is the 
time indicator; 𝛼 expresses a vector of coefficients of 𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 ; 𝜂𝑖 is a time-invariant 
unobserved region-specific effect; 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡  is a vector of disturbances; and C is constant. 
Lags of the explanatory variable and NPLR itself are included to explore the effect of 
omitted explanatory variables and the persistence of NPLR. 
There is wide range of statistical methods of the EWS such as linear regression, 
decision trees, neural networks and hazard models. In practice, logit/probit regression 
model is one of the most popular methods. In our application of the probit approach to 
study banking stability indicators for China can be described through the following 
equation: 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑋𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡                                                                                                                        (2) 
where 𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡  denotes a variable positively correlated with the likelihood of an occurrence 
of banking instability in region i at time t. Due to the fact that -∞<𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡<+∞ is not 
observable, we use the observable binary dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 , which takes on a 
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value of 1 if banking distress actually occurs in region i at time t and 0 otherwise, 
using the following rule: 
𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 =  
1  𝑖𝑓𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 > 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                                                                                  (3) 
We follow the definition used by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) for the 
dependent variable, in which the region is defined as an unstable region if at least one 
of the following two conditions is satisfied: 
(1) The NPLR in the banking sector is larger than 10%. 
(2) A systemic bank failure occurs or emergency measures are enacted for rescuing 
systemic banking problems. 
  
Table 5.2: Variables‘ Description and Data Sources 
Variables Description  
 
Main Source 
NPLR Ratio of non-performing loans to gross 
loans, in percent  
 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) 
GDP Gross domestic production index National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBSC) 
GDPP Gross domestic production per capita NBSC 
UNE Unemployment rate in percent NBSC 
CPI Consumer price index  NBSC 
RPI Retail price index NBSC 
EXP Annual change in regional export in 
percent  
NBSC 
FDI Foreign direct investment NBSC 
FIX Fixed asset investment NBSC 
HP House price NBSC 
 
As shown in Table 5.2, we start by including the whole list of the independent 
variables following both the theoretical and empirical literature. GDP, unemployment 
rate, and the annual change in regional export are chosen as indicators of general 
macro-economic performance and economic cycle, because that the stability of 
economic fundamentals is the premise of a healthy financial system and weak 
economic fundamentals are more likely to amplify potential shocks to a systemic 
banking problem. Therefore, GDP growth and export are expected to be negatively 
related with NPLR, while the unemployment rate is positively related with NPLR.  
Consumer price index (CPI), retail price index (RPI), and changes in the housing 
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price are included as additional indicators of the state of the macro-economic and 
financial environment that may influence loan quality. Real estate is been chosen for 
several reasons. First of all, real estate loan is one of the most critical components of 
bank assets. Moreover, commercial property has a widespread use as collateral for 
other kinds of loans. Consequently, Davis and Zhu (2009) pointed out that house 
prices are correlated with prices of commercial property, which has also been a source 
of major bank losses during financial crises. In China, loans for real estate sector have 
grown to RMB 11.74 trillion (September 2012 a growth of 12.1%), while housing 
mortgages reached RMB 2.2 trillion at the end of 2011 maintaining rapid growth 
(Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission). Despite the fact that the growth of 
the proportion of real estate loans in total banks‘ loans slowed down under regulation, 
the amount of real estate loans still increased by RMB 565.3 billion. As Allen and 
Gale (2000) suggest, asset price inflation, amplified by credit expansion, is a potential 
risk for banking stability. Additionally, owing to that real estate is the major item of 
collateral, banks would be less willing to service the debt in the case of the real estate 
value declines. Owing to that the bank is the major finance resource of fixed asset 
investment nowadays in China, the volume of fixed asset investment has a direct 
impact on the credit exposure on the bank‘s loans. In short, rising asset price is able to 
help banks against unexpected adverse shocks by boosting the value of the underlying 
assets used as collateral, thus, real estate price changes are assumed to be negatively 
related with NPLR. 
The impact of inflation on bank‘s debt servicing capacity and loan quality could 
be positive or negative through diverse channels. High inflation level is typically 
associated with low unemployment as the Phillips‘ curve suggests. Additionally, high 
inflation reduces the real value of outstanding loans. Hence, it will enhance the debt 
service capacity of the bank system. However, the impact could be opposite through 
weakening the debt service capacity by reducing real income. 
Regarding the fast growth of fixed asset investment which is mainly supported by 
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banking sector, it leads to more susceptible for debtors when they face adverse shocks. 
Therefore, it is possible to weaken debt servicing capacity of debtors. In economic 
upturns, the swift expansion of borrowers‘ indebtedness would indicate inadequate 
risk management or a softening of lending standards. Thus, it would be positively 
related with succeeding periods‘ NPLR.  
GDP per capital is also selected as a proxy for institutional quality in the EWS 
model following previous studies (e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Rodrik, 
2003). They found that institutional quality is positively correlated with GDP per 
capital and negatively correlated with the probability of banking instability, because a 
good institutional quality usually implies the existence of an effective banking 
regulation. 
The dependent variable - non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) - is defined as the 
ratio of overdue loans to gross loans. According to the "Loan Quality Assessment 
Guidelines", non-performing loan ratio = (sub + doubtful + loss) / total loans. The use 
of NPLR in the remainder of the study refers to this definition.  
For the logit/probit EWS model, we only employ lagged explanatory variables in 
order to emphasize the function of this model as a leading indicator. We set the 
maximum time lag of the explanatory variables to two years. 
  
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics (2002-2011) 
Variables   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
NPLR  9.21  6.00  37.30  0.57  8.63 
GDP  112.69  112.70  123.80  105.40  2.21 
GDPP  23351.59  19074.00  85213.00  3701.00  16184.05 
CPI  103.09  103.00  110.10  97.70  2.25 
RPI  102.41  102.30  110.60  96.80  2.48 
UNE  3.77  3.90  6.50  1.30  0.66 
FIX  5085.84  3509.66  26749.68  133.96  4830.81 
EXP  0.27  0.27  1.65 -0.69  0.28 
FDI  634.87  232.00  5728.51  3.31  988.69 
HP  3556.21  2797.58  17782.00  1210.00  2526.64 
We employ an annual panel data from 2002 to 2011 for a sample of 22 provinces, four 
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direct-controlled municipalities and five autonomous regions in China (totaling 31 
regions; see Appendix D, Table D.1). The NPLR ratio data comes from the website of 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, which covers the commercial banks, the 
state-owned commercial banks, the joint-stock commercial banks, the city commercial 
banks, the rural commercial banks and the foreign banks. The time interval is 
constrained by the availability of long enough NPLR time series which are published 
since 2003. Due to the unavailability of NPLR data, the sample is unbalanced. The use 
of panel data offers the benefit of increasing the sample size while having a cross-
region perspective.  
The list and description of variables used in the analysis are in the Table 5.3. The 
explanatory variable list covers GDP growth (GDP), GDP per capita (GDPP), 
unemployment (UNE), consumer price index (CPI), retail price index (RPI), change in 
export (EXP), foreign direct investment (FDI), fixed asset investment (FIX), and real-
estate price (HP).  
 
5.4. Empirical Results 
Over the last decades, China‘s government has implemented a series of economic 
development plans to support the regional economy to reduce the gaps between 
provinces. However, different regions are in different paces of economic development, 
so that the problems they faced are different as well. The eastern region was 
characterized by an export-oriented economy with clustered foreign financial 
institutions. Consequently, the development was largely affected by quick 
international capital flow and active private financing which are highly risky issues. 
The growth of the central region has accelerated significantly by accepting industry 
transferred from the eastern region, while the industry structure has been improved 
simultaneously. Nonetheless, excess capacity in some traditional advantage industry 
becomes the new potential risk factors. The western region which was the less 
developed region maintained fast growth trend. With this trend, the assets of banking 
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sector expanded quickly, when the outdated risk management is not able to handle the 
potential risks in property credit and financing platform.  
In 2011, the operating scale of the banking sector in all regions continued to 
expand. The total assets of the banking sector in eastern, central, western, and north-
eastern regions reached RMB59.34 trillion, RMB15.50 trillion, RMB18.97 trillion, 
and RMB7.49 trillion, up 17.44%, 16.69%, 21.76% and 16.07% respectively. The 
share of the banking sector in eastern region dropped continually. However, it still 
takes down about 50% of the entire banking industry with a certain amount of 
headquarters of the large commercial banks and foreign-funded banks located here. 
The assets size of the banking sector in the western region maintains the fastest 
growth in the four regions and the share of the western region increased by 0.58 
percentages. Among the 14 provinces whose assets size of the banking sector grew 
more than 20%, 10 provinces are located in the western region, including Tibet 
(29.27%), Chongqing (26.25%), and Xinjiang (26.03%). 
Along with the expand trend of asset size, the overall asset quality also improved 
to some extent. Both the non-performing loan (NPL) and NPL ratio decreased 
continually. As the end of 2011, the outstanding NPLs in eastern, central, western, and 
north-eastern areas reached RMB376.94 billion, RMB248.23 billion, RMB198.97 
billion, and RMB167.96 billion, and NPLRs are 1.2%, 3.03%, 1.89% and 4.22% 
respectively (see Appendix D, Figure D.1). Among all the four regions, the NPLs in 
western region dropped most by RMB68.79 billion while the NPL ratio declined by 
1.41 percentage. Even with significant growth of banking sector in 2011, downside 
risks to the regional economy gradually emerged. Under such circumstances, 
underlying credit risk of loans extended to certain industries and areas is likely to 
surface. First, there is lending risk related to local government financing platform 
companies (FPC). Currently, debt of local government FPC was approaching 
centralized payment period, together with economic slowdown and decrease in 
revenue from selling lands, the short term solvency of local government may be 
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affected. Second, asset quality is possibly undermined by adjustments in the real 
estate sector. The house price may drops due to a series of national macro 
management policies. Considering the strong correlation between real estate and other 
sectors, the adjustment of the real estate sector would directly affect the loan quality 
of the real estate sector and its upstream/downstream industries, thus lead to higher 
default risk of mortgage loans. 
Since the stochastic variables included in the long-run equation are mostly non-
stationary, it is important to establish first the stationarity of the residuals of the 
cointegrating equation before proceeding to the second stage. Thus, residual tests were 
undertaken to ensure that the requisite statistical properties are satisfied. To inform 
model specification, we examine the level of integration of the variables. The results 
in Table 5.4 suggest that most series are stationary in levels and others are stationary 
in first-difference. We use tests proposed by Levin et al., (2002) which assume 
common unit root processes, and the Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests (Maddala and 
Wu, 1999), which assume individual unit root processes across regions included in the 
panel. The Fisher test based on the p-values of individual unit root tests, and assumes 
that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that 
at least one series in the panel is stationary. The results suggest that, all variables are 
stationary in levels.  
  
Table 5.4: Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variables Assumes common unit root process Assumes individual unit root processes  
Levin, Lin & Chu t ADF - Fisher  PP - Fisher  
NPLR Level -15.41*** 95.09*** 157.79*** 
ln(GDP) Level -7.06*** 67.96 124.43*** 
ln(GDPP) Level -8.04*** 57.19 98.08*** 
UNE Level -10.20*** 94.87*** 147.47*** 
ln(CPI) Level -24.97*** 192.33*** 243.62*** 
ln(RPI) Level -19.19*** 150.22*** 250.15*** 
EXP Level -10.78*** 120.06*** 206.49*** 
ln(FDI) Level -11.77*** 75.64 79.23* 
ln(FIX) Level -5.41*** 96.99*** 116.41*** 
ln(HP) Level -8.64*** 81.24* 105.22*** 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively; 
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
We conduct models using several econometric specifications presented in Table 5.5, 
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including OLS, two-way fixed effects, and random effects. First, we fit an OLS model 
including lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables. We follow up with a 
fixed effects model. The statistics of the Fisher and chi-square test suggest the 
country-specific fixed effect is appropriate in models.  
  
Table 5.5: Determinants of Non-Performing Loans 
Explanatory variables 
 
OLS Fix-Effect 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
C 471.36*** 
(95.48) 
348.39*** 
(66.45) 
489.97*** 
(114.37) 
458.05*** 
(95.07) 
NPLR𝑡−1 0.75*** 
(0.07) 
0.76*** 
(0.07) 
0.69*** 
(0.08) 
0.68*** 
(0.08) 
NPLR𝑡−2 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃) 10.66 
(10.56) 
 
 
12.35 
(13.36) 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 20.64* 
(11.60) 
 
 
20.10 
(12.57) 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2 -35.56*** 
(9.73) 
 
 
-32.02*** 
(12.26) 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃)  
 
-8.81* 
(5.02) 
 
 
-1.28 
(6.36) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃)𝑡−1  
 
17.27** 
(8.03) 
 
 
15.58* 
(8.21) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
-8.84* 
(5.05) 
 
 
-5.66 
(5.94) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼) -38.65*** 
(8.72) 
 
 
-41.97*** 
(11.02) 
 
 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -36.19*** 
(8.34) 
 
 
-38.33*** 
(0.07) 
 
 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2 -21.21** 
(9.78) 
 
 
-24.20* 
(12.34) 
 
 
ln(𝑅𝑃𝐼)  
 
-24.63*** 
(8.86) 
 
 
-37.93*** 
(10.66) 
ln(𝑅𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1  
 
-43.07*** 
(9.44) 
 
 
-50.25*** 
(10.57) 
ln(𝑅𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2  
 
-6.07 
(9.13) 
 
 
-16.34 
(11.37) 
UNE 0.52 
(0.70) 
-0.19 
(0.73) 
0.27 
(0.93) 
-0.91 
(0.95) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 -1.08 
(0.95) 
-0.45 
(1.01) 
-1.72* 
(1.04) 
-1.02 
(1.08) 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−2 0.57 
(0.70) 
0.53 
(0.73) 
1.04 
(0.84) 
1.07 
(0.86) 
EXP -0.42 
(0.63) 
-0.01 
(0.68) 
-0.34 
(0.73) 
-0.09 
(0.78) 
EXP𝑡−1 0.81 
(0.66) 
0.23 
(0.71) 
0.65 
(0.77) 
0.00 
(0.82) 
EXP𝑡−2 -1.83*** 
(0.63) 
-2.12*** 
(0.65) 
-2.12*** 
(0.77) 
-1.95** 
(0.78) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.00 
(0.64) 
0.82 
(0.64) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.85 
(0.78) 
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ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−1 -0.36 
(0.89) 
-1.32 
(0.90) 
-0.58 
(0.95) 
-0.94 
(0.95) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−2 0.38 
(0.60) 
0.57 
(0.63) 
0.57 
(0.75) 
0.75 
(0.76) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋) -2.38 
(2.31) 
-1.58 
(2.36) 
-3.68 
(2.69) 
-4.88* 
(2.84) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−1 4.31 
(3.98) 
1.63 
(4.10) 
5.41 
(4.27) 
3.56 
(4.33) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−2 -2.15 
(2.43) 
-0.09 
(2.59) 
-4.60 
(2.91) 
-5.05 
(3.13) 
ln(𝐻𝑃) -1.81 
(1.51) 
-1.36 
(1.61) 
-0.71 
(1.99) 
-2.27 
(2.14) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 -1.85 
(1.81) 
-3.18 
(1.94) 
-1.86 
(1.93) 
-3.66* 
(2.04) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2 3.21** 
(1.52) 
4.31** 
(1.67) 
4.85*** 
(1.79) 
4.91** 
(1.89) 
R-squared 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.93 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.91 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.29 2.34 2.26 2.36 
F-statistic 106.45 97.18 56.12 41.60 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively; 
standard errors in ( ). 
 
The findings of the panel regressions presented in Table 5.5 are generally in line 
with stylized facts and expectations. First, the coefficients of the lags of NPLR are 
found to be significant and positive in all three models. This finding indicates that the 
deterioration of banks‘ loan quality in the preceding period would generate a 
prolonged impact on the NPLR in the current period, and this impact doesn‘t decrease 
in short-time horizon. It implies that NPLR would worsen relatively slowly when 
affected by a shock, implying it would be reasonable to anticipate long-term effect. 
Therefore, this finding suggests that an early warning system should be more reliable 
to identify the potential adverse shocks to loans in advance. Second, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1  and 
unemployment rate are found to be, respectively, positively and negatively related to 
NPLR, which is contrary against our expectation. It may be due to that, during 
China‘s banking reforms, the continuous operation of the central bank including 
stripping bad asset from banks‘ balance sheet and capital injection reduced the NPL 
ratio. However, the sign of the coefficient of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 meets our expectation. Third, 
our results show a negative relationship between inflation, real estate price, fixed asset 
investment and the NPLR. Therefore, it confirms that deterioration in the macro-
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economic environment is substantially associated with bank distress, and captured by 
rising NPLR. The results for inflation indicate that high inflation in China would 
reduce the real value of outstanding loans. Therefore, it will significantly enhance the 
debt service capacity of banks. Both the R-square and the Durbin-Watson statistics 
indicate that the model is able to adequately explain the relationship between banks‘ 
bad loan and macro-economic dynamics. Besides, the results of Hausman test, Hansen 
test, and Arellano-Bond test suggest, comparing with random-effect model and GMM 
model, OLS and fixed-effect model with sector dummy are more appropriate for our 
regression. 
Table 5.6 to Table 5.9 report sub-sample region results based on OLS estimation 
and two-way fixed-effect estimation respectively, which divide the 31 province/direct-
controlled municipalities/ autonomous regions into four geographical regions i.e., east 
region, central region, west region and north-east region. Similar to the findings from 
the above aggregate model, macro-economic variables contribute to the build-up in 
NPLs in the each regions. However, the regression of north-east region failed to 
provide satisfied results, most probably, because of the small sample size. The NPLRs 
of the previous period are found to have a significantly positive relationship with 
NPLRs of next period. The coefficients show that this variable of east region is more 
sensitive than other regions, which may be caused by increased exposure to guarantee 
chain risk in the east region, which has negative impact on asset quality of banking 
institution. Guarantee chain risk, characterized by high industry concentration, with 
common practices of cross guarantee within the industry, thus, may trigger wide credit 
risk. Meanwhile, financing entities are connected through guarantee chain which leads 
to contagion effect among regional banking system, forming a major risk exposure 
and affecting regional financial stability. Despite some insignificant differences, GDP 
growth, unemployment rate and inflation all exhibit a strong autocorrelation in all 
three regions, which are generally consistent with the aggregate model. As the result, a 
steady economic growth with low unemployment is the fundamental for banking 
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sector stability. World trade is found having significant correlation, but the signs of the 
current period and previous period are opposite. It demonstrates that the changes in 
export business have a lagging effect towards the asset quality of banking institutions. 
Therefore, some of the export business faces the situation of excess capacity and the 
uncertainty of appreciation of RMB, the risk would be accumulates during the 
economic upswing and shows its harm later. The negative correlations of fixed 
investment indicate that the strong investment demand, especially the infrastructure 
projects dominated by government, would improve the asset quality of banks. 
Nevertheless, evidence from east region illustrates the potential risk of overheating 
infrastructure projects which are supported by the local government financing 
platform. The pressure of repayment concentrating on the local government financing 
platform was high with lower growth rate of tax revenue, significant decrease of land 
leasing revenue and failure to realize expected profit for some projects. Property price 
is found negatively related with NPLR in central and west region. It may explain the 
concern about the impact of overheating real estate market towards the banking 
system. The results indicate that the non-rational increase property price in central and 
west region would encourage the speculative behaviour and push up financing cost for 
real-estate company, thus deteriorate banking stability. 
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Table 5.6: Determinants of Non-Performing Loans in East region 
Variables East Region 
OLS(1) FE(1) OLS(2) FE(2) 
C 223.31*** 
(77.05) 
253.26*** 
(79.56) 
493.07*** 
(89.76) 
441.44*** 
(79.21) 
NPLR(-1) 0.76*** 
(0.04) 
0.71*** 
(0.05) 
0.77*** 
(0.04) 
0.76*** 
(0.05) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃) 2.68 
(9.59) 
-6.39 
(8.37) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 -9.22 
(10.48) 
-10.37 
(8.47) 
11.08 
(9.04) 
3.04 
(7.42) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-15.27* 
(8.99) 
-12.21** 
(5.92) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼) -6.87 
(9.78) 
-5.36 
(8.17) 
-42.14*** 
(8.38) 
-31.60*** 
(7.08) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -34.96*** 
(12.13) 
-31.11*** 
(9.90) 
-31.80*** 
(8.36) 
-29.15*** 
(6.21) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-28.27*** 
(8.47) 
-25.18*** 
(7.51) 
UNE -0.45 
(0.66) 
-0.49 
(0.67) 
 
 
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 0.56 
(0.62) 
-0.69 
(0.63) 
0.22 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.63) 
EXP -2.89** 
(1.42) 
-2.89** 
(1.25) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−1 1.47 
(1.01) 
1.69* 
(0.96) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-2.16*** 
(0.78) 
-1.74* 
(0.94) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.04 
(0.58) 
0.17 
(0.83) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−1 -0.45 
(0.60) 
-1.10 
(0.83) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋) -3.15 
(2.23) 
-3.93** 
(1.95) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
-0.77 
(0.72) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−1 3.55 
(2.15) 
3.59* 
(1.92) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃) 0.36 
(1.71) 
1.60 
(1.26) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 -0.27 
(1.73) 
-0.55 
(1.31) 
0.49 
(1.64) 
-1.26 
(1.16) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-0.63 
(1.61) 
2.10 
(1.26) 
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.97 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.92 2.04 2.14 2.29 
F-statistic 102.68 90.41 98.43 117.48 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively; 
        standard errors in ( ). 
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Table 5.7: Determinants of Non-Performing Loans in Central region 
Variables Central Region 
OLS(1) FE(1) OLS(2) FE(2) 
C 355.22** 
(142.91) 
28.78 
(188.76) 
876.19*** 
(216.17) 
863.27*** 
(239.19) 
NPLR(-1) 0.79*** 
(0.08) 
0.29* 
(0.51) 
0.85*** 
(0.08) 
0.32* 
(0.18) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃) 38.20* 
(19.22) 
48.29** 
(20.61) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 -3.49 
(17.46) 
26.57 
(17.50) 
16.48 
(16.15) 
42.44** 
(15.79) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-58.82*** 
(18.70) 
-38.24** 
(16.72) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼) -27.51 
(16.58) 
3.83 
(16.76) 
-65.49*** 
(19.60) 
-65.18*** 
(22.85) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -85.97*** 
(17.56) 
-68.89*** 
(15.15) 
-41.39** 
(16.85) 
-46.95*** 
(15.93) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-37.89 
(25.03) 
-65.28** 
(30.14) 
UNE 4.73*** 
(1.61) 
2.96* 
(1.61) 
 
 
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 -3.69** 
(1.64) 
-2.25 
(1.57) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
1.30 
(1.52) 
EXP 0.10 
(1.60) 
-1.26 
(1.49) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−1 5.98*** 
(1.43) 
5.11*** 
(1.47) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-3.78** 
(1.50) 
-1.67 
(1.57) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼) 6.57* 
(3.25) 
3.70 
(3.52) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−1 -8.84*** 
(3.02) 
-8.50** 
(3.13) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋) 0.98 
(4.61) 
-4.90 
(4.09) 
-0.54 
(0.64) 
-6.65*** 
(1.67) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−1 0.81 
(4.46) 
3.89 
(3.31) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃) 6.67 
(3.97) 
4.50 
(3.69) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 -7.18* 
(4.12) 
-10.29** 
(4.32) 
-3.46 
(3.58) 
-3.08 
(3.04) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
3.44 
(3.96) 
2.73 
(3.41) 
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.64 2.14 2.27 1.94 
F-statistic 68.62 90.42 71.93 98.20 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively; 
        standard errors in ( ). 
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Table 5.8: Determinants of Non-Performing Loans in West region 
Variables West Region 
OLS(1) FE(1) OLS(2) FE(2) 
C 387.46*** 
(89.98) 
481.86*** 
(95.07) 
549.97*** 
(108.22) 
751.44*** 
(84.56) 
NPLR(-1) 0.59*** 
(0.06) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.07) 
0.15* 
(0.09) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃) -22.48 
(15.43) 
-24.38* 
(12.84) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 16.81 
(15.23) 
-1.77 
(12.62) 
31.77** 
(14.06) 
-3.63 
(8.94) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-43.48*** 
(14.23) 
-43.28*** 
(9.37) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼) -27.37*** 
(10.10) 
-25.94*** 
(7.40) 
-39.70*** 
(9.53) 
-28.08*** 
(6.51) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -43.83*** 
(11.96) 
-37.54*** 
(9.06) 
-32.55*** 
(8.83) 
-35.39*** 
(5.65) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-29.39*** 
(10.78) 
-37.19*** 
(8.16) 
UNE 1.31 
(1.35) 
0.13 
(1.51) 
 
 
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 -1.01 
(1.33) 
-0.72 
(1.27) 
0.04 
(0.62) 
0.72 
(1.13) 
EXP -0.10 
(0.79) 
-1.21** 
(0.60) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−1 1.56** 
(0.76) 
2.59*** 
(0.58) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-0.69 
(0.78) 
-0.27 
(0.66) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼) 0.37 
(1.10) 
0.76 
(0.87) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−1 -0.74 
(1.05) 
-0.67 
(0.80) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋) -0.19 
(3.46) 
-1.21 
(2.67) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
-3.73*** 
(1.02) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−1 0.62 
(3.46) 
-2.74 
(2.59) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃) -2.63 
(2.08) 
-1.47 
(2.37) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 -1.50 
(2.16) 
-2.25 
(2.33) 
-3.68** 
(1.84) 
-4.40** 
(1.75) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
0.93 
(1.84) 
0.24 
(1.74) 
R-squared 0.89 0.95 0.89 0.97 
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.93 0.87 0.95 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.16 2.21 2.31 2.12 
F-statistic 47.17 50.12 51.26 80.96 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively; 
        standard errors in ( ). 
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Table 5.9: Determinants of Non-Performing Loans in North-east region 
Variables North-east Region 
OLS(1) FE(1) OLS(2) FE(2) 
C 483.92 
(1291.49) 
-252.40 
(1184.25) 
2660.06** 
(935.82) 
1871.35*** 
(739.43) 
NPLR(-1) 0.66 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.67) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
-0.75** 
(0.23) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃) 66.34 
(159.23) 
150.84 
(147.41) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 -28.86 
(210.39) 
-14.86 
(221.29) 
138.95 
(85.44) 
-81.13 
(104.64) 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-113.88 
(137.58) 
-28.62 
(98.44) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼) -18.14 
(68.86) 
25.40 
(75.21) 
-211.71*** 
(53.95) 
2.74 
(100.79) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -99.89 
(64,96) 
-38.68 
(69.36) 
-64.63 
(45.56) 
-28.99 
(41.94) 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-292.62*** 
(71.24) 
-112.80 
(94.82) 
UNE 1.68 
(5.69) 
3.29 
(5.21) 
 
 
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑡−1 -1.43 
(5.26) 
-2.89 
(5.86) 
-2.22** 
(0.97) 
-6.53*** 
(1.31) 
EXP -3.16 
(6.98) 
-1.74 
(6.68) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−1 3.64 
(6.05) 
-1.09 
(6.50) 
 
 
 
 
EXP𝑡−2  
 
 
 
8.35** 
(3.15) 
2.05 
(3.14) 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼) -0.75 
(6.65) 
0.25 
(6.31) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡−1 2.37 
(7.67) 
0.97 
(5.95) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋) -24.62 
(24.37) 
-35.27 
(31.36) 
-6.00 
(5.92) 
-7.95 
(4.94) 
ln(𝐹𝐼𝑋)𝑡−1 22.79 
(29.04) 
37.68 
(36.77) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃) -31.12 
(35.08) 
-31.49 
(36.42) 
 
 
 
 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 18.79 
(41.76) 
-10.73 
(47.40) 
-44.99** 
(17.68) 
-77.02*** 
(15.65) 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2  
 
 
 
36.59** 
(13.93) 
3.23 
(12.27) 
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.98 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.18 3.04 2.48 2.94 
F-statistic 21.37 27.84 38.43 88.95 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively; 
        standard errors in ( ). 
 
 
The probit model results are presented in Table 5.10. The McFadden R-squared, also 
known as pseudo R-squared, suggests an acceptable goodness of fit value of 0.53. The 
LR statistics for both equations suggest that the explanatory variables chosen have a 
fairly strong effect and probability of decision on in the dummy dependent variable. 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
114 
 
The output of Hosmer-Lemeshow test and Andrews test are presented in Table 5.10 as 
well, whose null hypothesis is that the fit is sufficient to the data. With the p-value, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, so it is reasonable to consider the goodness-of-fit is 
quite acceptable, and expect well-performed forecast ability. 
The estimated coefficients of GDP and CPI are negative, while that of UNE is 
positive, with all being significant at 10% level. It indicates that banking instability is 
preceded by slowing economic growth, declining inflation and high unemployment 
rates. However, the findings of CPI are not completely consistent with the empirical 
findings by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2000) and Wong et al. (2010), 
which indicate that high inflation may enhance the asset quality of banking sector by 
reducing the real value of outstanding loans. One possible explanation may be because 
inflation level in China appears to follow a steady growth trend along with the 
economic growth and has not show obvious fluctuations. Institutional quality, 
measured by GDPP, is positively related to banking distress and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level, which indicates regions with higher institutional quality 
are found to be more vulnerable to banking distress. Specifically, in China, the east 
region accumulates more potential banking risks than other regions, due to higher 
levels of active informal finance and speculative behaviour prevalent in this region. 
The estimated coefficient of HP is negatively and statistically significant at the 5% 
level, which is generally consistent with the theory (Allen and Gale, 2000 and Che et 
al., 2011). Allen and Gale (2000) found that credit expansion is able to accelerate 
asset price increases, and lead to systemic banking distress. In China, Bank lending 
also plays one of the most crucial roles in pushing up property prices. Therefore, any 
bursting of the property price bubble would affect banking stability directly (Che et al., 
2011). 
 
 
Nottingham Trent University                                               Financial Stability of Banking System in China 
115 
 
 Table 5.10: Estimation Results of the Probit Model 
Explanatory variables Coefficients Standard errors 
C 197.36*** 66.84 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−1 11.49 7.59 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑡−2 -14.96* 8.32 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃)𝑡−1 -1.69 1.06 
ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃)𝑡−2 1.98* 1.06 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−1 -16.46** 7.45 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑡−2 -17.59** 7.16 
UNE𝑡−1 0.47* 0.25 
EXP𝑡−1 0.51 0.55 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−1 -2.38** 0.98 
ln(𝐻𝑃)𝑡−2 -1.25 0.98 
McFadden R-squared 0.54 
Log likelihood -73.40 
LR statistic 169.89 
H-L Statistic 4.88 
Andrews Statistic 37.14 
Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.77 
Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0001 
Number of 
observation 
247 
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
The predictive power of the model is the crucial element of the early warning system 
for banking distress. Table 5.11 shows the effect of forecast of the estimated model, 
with the cutoff of 0.5, equaling to the threshold of the model. The observations are 
classified as having predicted probabilities that are above or below the cutoff value in 
the left-hand, while the observations are classified using the predicted probability 
given by the sample proportion of y=1 observations in the right-hand. ―Correct‖ 
classifications are obtained when the predicted probability is less than or equal to the 
cutoff and the observed y=0, or when the predicted probability is greater than the 
cutoff and the observed y=1. In our predicted results above, 148 of the Dep=0 
observations and 69 of the Dep=1 observations are correctly classified by the 
estimated model. 
Specifically, the proportion of correct classification is 87.9% indicating that the model 
correctly predicts 87.85% of the observations (90.80% of the Dep=0 and 82.14% of 
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the Dep=1 observations).The gain in the number of correct predictions obtained in 
moving from the right table to the left table reflects the predictive ability of model. 
The gains are reported in both absolute percentage increases (Total Gain), and as a 
percentage of the incorrect classifications in the constant probability model (Percent 
Gain). This model predicts that all 163individuals will have Dep=0. This prediction is 
correct for the 163 y=0 observations, but is incorrect for the 84 y=1observations. The 
estimated model improves on the Dep=1 predictions by 82.14 percentage points, but 
does more poorly on the Dep=0 predictions (-9.20 percentage points). Overall, the 
estimated equation is 21.86 percentage points better at predicting responses than the 
constant probability model. This change represents a 64.29 percent improvement over 
the 65.63 percent correct prediction of the default model, which indicates good 
forecasting capability of our model and methods. 
 
Table 5.11: Expectation-prediction Result 
 Estimated Equation Constant Probability 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=C 148 15 163 163 84 247 
P(Dep=1)>C 15 69 84 0 0 0 
Total 163 84 247 163 84 247 
Correct 148 69 217 163 0 163 
% Correct 90.80 82.14 87.85 100.00 0.00 65.99 
% Incorrect 9.20 17.86 12.15 0.00 100.00 34.01 
Total Gain* -9.20 82.14 21.86    
Percent Gain** NA 82.14 64.29    
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
The global financial crisis in 2008 has emphasized the challenges posed by rising 
NPLR in advanced economies. Although China has been relatively unaffected, there 
are lessons that can be learnt from a comprehensive examination of the relationship 
between NPLR and macro-economic performance. Our analysis is the first to examine 
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NPLR from a sample that covers most regions in China and data related to the recent 
crisis.  
Using the panel data from 2002 to 2011 for 31 regions in China, this study 
identifies the determinants of NPLs in regional China‘s banking sector and examines a 
set of leading indicators of banking instability. Furthermore, we develop an EWS 
model to estimate the probability of an occurrence of banking distress. Our empirical 
results support the view that macro-economic performance determines the level of 
non-performing loans. In particular, we found strong evidence of a significant 
relationship between inflation, real estate price, fixed asset investment and 
nonperforming loans. The study also showed that change in export and foreign direct 
investments have an effect on NPLs of banks. This implies that regulators and central 
banks in China have to be wary about increasing NPLs during periods of low growth 
and tight financing. The EWS model suggests that slowing economic growth, 
declining CPI, an increase in unemployment would deteriorate asset quality of banks. 
In addition, the asset price, which is generally pushed up by strong credit expansion, 
is useful leading indicators of banking distress. 
The empirical findings of this chapter have both practical applicability and policy 
implications for banking regulation in regional China. The regressions‘ coefficients 
along with assumptions on macro-economic variables and asset prices are able to be 
used in a macro-stress testing to assess the stability of banking sector based on some 
indicative threshold. Moreover, our study highlights the central role of NPL. As that 
NPLR is still a permanent feature of banks‘ balance sheets, policies makers should 
pay attention to prevent excessive risk-taking during upturns. It also suggests that a 
stronger focus on macro-prudential regulation, particularly through capital and 
liquidity buffers, and countercyclical provisioning, could help mitigate the impact of 
macro-economic risks on the banking system. From a policy perspective, the EWS is 
substantial valuable to anticipate banking distress for supervisors if it is employed 
carefully and sensibly. Developing a reliable EWS, which is able to obtain clearer 
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signals to inform regulators to take action to prevent financial turmoil, could be one of 
the major targets for policy makers.  
However, this analysis is subject to some drawbacks. First, the NPLR is a general 
measure of loan quality. Accordingly, the flow of debt classified as non-performing 
loan for the first time would be more informative. Second, the importance of banks in 
the overall credit allocated to the private sector differs across regions because of the 
involvement of non-bank financial institutions. Thus, it is difficult to assess the 
macro-financial stability only with NPL from the balance sheets of banks.  
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6. CHAPTER 6                                                                   
111111Conclusion 
 
This chapter is divided into 3 sections. The first section provides a brief summary of 
this study. The second section discusses the limitations of this research. The last 
section provides some directions for further research focusing on the subject matter 
for reducing the effect of the limitations. 
 
6.1. Summary 
The major purpose of risk management is to identify and control the potential risk in a 
logical and systematic way. Appling the appropriate credit risk management strategy 
would definitely offer the banking sector greater capacity to minimise losses when it 
confronts risks. Hence, the impact of risk management for the banking system could 
be significantly improved by the ability of those concerned to measure credit risk. In 
this way, both banks and the supervisors can construct the optimal plan to manage and 
monitor the credit risk in a portfolio with the help of the forecasted credit loss 
distribution: for example, actions on the loan loss reserves or selling loans to reduce 
risk. 
Although there was a range of traditional credit risk method, the arrival on the 
scene of the Basel Accord I, II and III have made impressive progress in this field, 
including the detailed instruction of risk assessment for financial institutions, the 8% 
capital requirement of the total of operational capital, and - most important – the three 
pillars framework. The capital requirement is emphasised in the first pillar. The 
second pillar illustrates the supervisory review process with tool sets for risk 
measurement. The third pillar focuses on market discipline, which means that 
information disclosure is accessible for both the market and the stakeholders. 
Generally, the widespread implementation of the Basel Accord is beneficial for 
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banking systems to assess their risk exposure following a much clearer and easier 
process. With the clear identification of risk exposure, it is possible to achieve an 
effective risk management practice with lower cost, wider coverage of risks, and ex 
ante risk management action. Furthermore, the monetary policy maker and supervisor 
authority might be availed of a range of tools like stress-testing and the early warning 
system, with which to monitor the healthy financial environment of growth. Therefore, 
to reduce the vulnerability of a financial system, it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of characteristic of risk factors of the system and apply these methods 
which are discussed throughout this thesis. 
This thesis studied financial stability in China (specially, in the Chinese banking 
system). Considering NPL as a factor that increases financial pressures on the macro 
economy and hence financial instability that the monetary authority or central bank 
should be aware of, Chapter 2 has provided a literature review of financial stability, 
risk management for the banking sector, and China‘s banking system in general. The 
philosophy and methodology issues of this thesis were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 has developed a framework for macro stress-testing of credit risk for the 
banking system in China. This framework was used to measure the financial stability 
of the banking system in response to shocks in different macro-economic variables. 
We utilised VAR models and analysed eight macroeconomic variables, with the 
macroeconomic credit risk models successfully explaining the impact of severe 
macro-economic shocks on the balance sheet of banks. Macro stress-testing was used 
to assess the financial stability of the banking system. We combined the historical 
method and the hypothetical method to produce three stress scenarios with various 
artificial shocks including GDP growth shocks, interest rate shocks, and exchange rate 
shocks. Thereafter, the distribution of possible NPLRs, derived from the Monte Carlo 
method, was simulated, and the value-at-risk for credit risk was calculated.  
Chapter 5 uses the panel data from 2002 to 2011 for 31 regions in China to 
identify the determinants of NPLs in regional China‘s banking sector and examines a 
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set of leading indicators of banking instability. Furthermore, we develop an EWS 
model to estimate the probability of an occurrence of banking distress throughout 
different regions. 
Chapter 4 indicated two key points: first, there are some significant relationships 
between the default rates and macroeconomic factors, such as GDP growth, the 
unemployment rate, the interest rate, and the exchange rate, which are focal concerns 
for macro stress-testing perspectives; and second, the banking system in China would 
be healthy in the case of interest rate shocks, but in the case of GDP growth and 
exchange rate shocks the NPLR of banks would climb beyond the limit of 2%. 
Although from a macro prudential perspective China emerged unscathed from the 
GFC, the Central Bank of China should learn the lessons of risk management from 
Western countries and encourage commercial banks to carry out both micro stress-
testing and macro stress-testing under the framework of the FSAP. In the case of the 
policymakers, they should pay more attention to the stress testing results during the 
decision-making process, particularly when formulating growth and exchange rate 
policies. The monetary authority should maintain a reasonable and abundant level of 
liquidity in the banking system and encourage the financial institutions to enhance 
credit support to the weak links in the real economy, while keep improve the risk-
resistance capacity of banking system. Furthermore, the ongoing foreign exchange 
rate system reform is something that needs to be considered carefully so that China 
can avoid severe exchange rate shocks, which our study suggests would be extremely 
costly.  
The empirical findings of Chapter 5 support the view that macroeconomic 
performance determines the level of non-performing loans. In particular, we found 
strong evidence of a significant relationship between inflation, real-estate price, fixed 
asset investment and nonperforming loans. The study also showed that change in 
export and foreign direct investments have an effect on NPLs of banks. This implies 
that regulators and central banks in China have to be wary about increasing NPLs 
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during periods of low growth and tight financing. The EWS model suggests that 
slowing economic growth, declining CPI, and an increase in unemployment would 
lead to deterioration in the asset quality of banks. In addition, the asset price, which is 
generally pushed up by strong credit expansion, is a useful leading indicator of 
banking distress. These results have both practical applicability and policy 
implications for banking regulation in regional China. The regressions‘ coefficients 
along with assumptions on macroeconomic variables and asset prices are able to be 
used in macro-stress testing to assess the stability of the banking sector based on some 
indicative threshold. Moreover, our study highlights the central role of NPL. Because 
NPLR is still a permanent feature of banks‘ balance sheets, policymakers should 
remain alert to prevent excessive risk-taking during upturns. The thesis also suggests 
that a stronger focus on macro-prudential regulation, particularly through capital and 
liquidity buffers, and countercyclical provisioning, could help mitigate the impact of 
macroeconomic risks on the banking system. From a policy perspective, it should 
strengthen the monitoring and prevention of systemic and regional financial distress in 
a concrete manner. Since that EWS has substantial value in helping supervisors to 
anticipate banking distress if it is employed carefully and sensibly, developing a 
reliable EWS, which is able to obtain clearer signals to inform regulators to take 
action to prevent financial turmoil, could be one of the major targets for policy makers.  
 
6.2. Limitations of the Research 
It is needed to be noticed that this thesis may have some limitations in the method of 
analysing financial stability and in the process of applying stress-testing. These 
limitations are addressed below. 
The contagion effect within the banking system: In usual circumstances, the central 
bank uses aggregate data to test the change of credit risk of regional banking system in 
the assumption that is takes place from the top to bottom. Nevertheless, when we use 
aggregate data to treat the credit risk of the entire banking system as a risk factor, it is 
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equal to carrying out the micro stress-testing with the aggregate data, ignoring the 
structural problems within the financial system. In the case of severe adverse shocks, 
individual banks may become insolvent at the initial stage and the effect of the shocks 
would extend throughout the whole banking system, and even the financial system, 
due to the contagion effect. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasise the internal 
interaction problems within the financial system when implements macro stress-
testing in future work. This issue has not been taken into account in this thesis, 
because that analysis of the banking system at the aggregate level would be more 
useful for the monetary authorities. 
Normal distribution assumption within the stochastic simulation technique: In the 
stress-testing approach, it usually sets a random variable from a presumed statistical 
distribution to represent the error terms. For this study, the distribution of non-
performing loan rates is represented by the random variable based on the 
macroeconomic credit risk model. It is commonplace to assume that error terms 
follow normal distribution in the economic and financial studies. However, the 
probability of extreme values, which is characterised by fat tails, could not perfectly 
be forecasted by normal distribution. Therefore, in future work, we could try other 
alternative distribution to generate the random variable and simulate the distributions 
of independent variables. Thus, it would be possible to capture the extreme values in 
stress scenarios.  
 
6.3. Future Research 
Overall, for future studies, it would be useful to apply different methods of financial 
stability and compare the validity of these methods. With the development of 
definitions of ‗financial stability‘, it would be possible to construct a more 
comprehensive index which covers different measures of financial stability and a 
more thoughtful indicator system that involves macroeconomic performance, financial 
system performance, and financial market structure, among others. Moreover, due to 
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the fact that the validity of both stress-testing and EWS is highly dependent on the 
quality and quantity of input data, a future study would be improved by employing a 
larger sample size and high-frequency input data.  In the context of Chapter 4, the 
contagion effect would be a further extension topic to examine inter-bank mechanisms, 
which facilitate the spread of the shocks throughout the system and hence weaken the 
stability of the financial system. Furthermore, one can include some horizontal stress-
testing analyses of developing countries, particularly for East Asian countries, to 
achieve a global or regional perspective to assess the financial stability condition. The 
work in Chapter 5 could be further extended by introducing different approaches for 
the EWS, such as the neural networks approach which can model the relationship 
between a set of inputs and a set of outputs, under the assumption that the relationship 
is nonlinear, an approach that differs from classical risk management methods. 
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A. APPENDIX A 
The following table describes the abbreviations used throughout the thesis. 
Table A.1: Abbreviation List 
Abbreviations and Definition of Terms 
ABC Agricultural Bank of China 
ADBC Agricultural Development Bank of China 
AMC Asset Management Companies 
BOC Bank of China 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio 
CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CCB China Construction Bank 
CPI Consumer price index 
CSFP Credit Suisse Financial Products 
CSRC China Securities Regulation Commission 
EDF Expected Default Frequencies 
EIBC Export-Import Bank of China 
G-SIFI Global Systemically Important Financial Institution 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IRB Internal Ratings Based 
LGD Loss Given Default--The fraction of credit exposure that will not be recovered 
in the event of default on a specified obligation. 
EU European Union  
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program 
G-10 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (and sometimes Switzerland is 
involved) 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GFC Global financial crisis in 2008 
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Abbreviations and Definition of Terms 
GMM Generalized Method of Moments 
ICBC Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JCB Joint-Equity Commercial Bank 
M2 A measure of broad money supply 
NBS National Bureau of Statistics of China 
NPLs  Non-Performing Loans 
NPLR Non-Performing Loan Ratio  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PBC  People's Bank of China 
OTC Over the Counter 
PD Probability of Default 
RPI Retail Price Index 
SDBC State Development Bank of China 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
SOCB State-Owned Commercial Bank 
US United States of America 
VaR Value at Risk 
VAR Vector autoregression 
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APPENDIX B Appendix for Chapter 2 
Table B.1: Milestones in the History of Risk Management 
Time Events 
1730 First futures contracts on the price of rice in Japan 
1864 First futures contracts on agricultural products at the Chicago Board of Trade 
1900 Louis Bachelier‘s thesis ―Theorie de la Speculation‖; Brownian motion 
1932 First issue of the Journal of Risk and Insurance 
1946 First issue of the Journal of Finance 
1952 Publication of Markowits‘s article ―Portfolio Selection‖ 
1961-1966 Treynor, Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin develop the CAPM 
1963 Arrow introduces optimal insurance, moral hazard, and adverse selection 
1972 Futures contracts on currencies at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
1973 Option valuation formulas by Black and Scholes and Merton 
1974 Merton‘s default risk model 
1977 Interest rate models by Vasicek and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) 
1980-1990 Exotic options, swaptions and stock derivatives 
1979-1982 First OTC contracts in the form of swaps: currency and interest rate swaps 
1985 Creation of the Swap Dealers Association, which established the OTC 
exchange standards 
1987 First risk management department in a bank (Merrill Lynch)  
1988 Basel I  
Late 1980s Value at risk (VaR) and calculation of optimal capital  
1992 Article by Heath, Jarrow and Morton on the forward rate curve 
1992 Integrated Risk Management 
1992 RiskMetrics 
1994-1995 First bankruptcies associated with misuse (or speculation) of derivatives: 
Procter  
and Gamble (manufacturer, rates derivatives, 1994), Orange County 
(management  
funds, derivatives on financial securities, 1994) and Barings (futures, 1995) 
1997 CreditMetrics 
1997-1998 Asian and Russian crisis and LTCM collapse 
2001 Enron bankruptcy 
2002 New governance rules by Sarbanes-Oxley and NYSE  
2004 Basel II  
2007 Beginning of the financial crisis  
2009 Solvency II (not yet implemented in April 2013)  
2010 Basel III 
Source: Dionne (2013). Risk Management: History, Definition, and Critique 
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APPENDIX C Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
The motivation of building VAR model is that the default rate can be used for 
forecasting and impulse response analysis. To achieve this goal, the selection of the 
lag length of the VAR is a critical step. To determine the optimal lag length for the 
VAR model, we launched the Likelihood Ration Test, Residual Normality Test, and 
Residual Serial Correlation LM Test. 
Table C.1: Lag Length Criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -458.59 NA   0.005  20.33  20.69  20.46 
1 -189.38  421.38  1.62e-06  12.15  15.72  13.49 
2 -105.09  98.94  2.12e-06  12.00  18.80  14.55 
3  36.86  111.10  5.46e-07  9.35  19.37  13.11 
4  580.04   212.55*   4.35e-14*  -10.74*   2.49*  -5.78* 
* Indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
To ensure the validity of ours VAR model, we should make sure the stationary of the VAR 
model which might directly affect the results of impulse response. Besides the unit root 
tests, we also report the inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial in Figure C.1, 
which indicate the VAR is stable since almost all the roots are less than one and keep 
inside the unit circle. 
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Figure C.1: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2: Impulse Response Results 
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The idea of Granger causality test was raised by Granger (1969, 1980), which is 
designed to detect causal direction between two time-series variables X and Y. More 
precisely, a time-series variable X Granger causes another time-series variable Y, if 
present value of Y can be better predicted by using past value of both X and Y than it 
can by using the past value of Y alone. Later, Sim (1980) introduce the Granger 
causality test into the VAR model. 
Results of Granger causality tests are presented in Table C.2. The results show 
that the default rate is Granger caused by a series of macro-economic variables, 
including GDP, fixed investment, money supply, and interest rate. These findings 
indicate that the downturn of the macro economy and credit crunch would lead to the 
increase of default rate, and thus the deterioration of quality of banks‘ asset. 
Meanwhile, there is also a unidirectional Granger causality running from the default 
rate to real-estate price, which means that the distress of banking system would have a 
feedback impact on the real-estate market. 
Table C.1: Tests of Granger-Causality 
Dependent 
Variable 
Chi-sq 
𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
𝐲𝐭  10.21** 6.27 7.33 7.02 16.39*** 8.62* 9.10* 6.92 
DGDP 4.21  2.85 6.53 0.15 1.93 2.95 3.97 1.60 
RPI 4.95 5.95  1.13 1.05 5.66 8.44* 2.15 1.57 
DUNE 7.31 4.19 8.34*  11.49** 7.73 2.67 7.67 1.07 
HPI 9.10* 15.21*** 5.97 16.19***  7.13 6.44 4.24 5.34 
DFIX 0.49 4.73 6.29 1.67 2.82  1.52 1.82 5.24 
M2 3.83 2.87 1.61 0.89 0.52 4.76  2.59 1.90 
DINT 4.93 6.66 3.22 5.08 0.21 12.42** 5.55  1.53 
DEX 1.48 3.08 3.19 0.82 2.85 4.33 2.02 1.54  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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APPENDIX D Appendix for Chapter 5 
 
Table D.1: Division of China's Regions 
Administrative District Administrative District (in Chinese) Region Division 
Beijing 北京 east region 
Tianjin 天津 east region 
Hebei 河北 east region 
Shanghai 上海 east region 
Jiangsu 江苏 east region 
Zhejiang 浙江 east region 
Fujian 福建 east region 
Shandong 山东 east region 
Guangdong 广东 east region 
Hainan 海南 east region 
Shanxi 山西 central region 
Anhui 安徽 central region 
Jiangxi 江西 central region 
Henan 河南 central region 
Hubei 湖北 central region 
Hunan 湖南 central region 
Chongqing 重庆 west region 
Sichuan 四川 west region 
Guizhou 贵州 west region 
Yunnan 云南 west region 
Tibet 西藏 west region 
Shannxi 陕西 west region 
Gansu 甘肃 west region 
Qinghai 青海 west region 
Ningxia 宁夏 west region 
Xinjiang 新疆 west region 
Guangxi 广西 west region 
Innermongolia 内蒙古 west region 
Heilongjiang 黑龙江 north-east region 
Jilin 吉林 north-east region 
Liaoning 辽宁 north-east region 
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Figure D.1: China Regional NPRL in 2011 
 
 
 
 
